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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: A Century of  
Aerial Warfare
For many centuries humanity had dreamt of flight, of the  wonders 
of a speedy and expansive mobility above land and sea. This feat 
was finally accomplished during the early years of the  twentieth 
century, when the Wright brothers and Louis Bleriot took to 
the air in powered flight. But celebration was soon tarnished 
by the onset of aerial warfare and its frightening implications. 
Two bombing events initiated the era of modern air warfare. Both 
occurred during the Ottoman Wars and before the beginning of 
the First World War of 1914–18. One was the bombing of Libya 
by the Italians in 1911; the other was the Bulgarian bombing of 
Turkey in 1912.
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The first air raid of the twentieth century was loosely directed at 
a rural target. In early November 1911, the Italian pilot  Lieutenant 
Giulio Gavotti flew his German-made biplane over the Ain 
Zara oasis in Libya, dropping four ‘grenade-style bombs’ onto 
the desert floor below. Although it was a modest event, killing 
nobody, this was the beginning of the history of aerial warfare.1 
Italy was engaged in a war against the Ottoman Turkish Empire 
in North Africa in order to build a little empire of its own to 
challenge those of other European countries. The following year 
the Balkan League countries, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and 
Serbia, rose up against the Turkish Empire in the Balkan War of 
1912–13. During this conflict, the Bulgarians perfected the first 
fit-for-purpose bomb and deployed it on a civilian building:
The modern aerial bomb, with its distinctive  elongated 
shape, stabilising fins and nose-fitted detonator, is 
a  Bulgarian invention. [A] Bulgarian army  captain, 
 Simeon Petrov, adapted and enlarged a number of  
grenades for use from an aeroplane. They were dropped 
on a Turkish railway station on 16 October 912 from an 
Albatross F.2 biplane piloted by Radal Milkov.2
The Balkan War witnessed the first bombing runs on enemy 
 targets, the earliest shooting down of an aeroplane, and the first 
 air-naval operation in military history, all part of an early,  emergent 
synthesis of air power with ground and sea forces. In the German 
strategic bombing campaign during the First World War of 1914-
18, Western European countries were bombed from zeppelin air 
ships, and from biplanes. Military leaders consciously planned for 
strategic bombing campaigns against military targets, targets that 
in a rapidly urbanising continent were often situated near to towns 
and cities.
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Bombing was a new and terrible feature of the emergence of 
‘total war’. During the First World War combatant countries 
 witnessed the militarisation of everyday life. Those who did not 
don a military uniform and go to fight on the front instead served 
on the ‘Home Front’. Civilians were now essential to the  winning 
of wars, producing food, industrial goods and munitions, and 
 serving in variety of voluntary civil defence, emergency and 
 medical services to minimise the impact of air raids. It is also 
noteworthy that the St Paul’s Watch was formed in 1915, by a 
team of employees of the cathedral, and volunteers, to ensure the 
iconic place of worship was not damaged by fire, thus handing a 
propaganda coup to the enemy.3
Following the industrialised carnage in the trenches and 
 battlefields of the First World War, the leaders of Britain, France 
and the USA met at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The 
Treaty of Versailles established the League of Nations in order 
to promote international cooperation to prevent war. The Treaty 
also severely circumscribed the German military, forbidding 
both an air force and aviation activities from its much-diminished 
Navy.4 This ‘air disarmament’ confirmed that air power was 
now a threat to everyone involved in national and international 
hostilities, leading to a new culture of planning for air raids on 
civilians.5 As chapter two demonstrates, the leading industrial 
nations, particularly in the context of growing international 
tensions in Europe, improved their air forces for aerial warfare, 
while promoting a civil defence apparatus to minimise death 
and destruction, and to maintain, as far as possible,  civilian 
morale. In the face of the emerging terror of air wars between 
1918 and 1939, millions of people became not only air-minded, 
but threat-minded. As  chapter two also argues, the later 1930s 
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witnessed a number of terrible air raids on civilians which 
 literally brought air war into the home. And from September 
1939, the world was pitched into a prolonged global conflict in 
which air power played a crucial, tragic and yet nuanced role 
in  shaping both civilian experiences in total wars, and in the 
 outcome of the war itself.
Chapters three, four and five cover the first and most sustained 
global interface between civilian populations and the  technology 
of aerial warfare during the twentieth century. This was the 
 Second World War. Britain is given particular focus in chapter 
three for the simple reason that it sustained the longest air raid of 
any European city during the twentieth century, on London from 
1940–41. The Blitz has been much debated by historians. How 
civilians behaved during the Blitz, their collective morale, and the 
performance of civil defence and emergency services, have been 
the subject of many controversial and conflicting interpretations. 
Moreover, contemporary government and media propaganda 
about heroic tales of civilian endurance and the ultimate triumph 
over mass bombing, gave rise to a national story of wartime unity 
and the ‘Blitz spirit’ that was invoked by the Labour Party in the 
general election campaign of 1945.
Populations in other countries suffered to a far greater extent 
than the British, however. The Allied strategic bombing  campaign 
against German cities from 1942–5 was initially viewed, from the 
perspective of the victorious allies at least, as Germany reaping 
what it sowed. But recent decades have seen a profound  questioning 
of the morality or otherwise of the bombing of Germany. And 
 countries across continental Europe all suffered air raids that, with 
the benefit of hindsight, have been criticised as causing unnecessary 
suffering to innocent children, women and men. Many of those air 
raids were conducted by the German Luftwaffe, some with  support 
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from the Regia Aeronautica, the Royal Italian Air Force. Many 
others were initiated by the Allies, including the Soviet Union, to 
liberate Europe from fascism. The impact of air raids on civilians 
across continental Europe is explored in chapter four.
In tandem with Germany and Italy, Japan was the third Axis 
Power pitched against the Allies. Its decision to attack Pearl 
 Harbor in December 1941 created a powerful nemesis,  triggering 
American entry into the war. Japan would be subjected to heavy 
conventional bombing by the Allies from late 1944, but the most 
lethally destructive bombing events of the twentieth  century 
were visited by the Americans upon Japan in August 1945. 
Victory over Europe or ‘VE Day’ had been declared by the Allies 
on Sunday 8 May 1945, but for months afterwards the Japanese 
continued to fight their American enemies. The decision by 
US President Harry S. Truman and his military and scientific 
advisors to drop the atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki was a momentous one in the history not only of warfare, 
but for human affairs since. Chapter five assesses the scale of the 
bombing of Japan, the reasons for unleashing the atomic bomb, 
its terrible impact on the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
and the debates over the legitimacy of a nuclear catastrophe that 
brought the flailing but defiant Japanese war to an abrupt end.
Once the war was over, previous conflict areas lay in ruins, 
devastated by bombing and fire. Millions of people had seen their 
homes damaged or completely destroyed, while commercial and 
industrial premises, and road, rail and communications networks 
were in urgent need of replacement or repair. Pressure to rebuild 
towns and cities across the world initiated the era of reconstruc-
tion, which lasted from 1945 to the later 1950s. Focusing upon 
Britain, Germany and Japan, chapter six draws upon some highly 
original and mostly recent scholarship in social, urban and town 
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planning history – as the reconstruction of the built environment 
was accompanied by propagandist and politicised narratives of 
national renewal. The war had generated strong myths of national 
unity across internal class, regional and sectional divides, which 
were now mobilised by post-war governments to promote a vision 
of social renewal within the physical reconstruction of the nation. 
Physical reconstruction, however, was often bedevilled by practi-
cal problems and political constraints. Many bold visions for the 
future were curtailed.
Peace since 1945 proved fragile, and was often disrupted by 
conflict. The Cold War between the capitalist West and Soviet 
and Chinese Communism became embroiled with uprisings 
across former colonial territories of South East Asia. Significant 
 nationalist movements ignited by the Second World War led to 
further conflict in Korea and Vietnam. Initially these conflicts 
were challenges to the legacy of imperialism. The United Nations 
(UN) and communist forces confronted each other in the Korean 
War of 1950–3. And the United States led the fight against 
communism in the Vietnam War from 1954–75. Each of these 
bloody conflicts witnessed strategic bombing campaigns which 
both drew upon, and ignored, lessons learned by air forces dur-
ing the previous world war. As chapter seven argues, the Korean 
and Vietnamese wars brought extensive misery and suffering to 
civilian populations. Heavy and sustained bombing also wrought 
profound historical consequences, not simply for those enduring 
the conflict, but for the history of those countries following the 
ceasefire. The image and reputation of the United States, further-
more, as the major combatant on behalf of NATO and the UN, 
was severely damaged. Critics have attacked American bombing 
policy from the Korean War of 1950–3 to the present century as 
essentially a demonstration of ruthless imperialism.
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The civilian experience of bombing within the post-war  context 
of commemoration is discussed in chapter eight.  Warfare has 
long led to commemoration and memorialisation. For  centuries, 
combatants in military uniform were celebrated in friezes, 
 illustrations, marble or stone memorials, stories, carvings and 
tombs, culminating in the plethora of memorials erected to the 
war dead of the First World War in cities, towns and villages 
across Britain and Europe. Total war, however, involved entire 
societies mobilising against the military apparatus of other 
societies. Contemporaneously with the heroic victories or deaths 
of uniformed combatants, hundreds of thousands of civilians 
were slaughtered, injured, made homeless and even stateless by 
the onslaught of mass bombing. How were they to be remem-
bered? Bombed-out cities became sites of memory – lieux de 
memoire – while memorials were erected to the dead of the air 
raids in the Second World War. Memorials are both sites and car-
riers of memory, and sources of information about the war. So too 
are photography, film, literature, autobiographies, memoirs and 
oral testimony. They evoke the atmosphere of wartime air raids, 
and images and memories of air warfare on civilians and cities, 
promoting bombed towns and cities as lieux de memoire.
Chapter nine covers the sources and resources available to 
 students and anyone interested in the history of air raids on cities 
and civilians.
Key Themes and Questions
One hundred years after it was first bombed, Libya was again 
under attack from the air. Beginning in March 2011, a NATO 
coalition force involving Britain, France and the United States 
bombed Libyan cities in order to depose the brutal  dictatorship 
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of  Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The Italians joined in soon 
afterwards. In the short term, at least, the attack on Libya was 
 successful. Gaddafi was brutally killed on 20 October, and for a 
brief period  optimism reigned as democratic forces and a diverse 
range of young Libyans looked forward to a more  affluent and 
democratic future.
During the years since the 2011 bombing campaign, how-
ever, Libya imploded. Many comparisons were made with Iraq, 
bombed into regime change in 2003 by the USA with assistance 
from Britain. Initial successes in aerial bombardment were unrav-
elled by the vicious civil war that unfolded in the former dicta-
torship. This explains the hesitancy in 2015-16, among nervous 
NATO member countries, about military involvement in Syria, 
a country wracked with internal conflict under the regime of 
Bashar al-Assad. Then the Russians began bombing Syrian cities 
in 2015 in defence of Assad. With the exception of surgical strikes 
and drone attacks by the USA, NATO members were reluctant to 
throw air power at the problem until France, reeling from mass 
murder in Paris by Islamic State (ISIS) militants on 13 November 
2015, declared war on ISIS and began bombing ISIS strongholds 
in Syria.6 The British government and some of Her Majesty’s 
Opposition, fearful lest they be seen to franchising their defence 
against Islamic extremism to France, began bombing soon after-
wards.7 Those opposed to the bombing, notably the socialist Stop 
the War Coalition (STWC), argued that history proved that aerial 
bombardment was misguided and morally repugnant because it 
killed innocent civilians and was militarily unsuccessful.8
They were only partly right about that. As this book argues, 
any blanket denunciation of bombing campaigns as essentially 
immoral and militarily unsuccessful ignores historical realities. 
While many air raids were indeed notoriously brutal and led to 
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unnecessary civilian casualties, other air campaigns did assist 
in defeating dictatorships. So for example, while the air raids on 
London and other major British cities during the Second World 
War ultimately failed to defeat the British, the atomic bombing 
by the USA of Japan in August 1945 may be judged to have has-
tened the end of the war in the Pacific. In other cases the histori-
cal judgment is less clear cut. Allied air raids on German cities by 
the British and the Americans from 1942 have increasingly been 
criticised for causing unnecessary casualties. Many millions of 
words have also been written to prove that American bombing 
campaigns from the Korean War of 1950–3, through the Viet-
nam War to the recent air strikes in countries in the Middle East, 
have largely been unsuccessful, and even downright immoral. Yet 
some critics of American air power remained relatively silent on 
the bombing of Syria by Russian forces from 2015–17, or about 
recent Russian expansionism in the Ukraine.
e Blitz Companion assesses the causes and nature of aerial 
warfare during the last century and the early decades of the pre-
sent one. Its major theme, however, is the targeting of civilians, 
and the consequences of air raids upon urban populations. The 
British experience of air raids forms a significant chunk of the 
book. When understood comparatively, however, Britain suf-
fered less from air raids than other countries. But it was  Britain 
that hosted the paradigmatic Blitz of the twentieth century, 
from 1940–1. Across Europe during the Second World War, 
capital cities and major provincial urban areas were attacked, 
and  Germany sustained many more casualties and signifi-
cantly greater levels of environmental destruction. In Japan, the 
conventional and atomic bombing of its main cities eclipsed 
the magnitude of death and damage in many European urban 
centres. Hence much of the Blitz Companion focuses on air raids 
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and their aftermath in Britain, Germany and Japan, drawing 
wider comparative conclusions.
The Second World War was the catalyst for the Cold War 
between Western capitalism and the Communist eastern bloc. 
During the post-war era, the American bombing of Korea and 
Vietnam caused widespread death and devastation, within 
national and historical contexts that were quite different to the 
popular  experience of aerial bombing during the Second World 
War. And the end of the Cold War in no way brought about the 
much-heralded ‘end of history’. During the 1990s and into the 
present century, civilians have also been killed and injured in 
small wars, during the Balkan Civil Wars, in Afghanistan, and 
in the Middle East, notably Iraq, Libya and Syria. These conflicts 
were on a smaller scale than the Second World War, but they 
were a reminder of the cruel lesson learnt in earlier total wars: air 
power was here to stay, and civilians were going to die.
The bombing of these countries, and of the other  civilian 
 populations discussed in this book, leads to some hugely 
 important questions that apply to all air raids on all societies, no 
matter where or when in time. Among the most important are 
the following:
• In what ways did sorties over urban centres in previous 
decades provide dress rehearsals or practical lessons for 
later air campaigns?
• How did those military and political authorities plan-
ning air raids anticipate the effects on civilians of the 
bombing?
• How did civilians react during air raids? What prepara-
tions were made by governments and local authorities to 
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minimise the impact and consequences of aerial bom-
bardment, and how effective were they?
• Did bombing campaigns, large and small, achieve their 
intentions to degrade or defeat the civilian population?
• How resilient were cities and their residents during air 
raids and in the aftermath of destruction?
• How have societies come to terms with the death and 
destruction caused by the bombing of men, women and 
children?
The focus on civilians and aerial warfare is deliberately chosen for 
its emotive and moral dimensions. In the aftermath of the First 
World War military strategists and politicians soon understood 
that with the onset of air power civilians were no longer marginal 
to the process of conflict, but now bound up with it. And in spite 
of the Hague and United Nations conventions on military con-
duct to restrict civilian casualties, the spatial containment of war 
from the air to specific theatres of combat was increasingly irrel-
evant. During the interwar years, in the long shadow of the First 
World War that had cost so many young lives, pacifist organisa-
tions were formed to call for an end to war, and for negotiation 
henceforth to become the only path to avoiding war, or for peace 
and reconciliation. They were the forerunners of the anti-war 
and anti-bomb campaigning organisations of the post-war years. 
During the 1950s this was manifested in the formation of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain, and in the 
rise of peace activism during the Vietnam War. And as conflict in 
the Middle East raged following the attack on the Twin Towers in 
September 2001, the aforementioned Stop the War Coalition was 
formed. Unfortunately, many of the leading personnel of these 
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global peace movements shared political beliefs that distorted a 
more balanced appraisal of air warfare. Another intention of e 
Blitz Companion, therefore, is to critically engage with the current 
range of anti-war pacifist websites, and with critics of air power 





In his poem Locksley Hall, written during the 1830s, the decade 
that Queen Victoria came to the throne, Alfred Lord Tennyson 
imagined the apocalyptic and sublime power of mass human flight. 
His ‘Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be’ con-
jured up a spectral images of the heavens filled with commercial 
vessels, ‘argosies of magic sails’, and of celestial conflict between 
’the nation’s airy navies’.9 The poet was writing during the second 
phase of the Industrial Revolution in Britain. The railway network 
was beginning to burgeon across the land, speeding up travel time 
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and bringing once isolated cities and regions into the national 
infrastructure. Tennyson lived from 1809 to 1892, a lifespan that 
encompassed the American Civil War of 1860–5 and the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870–1. The Civil War involved not only armies 
and navies of the Union and the Confederacy but the societies of 
the Northern and Southern states of the USA. Arguably the first 
modern, industrialised total war in which civilians were mobilised 
or dragged into conflict, the Civil War also saw the military use 
of manned air balloons to spy from above on enemy positions.10 
During the Siege of Paris in 1871, air balloons were deployed by 
the French for communications and propaganda purposes.11 These 
conflicts marked the tentative beginnings of airborne vessels in 
modern warfare. Floating gracefully through the air, balloons were 
used as tools for disseminating propaganda, unwittingly anticipat-
ing the leaflet drops during twentieth-century wars.
Article 25 of The Hague Convention in 1899 on the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land stated unequivocally that ‘The attack or 
bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which 
are not defended, is prohibited.’ Article 27 was also explicit about 
the limitations of offensive military assaults:
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should 
be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to 
religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places 
where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they 
are not used at the same time for military purposes.
Articles 22 to 28 of the Hague Convention of 1907 made similar 
strictures about public buildings, arguing that the rights of bel-
ligerents to attack the enemy were not unlimited, and prohibiting 
the bombardment of undefended cities, towns and villages. (The 
articles are widely available online).
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These conventions were drawn up on the eve of aerial warfare 
during the twentieth century. Civilians had long been casualties 
of war, or course, as captives, victims of killing, execution and 
rape, or seen as figures in landscapes torn apart by conventional 
warfare. Now however they would become directly targeted from 
the air. During the twentieth century the Hague Conventions 
were subsequently updated to address the laws and customs of 
war from the air, and the United Nations Conventions or ‘Geneva 
Conventions’ after the Second World War also addressed the 
problem of minimising civilian casualties. But mass aerial bom-
bardment rendered these stipulations somewhat meaningless: 
fine words on paper, but easily ignored or negotiated around by 
belligerent powers seeking to destroy the enemy from the skies.
Fear of the Bomb
Anxiety about the potential of bombing from the air emerged 
even before mechanised flight was invented, as Locksley Hall 
illustrates. Writers alive to the wonderful opportunities offered by 
speedier air travel also grasped that air power possessed a hith-
erto unknown destructive potential. The British science fiction 
writer H.G. Wells is best known for War of the Worlds (1911), an 
apocalyptic novel about interplanetary aerial conflict which has 
been made into a number of films. But before hostile aerial bom-
bardment had even happened, Wells wrote War in the Air (1908). 
Portraying mass catastrophe caused by air raids in an industri-
alised world war, one scene from the novel looked down from a 
dirigible, an airship, during an air raid on New York:
He clung to the frame of the porthole as the airship tossed 
and swayed, and stared down through the light rain that 
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now drove before the wind, into the twilight streets, 
watching people running out of the houses, watching 
buildings collapse and fires begin. As the airships sailed 
along they smashed up the city as a child will shatter its 
cities of brick and card. Below, they left ruins and blaz-
ing conflagrations and heaped and scattered dead; men, 
women, and children mixed together as though they had 
been no more than Moors, or Zulus, or Chinese. Lower 
New York was soon a furnace of crimson flames, from 
which there was no escape. Cars, railways, ferries, all had 
ceased, and never a light lit the way of the distracted fugi-
tives in that dusky confusion but the light of burning. He 
had glimpses of what it must mean to be down there–
glimpses. And it came to him suddenly as an incredible 
discovery, that such disasters were not only possible now 
in this strange, gigantic, foreign New York, but also in 
London–in Bun Hill! that the little island in the silver 
seas was at the end of its immunity, that nowhere in the 
world any more was there a place left where a Smallways 
might lift his head proudly and vote for war and a spirited 
foreign policy, and go secure from such horrible things.12
War was no longer somewhere else or far away. Emphasising that 
modern war, total war, would be ‘everywhere’, all-encompassing, 
unavoidable, almost morally and practically unable to differenti-
ate between belligerents and the ‘quiet people’, Wells waxed upon 
feminine vulnerability to force home his point:
There is no place where a woman and her daughter can 
hide and be at peace. The war comes through the air, 
bombs drop in the night. Quiet people go out in the 
morning, and see air fleets passing overhead – dripping 
death – dripping death!13
During the First World War of 1914–18, however, the spectre 
of large grey airships dropping death from the city skies and of 
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biplanes coming in to drop bombs on familiar areas of the city, 
lent war this fearful new dimension, revealing the realities of mass 
aerial warfare on civilians for the first time.
The First World War and the New Realities of 
Air Warfare
Those bespoke bombs dropped onto Libya in 1911 and the subse-
quent Bulgarian innovation were the flimsiest of historical dress 
rehearsals for what would occur during the rest of the century. 
The war from 1914–18, however, more fully defined the nature 
and implications of aerial warfare for civilians. The first bombs to 
be unleashed came from Germany on Belgium, France and Brit-
ain. Minor raids in 1914 were followed by the first so-called ‘stra-
tegic bombing campaigns’ by Germany from 1915. As Richard 
Overy argues, there is so singular or clear definition of strategic 
bombing. It was first used during the First World War to mean 
long-range bombing behind enemy lines. It can also mean bomb-
ing to assist ground forces, the precision targeting of military or 
industrial installations, or the more generalised carpet bombing 
of cities and towns in order to degrade infrastructure, destroy key 
targets and weaken the ability of a nation to wage war, irrespective 
of ground forces.14
During the First World War, German bombing missions over 
England were aimed at military installations, factories and muni-
tions works, and naval activities in ports. Hence Hull and Whitby 
in north-east England, and the smaller seaside towns of Great 
Yarmouth, King’s Lynn and Sheringham in Norfolk, were attacked 
for their mercantile connections, but also because they were on 
the East Coast, and easier for the zeppelins to reach. Birming-
ham was attacked, although the zeppelins failed to reach targets 
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further west. London was an obvious objective for the Germans, 
however. The air raids in the First World War drew an early pat-
tern of incursion and destruction that would be more widely rep-
licated in the Second World War. Among the first areas of London 
Figure 1: The Zeppelin Building, Farringdon, East-Central  London 
(photograph by author, 2017).
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to be hit were the docks along the banks of the River Thames in 
East London, and adjacent urban areas. Over the course of the 
First World War zeppelins raided or attempted raids on Deptford, 
Greenwich, Hackney, the Isle of Dogs, New Cross, Rotherhithe 
and Stepney. Towns in the hinterland of London, in the counties 
of Essex, Hertfordshire and Kent were also attacked.15
The air raids on London provided early clues to the behaviour 
and morale of urban populations under the bomb. As Philip Zie-
gler argues, when a nightly air raid on East London was immi-
nent, many East Londoners trekked to the relatively safer areas 
of West London. Many others took shelter in the London Under-
ground tube stations, huddling together on the platforms as the 
bombs fell above.16 Others experienced feelings of anxiety, and 
one ‘terrified housewife’ committed suicide. By contrast, children 
were openly thrilled by the spectre of airships coming across the 
sky. Anger and shock at the casualties and deaths caused by these 
unprecedented attacks on British cities rarely led to mass panic, 
moreover.17 As Susan Grayzel argues, such behaviour anticipated 
patterns of coping and of self-protection in later wars.18
Newspapers reported not only on the air raids but also specu-
lated on the potential changes to everyday life in the event of war 
from the air. Yet the subject, fearful in itself, also led to humor-
ous and satirical observations. The cartoonist W.K. Haselden, for 
example, drew an amusing but also insightful portrait of life ‘if 
air raids become a daily occurrence.’19 While the cartoon is not 
intended to be an accurate anticipation of the changed contexts 
of everyday life during air raids, the illustration uncannily hints 
at some innovations that would be introduced in time for the air 
raids of the Second World War. Instead of the narrow windows of 
the house, blackout and storm-proofed curtains were used. The 
motor car would see its headlamps dipped or turned off, while 
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the cartoon hints at armoured cars for military personnel operat-
ing in civilian areas. Protective headwear would indeed be worn 
by voluntary emergency workers and air raid wardens, and while 
armoured prams did not materialise, Mickey Mouse gas masks 
would be introduced for children, for example, alongside normal 
masks for adults.20
If popular culture made light of the implications of total war, 
highbrow writers made more serious observations. In the years 
following the First World War, intellectuals grappled with its 
Figure 2: ‘If air raids become daily occurrences’, W.K. Haselden 
cartoon, Daily Mirror, © Mirrorpix.
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 terrible legacy, encapsulated in the modern spectre of air power. 
The American-born poet T.S. Eliot had been deeply unsettled 
by the impact of the war. In e Waste Land, published in 1922, 
and written while he was living in London, a much-debated 
stanza entitled ‘What the Thunder Said’ begins with a  rhetorical 
 question ‘What is that sound high in the air’. The poem goes on 
to evoke a cracked ancient earth, and the ‘falling towers’ in such 
historic cities as Jerusalem, Athens, Alexandria, Vienna and 
London: ‘unreal’.21 Ancient European cities, bastions of civilisa-
tions, are now ‘cracked and reformed’ in a historically instantane-
ous moment delivered by modern technology.  Furthermore, the 
sound high in the air and the murmur of maternal lamentation 
might be viewed as the fear of a mother for her children as the 
bombers emerge over the far flung landscape, causing the people 
to flee.
e Waste Land was published almost four years after the Armi-
stice of 1918 and represents an inchoate grasp or fear of the power 
of airborne destruction. A fuller understanding of the impact 
of air raids, and of the need to prepare for them in the future, 
began during the First World War, and continued, albeit in fits 
and starts, during the 1920s and 1930s. In 1917 the London Air 
Defence Area (LADA) was established to improve the coordina-
tion of British fighter planes when defending the metropolis. And 
in 1918 the formation of the Royal Air Force (RAF) marked the 
ascendency of the national air force within the military capacity 
of Britain. In 1920, in Iraq, the British developed a policy of using 
the RAF to police the skies above Mesopotamia. The Minister of 
War and Air, Winston Churchill, and the Chief of the Air Staff 
Sir Hugh Trenchard, argued that air power could be deployed to 
support ground forces, to hit relatively remote targets, and to dis-
tribute propaganda.22
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Other countries invested in modern combat air fleets. The 
United States had created the American Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) in 1917 when America joined the Allies. The French Air 
Force, first formed in 1909, was expanded to counter a possible 
German threat following the Treaty of Versailles. In Italy the Regia 
Aeronautica, or Italian Royal Air Force, was established in 1923, 
the year after Benito Mussolini seized power. The German Air 
Force, curtailed following 1919, was reborn as the Luftwaffe in 
Nazi Germany in 1935. That event accelerated air raid precautions, 
or civil defence, that had been ongoing in Britain since the 1920s. 
Other countries also began to assemble air defence measures.
Fear of the Bomb and Preparations for Aerial 
Warfare, 1918–39
In 1924, a new sub-committee on air raid precautions was added 
to the functions of the Committee of Imperial Defence in Britain. 
First formed in 1902, following the ignominious military per-
formance of the British Empire during the Boer War, the Com-
mittee for Imperial Defence now began, slowly, to confront the 
realities of air war for civilian populations. The Chair of the sub- 
committee was Sir John Anderson, ‘an enormously able but 
uninspiring public servant’ whose deliberations and preparations 
established the civil defence apparatus prior to the outbreak of the 
Second World War in 1939.23
The impact of air raids on innocent civilians during the First 
World War, and the growing awareness of the terrible potential 
of bombing in future wars, demonstrated what historians have 
labelled ‘air-mindedness’ after 1918.24 This was evident in the 
new conceptual understandings of air power in the writings 
of military leaders notably the Italian Giulio Douhet and the 
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American Brigadier William ‘Billy’ Mitchell, ‘the most important 
advocates of assault on the heart of a nation by self-contained, 
 self-defending bomber formations’.25 In Britain, Captain Basil 
Liddell Hart, Colonel J.F.C. Fuller and Sir Hugh Trenchard were 
leading proponents of strategic bombing offensives against enemy 
nations.26 In sharp relief, heavy bombing could deliver a knock 
out blow, rendering civilian populations paralysed, and disrupt-
ing or destroying ground targets to allow for successful invasion 
by land forces. In their study of Liverpool’s preparations for air 
raids, Peter Adey et al. stress the importance of interdependency 
in Air Raid Precautions (ARP). An attack on one element of the 
urban infrastructure could have calamitous knock-on effects in 
a modern state; so joined-up thinking was entirely necessary for 
holistic preparation for air raids.27
The global threat of air power led to international attempts 
to limit the potential effect of aerial bombardment on civil-
ian populations as far as possible. Article XXIV of e Hague 
Rules of Air Warfare, drawn up in late 1922 (widely available 
online), was clear that aerial bombardment was legitimate 
only when directed at a military objective to military advan-
tage; when directed solely at military forces and establishments; 
and at factories and other centres manufacturing weapons or 
ammunition. Any bombardment of human settlements beyond 
the operations of land forces is prohibited, along with the indis-
criminate bombardment of the civilian population. Yet the 
caveats were fluid, to say the least:
In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of 
land forces, the bombardment of cities, towns,  villages, 
dwellings, or buildings is legitimate provided that 
there exists a reasonable presumption that the military  
concentration is sufficiently important to justify such 
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bombardment, having regard to the danger thus caused 
to the civilian population.
One of the most important consciousness-raising attempts by 
politicians about the terrible realities of air warfare came in the 
speech by the Conservative leader Sir Stanley Baldwin to the 
House of Commons in 1932. Baldwin had been Conservative 
Prime Minister from 1924–9, and traded on his reputation as a 
dependable and trustworthy leader. His words had gravitas, and 
he did not mince them. Highlighting the rapid improvements 
in flight technology, and speedier and more powerful bomber 
planes, Baldwin pointed out that no town was safe: ‘The question 
is: whose morale will be shattered quickest by that preliminary 
bombing?’
Baldwin was content to ram home his point that rapidly evolv-
ing aircraft technology was a threat in and of itself:
I think it is well also for the man in the street to real-
ize that there is no power on earth that can protect him 
from being bombed, whatever people may tell him. e 
bomber will always get through. [Take] any large town 
you like on this island or on the Continent within reach 
of an aerodrome. For the defence of that town and its 
suburbs you have to split up the air into sectors for de-
fence. Calculate that the bombing aeroplanes will be at 
least 20,000 feet high in the air, and perhaps higher, and 
it is a matter of mathematical calculation that you will 
have sectors of from 10 to hundreds of cubic miles.28
The famous warning that ‘the bomber will always get through’ 
was accompanied by the latest military thinking about the need 
for sectors of air defence to calibrate as far as possible the num-
ber and trajectory of incoming enemy planes, and to facilitate the 
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most efficient defence system, albeit within highly difficult cir-
cumstances. The point about suburbs is often ignored by histo-
rians, but it is a reminder that while the town and city centres 
offered higher densities of population and infrastructure to the 
invader, outlying areas were also vulnerable despite their more 
residential character. Between the wars, British cities had wit-
nessed extensive suburbanisation. The social consequences of this 
were a broad segregation of the classes into mostly working-class 
inner-urban areas, and suburban working-class council estates. 
The middle classes increasingly settled in private owner-occupied 
suburbia.29 The spatial consequences were visible in the much-
detested sprawl of the cityscape, and the mass arrival of the semi-
detached house along the new roads that spread out into the 
countryside from the town and city centres. When the poet John 
Betjeman wrote in his 1938 poem Slough ‘come friendly bombs 
and fall on Slough, it isn’t fit for humans now’ he was only half-
joking.30 He hated the new suburban settlements around London, 
and had clearly understood the new realities of air power. He was 
air-minded.
Baldwin continued with the most chilling passage of all, warn-
ing that ‘the only defence is in offence, which means that you have 
got to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy 
if you want to save yourselves’.31 This was to be the reality of the 
next war, he correctly predicted.32 Like H.G. Wells before him, 
Baldwin emphasised the shocking scenario of killing women 
and children. In essence, because the bomber would always get 
through, the awful lesson was that the defending nation would 
feel compelled to violate the principles laid down in the Hague 
Conventions on Air Warfare. Baldwin’s seemingly heartless words 
must, however, be viewed with the context of the disarmament 
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debates that were taking place in Britain and across the world. 
Just two years later, however, Baldwin made another famous 
speech in which he moved toward rearmament. By then, Nazi 
power in Germany had been brutally entrenched, and Germany 
had pulled out of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Swit-
zerland, as early as November 1933.33 Baldwin pledged that the 
National  Government would ensure that British air power ‘shall 
no longer be in a position inferior to any country within striking 
distance of its shores’, and he went on to issue an almost sublimi-
nal message to Germany:
When you think of the defence of England you no longer 
think of the chalk cliffs of Dover, you think of the Rhine. 
That is where our Frontier lies.34
The National Government initiated an expansion of the RAF from 
1934. It was opposed by the Labour and Liberal parties because 
it might accentuate the interwar arms race.35 Another prominent 
conservative politician, Winston Churchill, was however grow-
ing increasingly fearful of air warfare. He was keenly aware of 
the main problems and consequences inherent in indiscrimi-
nate bombing, arguing to an American audience in 1934 that ‘air 
bombing of the non-combatant population for the purposes of 
slaughter’ would upset public opinion and alienate allies. He also 
raised what Michael Sherry has termed the ‘overlooked question’ 
of how a civilian population under heavy bombardment, who 
wished to surrender could make their will known to the enemy 
above.36 Speaking to the House of Commons on 30 July 1934, in 
a debate on German rearmament, Churchill also warned that 
London was going to be a potential target for aerial bombing. 
‘With our enormous metropolis here’:
The Emerging Terror 27
the greatest target in the world, a kind of tremendous, 
fat, valuable cow tied up to attract the beast of prey, we 
are in a position in which we have never been before, 
and in which no other country in the world is in at the 
present time.37
Although London was the largest city in Europe during the 1930s, 
industrialisation and urbanisation had created large cities and 
towns across Western Europe, Soviet Russia and North America. 
Yet in another context Churchill was unwittingly correct: interwar 
suburbanisation was at its most extensive in England, and English 
cities lay prone and sprawling beneath the dangerous skies.38
In 1934 the League of Nations called for an international pro-
cess of disarmament, a call enthusiastically supported by the vari-
ous pacifist groups in interwar Britain, both religious and secular. 
The No More War Movement, the Quaker Friends Peace Com-
mittee, the Labour League of Youth and the Peace Pledge Union 
were among the leading pacifist organisations that understood 
the growing threat of air power, and the increased vulnerability of 
civilian populations to mass death and destruction. Marches and 
demonstrations, and signing the petition or ‘pledge’ to end wars 
were increasingly prominent during the mid-1930s, although 
pacifism remained a marginal cause.39
Such efforts were to no avail, however. In 1935 Adolf Hit-
ler announced the Luftwaffe to the world. Despite the Treaty of 
Versailles, German air power would become a major element in 
Nazi rearmament and military production. New fighter planes 
were introduced. In Britain, a new Air Raids Precautions Depart-
ment was created in April 1935 in a timely response to the mili-
tarisation of Nazi foreign policy. In the same year the German 
Reichsluschutzbund (Reich Air Protection League) issued a 
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poster of Herman Goering stating ‘Air defence fighters have as 
much responsibility and as much honour as every soldier at the 
Front’. As Overy argues, civil defence under the Nazi regime was 
more militarised in character than British ARP. A greater pres-
sure to participate in the collective defence of the Fatherland led 
to over 15 million Germans participating in the Reichsluschutz-
bund by 1939, and 22 million by 1941. That was over a quarter of 
the German population.40
From Predictions to Realities: Air Raids in Spain 
and China
The second half of the 1930s witnessed a number of horrifying 
air raids, brutal evidence of the terrors to come. The Spanish Civil 
War from 1936–8 initiated the era of fascist air raids against civil-
ian populations in Europe. German pilots were to gain their first 
combat experience as the Luftwaffe now put its theories of air 
attack into practice.41 At the behest of the Falange leader Gen-
eral Franco, on 26 April 1937, the Luftwaffe bombed communist 
Republican forces in the Basque town of Guernica in Northern 
Spain. About a thousand civilians were killed. Guernica was an 
important moment in the growing international awareness of air 
warfare. During the 1930s the British public had been receiving 
many serious warnings about the growing importance of air war-
fare, alongside many novels of varying quality about the terrible 
nature and consequences of future air raids during war. For exam-
ple, the film ings to Come (1936) directed by Alexander Korda 
and based upon the novel by H.G. Wells, depicted bleak repre-
sentations of modern air warfare, as the wireless, blaring air raid 
sirens and barking megaphones announce the disruption and 
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destruction of urban and suburban life. The air raids on Guernica 
were real, though, and marked a turning point in Britain’s fear of 
the bomber, as the public now reluctantly accepted the certain-
ties of air warfare.42 This realisation was compounded by the raids 
conducted by the Royal Italian Air Force on Barcelona in March 
1938.43
The threat of modern air warfare was not confined to Europe. 
The Japanese air raids on Chinese cities from July 1937 ran paral-
lel to this new understanding, and were accompanied by more 
extreme reminders of the horrors of conflict. The Second Sino-
Japanese War began when Japanese fighter planes engaged in 
skirmishes with the Chinese forces. The Republic of China Air 
Force (ROCAF) was unable to resist air penetration, and the 
Japanese relied heavily upon the bombing of towns and cities, 
attacking both military and civilian targets from September to 
early December. The air raids devastated many smaller towns 
but also larger cities, notably the then capital of China, Nanking, 
leading to a mass exodus of people from the city that more than 
halved its population. Widespread international condemnation 
of the bombing was reflected in the British weekly magazine e  
Spectator:
The protests made by the British, American and other 
Governments had as their background far more vehe-
ment outbursts of public opinion. In this country e 
Times promptly opened its columns to a correspondence 
in which such various writers as Sir Francis Acland, the 
Bishop of Bristol and Mr. J. M. Keynes expressed the 
growing body of opinion in favour of bringing Britain, 
the United States and Holland into line, with a view to 
cutting off trade relations with Japan. e News Chroni-
cle has followed suit by organising a national protest 
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meeting at the Albert Hall, with the Archbishop of  
Canterbury in the chair.44
Being killed by bombs was arguably preferable to the forms of 
death that were inflicted on the Chinese during the Nanking 
Massacre. Many thousands of men, women and children, includ-
ing babies, were murdered with guns and swords, and many 
sadistic forms of execution were deployed. Rape, looting, arson 
and torture were commonplace atrocities. Biological warfare 
was also used against the Chinese.45 In total, about 15 million 
Chinese people lost their lives during the Japanese occupation, 
which finally ended with the entry into China of Soviet Russia 
in the late summer of 1945, and with the devastation caused by 
the bomb.46
The American President Franklin D. Roosevelt was shocked 
and angered by the air raids in the latter 1930s, denouncing the 
bombing in words which have been returned to since by critics of 
American post-war bombing campaigns:
The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unforti-
fied centres of population during the course of hostilities 
which have raged in various quarters of the earth dur-
ing the past few years, which has resulted in the maim-
ing and in the deaths of thousands of defenceless men 
women and children has sickened the hearts of every 
civilised man and woman, and has profoundly shocked 
the consciousness of humanity.47
In Britain, the enigmatic J.B.S. Haldane, the Anglo-Indian geneti-
cist, and an avowed communist, warned a crowd at Trafalgar 
Square that ‘half a dozen aeroplanes could pulp them in a few 
minutes’.48 He also argued that the sinister alignment of Germany, 
Italy and Japan was leading to the sharing of ill-gotten intelligence 
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from their air raids. Haldane was by no means alone in such fears. 
Politicians of the Left and Right, national newspaper leader col-
umnists and many other writers called for practical anti-aircraft 
and civil defence measures, and citizen awareness and training 
schemes, to be put into place in London and across the country.49
In 1937 the Air Raid Precautions Act received royal assent, 
creating the civil defence apparatus that would be reinforced by 
the Civil Defence Act 1939, and mobilised on the eve of war in 
 September 1939.50 The air attacks on Spain and China occurred 
during the gathering crisis between Czechoslovakia and Germany, 
and the Munich debacle in September 1938. British Prime Min-
ister Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler repeatedly negotiated 
over German plans to annex the Sudetenland, leading to height-
ened fears across Europe and in Britain that the Nazis might land 
a knock out blow. Over 150,000 Londoners left the capital in the 
autumn of 1938 in a kind of historical dress rehearsal of wartime 
evacuation. Thirty eight million gas masks were distributed, and 
trenches were dug in the Royal Parks of London. As Chamberlain 
argued in a BBC broadcast on 27 September 1938:
How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should 
be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here be-
cause of a quarrel in a far-away country between people 
of whom we know nothing.51
For reasons which were not crystal clear to them, the British peo-
ple were increasingly compelled to engage in air raid precautions. 
The final years of the 1930s witnessed an intensification of ARP in 
Britain that mirrored preparations in other European countries. 
As Lucy Noakes argues, the ARP Act of 1937 ‘marked a signifi-
cant shift in the relationship of the civilian citizen to the wartime 
state’ as people were encouraged to take up defensive responsibilities, 
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which of course reflected contemporary gendered ideas of 
masculinity and femininity.52 The government issued posters and 
advertisements calling for both male and female volunteers to join 
up as ARP wardens, men to sign up as volunteer fire fighters and 
women as auxiliary nurses. The blackout was enforced in 1939, so 
that homes had to hide their interior lights to the outside world, 
and cars had to drive with dipped or no headlights, lest the enemy 
above sighted the city below. The years leading up to the war also 
witnessed a significant increase in social capital, in the commit-
ment of individuals to volunteer their time and effort for the good 
of community and country. Yet although the British public were 
increasingly being prepped for total warfare and air raids, many 
commentators remarked upon the apathy of large swathes of the 
British public towards Air Raids Precautions, an indifference that 
continued to a degree even into the war itself.53
Evacuation: A Case Study in London
The declaration of war on Germany by Chamberlain on 3 
 September 1939 was preceded by a mass evacuation of children 
from London and other large cities. Over four thousand children 
went overseas, but most were moved elsewhere in Britain to so-
called ‘reception towns’ in safe areas away from bombing routes. In 
all over 3.5 million people, most of them children, were dispersed 
from the largest cities.54 From 1–2 September already rehearsed 
plans for evacuation were put into place across the country. Local 
authorities were responsible for organising this mass movement, 
coordinated from schools and other places of education.55
The experiences of young men and women at the Regent Street 
Polytechnic (now the University of Westminster) in the heart 
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of London provide a fascinating case study of evacuation, and 
glimpses into the everyday perceptions of evacuees. The auxil-
iary Secondary School and Craft Schools at the Poly, located in 
other sites close to the base at Regent Street, provided occupa-
tional training and apprenticeships for children and teenagers. A 
breezy report in the Polytechnic Magazine for September 1940 on 
the evacuation of the Craft Schools was both proud and relieved 
at the safe removal of children, but it was clear the process was not 
as straightforward as it could have been:
From various sources, chiefly the wireless, the staff and 
pupils of the Craft Schools heard that at last it had hap-
pened, and that the once hypothetical evacuation was 
to be carried out. We duly assembled at the Great Port-
land Street Extension on Friday, September 1st, com-
pletely equipped with luggage and gas masks, the boys 
having been previously well informed as to the amount 
of luggage, etc., required. The boys were very cheerful 
and there were obvious signs of disappointment when 
we learnt from the LCC Evacuation Officer that it would 
be impossible to move us on that day. We were there-
fore told to go back home and return on the morrow 
at the same hour—8.30 a.m. The next day, Saturday, the 
numbers in our ranks had increased, and we moved off 
in earnest by bus from Oxford Circus to the Holborn 
Underground entrance. There were a few mothers to 
see the boys off, but the partings seemed quite cheerful, 
and in spite of the serious international situation quite a 
holiday spirit prevailed. At Holborn we were compelled 
to wait for some time, and in order to avoid congestion 
at the railway station we spent this time at the Central 
School of Arts and Crafts in Southampton Row. We 
eventually entrained for Ealing Broadway, and on arriv-
al, were speedily transferred to the train for ‘somewhere 
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in England.’ We had a comfortable journey with plen-
ty of room and you can imagine our delight when we 
learned that we were going in the vicinity of the famous 
Cheddar Gorge and right into the ‘Heart of Mendip’. We 
got out of the train at Cheddar Station, and after waiting 
some considerable time were conveyed by buses to our 
destination—Winscombe, a beautiful village nestling at 
the foot of the Mendip Hills.56
A later report on the experiences of the boys and girls coming to 
terms with life a long way from London, while generally upbeat, 
admitted that some schooling time was being lost. Young people 
in country towns or urban areas had more to stimulate them in 
common with the types of lives they had led in London, while 
those in small villages or hamlets had to make their own fun, and 
become more self-reliant, something viewed as a positive conse-
quence of evacuation. The report then made a claim about social 
class mixing that became a key theme in the so-called ‘myth of the 
Blitz’ discussed in the following chapter:
Some of the boys are billeted in palatial homes, 
whilst others may be living in homes not quite up 
to the standard of their own, but all are fortunate in 
having comfortable dwellings with fairly modern 
 conveniences. is will have the eect of showing how 
dierent classes of people live, and should be invaluable 
to them in later life, whether or not they become lead-
ers in industry, professional men, or members of the 
working classes.57
Denied a normal full-time education, this was a kind of ‘Poly-
technic of Life’ experience, increasing sensitivities across class 
divisions, while preparing the young for their future occupational 
roles in the British class system.
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The nationwide evacuation scheme was voluntary, and 
 working-class parents such as those of the young students at the 
Poly took advantage of the local authority educational schemes 
and the arrangements offered by the Poly itself. Middle-class 
parents, by contrast, sent their offspring to live with friends and 
relatives elsewhere in the country. The lack of compulsion in the 
evacuation process was symptomatic of the strength of democ-
racy but also an internal weakness. By December 1939 many 
young people from all across Britain, not only from the Poly, had 
returned home for Christmas, often to the annoyance and frus-
tration of the authorities who wished to keep them in the rela-
tive safety of the reception areas. The so-called ‘Phoney War’, a 
distinct lack of military action on the Home Front, explained 
why many people wanted to go back home.58 So too, of course, 
did homesickness and a longing to be with family and friends in 
the old neighbourhood. During the early months of 1940 many 
evacuees trickled back home. It would take the sea-borne hero-
ics at Dunkirk in May, and the Battle of Britain in the spring and 
summer of 1940, to shake them out of their complacency.
Conclusion
Whatever the context – prediction, preparation or reality – the 
onset of air warfare cast a dark shadow over the interwar years. As 
Overy argues, the ‘voyage of the death ship’ captivated and exer-
cised elite writers, brought images of carnage and destruction into 
popular culture, and caused politicians, both local and national, 
to assemble air raid precautions as war loomed. The bombing of 
Spain in 1937, notably, was a lightning rod of realisation. Left-
wing activists denounced the atrocity in demonstrations and 
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writings, pacifists were re-energised in their hatred of warfare, 
while thousands of Basque children were evacuated to Britain, 
and elsewhere.59 This was the compelling harshness of air raids: a 
local catastrophe would inevitably have significant international 
consequences. Those young boys and girls from northern Spain 
or at the Regent Street Polytechnic threw into relief the distur-
bances and distortions that would affect everybody, in Britain and 
across the world, once war broke out in 1939.
CHAPTER 3
Air Raids in Britain, 1940–45
Introduction
During August 1940, as the Battle of Britain drew towards its con-
clusion, the Luftwaffe began sporadic attacks on London and the 
City of London. Following a reprisal attack on Berlin by the RAF 
which did little serious damage, angered that the capital of the 
Reich had been breached, Hitler declared that ‘If they threaten 
our cities, then we shall erase theirs’.60 With the blessing of Win-
ston Churchill, the RAF continued its air raids on Berlin, caus-
ing Hitler to operationalize his threat. Sporadic bombing raids on 
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London and other British cities occurred through late August and 
early September but on 7 September the Nazis shifted tactics to 
the continuous heavy bombing of London.
The London Blitz continued, with only a few respites, until 
May 1945. It remains, for the British at least, the most significant 
and emotive aerial bombardment in modern history. During the 
longest air campaign on a major urban centre in Europe during 
the twentieth century, heavy explosives and incendiary devices 
rained down on London night after night. Yet London did not 
suffer alone. Most urban-industrial centres were attacked during 
the Blitz. Many smaller industrial cities and towns and maritime 
cities were also heavily bombed, and in the case of Coventry in 
the West Midlands, the centre was almost completely destroyed.
Although the ferocity of the Blitz faded into recent memory as 
the war progressed, later raids served to remind the British they 
were still prey to Nazi hatred. During the spring and early summer 
of 1942, the so-called ‘Baedeker Blitz’ targeted the most beautiful 
cities in England. In 1944 the V1 flying bomb was launched against 
Britain, and the V2 flying rocket attacks, mostly on  London, lent a 
fearful new dimension to aerial warfare in 1944–5. Hence in this 
chapter the Blitz refers specifically to the air raids of September 
1940 to May 1941, but later bombing campaigns against British 
towns and cities during the war are also covered.
Nazi Intentions
In their 1940 Invasion Plans for the British Isles, codenamed Opera-
tion Sea Lion, Nazi Military High Command outlined the invasion 
strategy for Britain in general and of what Churchill had called the 
‘fat, valuable cow’ of London in particular. They had certainly done 
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their research, although dependence on British materials in German 
libraries meant that some maps and demographic data were probably 
out of date. The British capital was the largest city in Europe by 1940, 
with a population of over 8 million (much the same as it is today). 
This swelled to over 10 million, however, when the hinterlands 
beyond suburban London were included in the German calculation:
London, with its suburban settlements and dependent 
towns: approximately 10 million (i.e. a quarter of the en-
tire population of England and Wales).61
e London Basin: the London Basin is bound by the 
Chiltern Hills to the north, Reading to the west, and 
the North Downs or the High Weald to the south. Its 
population has everywhere, to some extent or another, 
merged with that of London itself. The more heavily 
built-up area displays a strong industrial presence in its 
northern, eastern and southern parts; they are generally 
distinct from the commercial and administrative cen-
tre of the City, and the purely residential districts of the 
western sector.62
The rationale for the aerial bombardment of London was quite 
straightforward. Having lost the Battle of Britain during the sum-
mer of 1940, and with Berlin breached, the Germans served the 
dish of revenge hot, attacking the British capital to disrupt its 
infrastructure, to reduce iconic buildings to rubble, and under-
mine civilian morale. This would in theory render the population 
unable to defend itself from the invasion forces poised to sail over 
from occupied France and the Low Countries.
The River Thames was a significant point of reference for the 
Germans, because it flowed into London from the west and 
snaked through the centre of the capital to the east where it wid-
ened out into the Thames Estuary in the county of Essex. Along 
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with the River Medway in Kent, the waterways were convenient 
guides to the capital for in-flying enemy pilots, who were also well 
aware of the residential and industrial zones that sat alongside 
the riverbanks. A moonlit night was a strong navigation aid, as 
the rivers were silver far below.63 When the moon was low or lit-
tle more than a nail paring, the knickebein, a beam transmitted 
from a ground station in occupied Europe, guided the bombers 
to their destinations. As Max Hastings shows, however, Winston 
Churchill was contemptuous of the knickebein in 1940, and later 
Sir Arthur Harris dismissed the beam as of little assistance to the 
Germans in their raids on Britain.64
A little over a year after war was declared, the Anti-Aircraft and 
Civil Defence apparatuses would be subjected to a prolonged and 
severe testing. An official wartime publication entitled Front Line: 
1940–1941 assessed how the Home Front in Britain weathered 
the Blitz. It divided the air raids into ‘the onslaught on London’ 
and ‘the ordeal of the provinces.’65 Published in 1942, Front Line 
provided the first historical summary of the Blitz, and while by no 
means uncritical of the anti-aircraft measures and civil defence 
machinery, it pictured the wardens, fire fighters, medical service 
personnel and others in uniform as the heroes and heroines in a 
dramatic battle.
‘The Onslaught on London’
During the late afternoon of the 7 September 1940 a young man, 
cycling through suburban south-east London, was among the 
first to see the awe-inspiring sight of the German bombers mass-
ing over London. His oral testimony is a good example of how 
memory and words can evoke the atmosphere and sense of trepi-
dation on that first day of the Blitz:
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It was the most amazing, impressive, riveting sight. Di-
rectly above me were literally hundreds of planes, Ger-
mans! The sky was full of them. Bombers hemmed in 
with fighters, like bees around their queen, like destroy-
ers round the battleship. So came Jerry.66
The first area of London to come under sustained attack was the 
East End, a historic mostly working-class district of the capital 
city, only a few miles from the wealthy and powerful West End yet 
many miles from it, figuratively, in social and economic condi-
tions. Just as they had been in the First World War, the docks were 
an obvious initial target because of their importance to the import 
and export trade. On ‘Black Saturday’ the Woolwich Arsenal and 
the Silvertown Docks were hit, and as they went up in flames, mil-
lions of pounds of foodstuffs and other goods were destroyed.67 
On the first night of the Blitz 1,800 lost their lives or were seri-
ously injured.68
One of the many tragedies of war from the air is that poorest 
people suffer the most, and the bombing of one of the poorest 
districts of London which initiated the eight-month Blitz is a 
stark reminder of that fact. The working-class districts around 
the extensive docklands were crammed with high-density, often 
poor-quality, housing. Wharves and warehouses populated the 
muddy waterside of the River Thames from Tower Bridge via 
Wapping to Canary Wharf on the North Bank, and from Tower 
Bridge via Rotherhithe to Greenwich along the South Bank. This 
urban warren was a legacy of unplanned urbanisation during the 
Victorian years.
The ARP and the emergency services were overwhelmed. Fire 
crews were brought in from Nottingham in the East Midlands 
and elsewhere to help fight the raging infernos.69 Transport access 
to fires and victims was impeded by the amount of rubble lying 
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across roads and streets. During the first weeks of the Blitz the 
physical destruction and the accumulation of debris was so exten-
sive that about 1,800 roads were blocked, while over 3 million 
tons of rubble and detritus had built up, requiring an extensive 
clearing-up and repair operation to the infrastructure of the 
capital city.70 Barrage balloons had done little to stem the tide 
of German attacks, and the air raid warning siren was no longer 
sounding for practice or to indicate a few lone bombers. To make 
matters worse, during the first two nights the anti-aircraft guns 
were largely impotent, unable to bring down large numbers of 
German aircraft, and even failing to fire properly in some instal-
lations. As Winston Churchill noted in his history of the Second 
World War, first published in 1959, when the anti-aircraft artil-
lery finally launched its salvoes into the London night, many hud-
Figure 3: Bomb damage to Hallam Street, London. Photograph by 
kind permission of the City of Westminster Archives,  London.
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dling in their shelters or on voluntary duties felt a sense of relief.71 
Yet few were convinced the AA guns offered a robust and reliable 
defence to the Luftwaffe, whether along the coast or at fixed points 
in the major urban centres. The American reporter Ed Murrow 
was living in Hallam Street in London during the Blitz, and his 
compelling live broadcasts of the Blitz with the sound of bombs 
in the distance were relayed back to an American audience. His 
broadcasts showed that civil defence was under strain.72
Three weeks into the raids the cover story of the Picture Post 
was ‘The East End at War.’ Captioned ‘two of Hitler’s enemies’ a 
mother was pictured comforting her crying little boy: ‘In a street 
in Stepney, the crowded heart of East London’, began the report:
there stood a small boy, just old enough to write. He 
had a piece of chalk and with it, very carefully, almost 
painfully, he wrote in huge capital letters on the wall of 
a bomb-shattered warehouse. Gradually he formed his 
sentence, and with it he summed up the feeling of Lon-
don about the aerial hell into which it had been pitched. 
The message was – HITLER IS MAD.73
The derangement of the enemy was secondary to the narrative 
that, despite the war coming to the East End, the bravery of Lon-
doners was winning through against Nazi barbarism. In a cartoon 
for the Evening News David Low depicted the so-called ‘Cockney 
Heart’ as battered but unbowed by German bombs while the leer-
ing face of Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, 
looked down from on high.74 The ‘cockney’ was the historic per-
sonification of the East End, a cheerful yet defiant working-class 
character despite the deprivations and poverty of living in East 
London.75
That the Picture Post article was published three weeks into the 
Blitz possibly reflected an official awareness that morale had not 
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collapsed, so the piece could be allowed through the filters of the 
Ministry of Information. By late September, the nightly bombing 
had also transitioned far beyond East London to include Central 
and West London, large tracts of inner South London, and incur-
sions into the further-flung suburbs of the capital city. Contain-
ing some of the most iconic buildings in Britain, Central London 
offered invaluable targets for the Nazis. Politically the Houses of 
Parliament and Whitehall represented not only democracy and 
stability, but imperial might. London was the capital not only of 
Britain, but of the British Empire, and the Nazis knew the propa-
ganda value of destroying iconic buildings and institutions. Few 
of these were spared. On 8 September, the night following the 
beginning of the Blitz, the grounds of Buckingham Palace were 
struck by a 50kg delayed-action HE bomb, doing little damage. 
The Palace was hit sixteen times however, causing the much-
related story of how Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother and King 
George VI could feel on equal terms with those poor East Enders 
who had been bombed out of their home.76 There was no equiva-
lence, of course, but the narrative of shared suffering irrespective 
of class, status and income was seen as essential to national unity 
during the Blitz. Cinematic propaganda such as the Movietone 
newsreel e Realm Remains Resolute (1940) is one of many war-
time broadcasts keen to show the monarchy moving among the 
people.
The Palace of Westminster, the historic heart of British govern-
ment, and a powerful symbolic site of democracy confronting the 
fascist onslaught against Britain, was bombed fourteen times dur-
ing the Blitz of 1940–1. The House of Commons and the House 
of Lords were removed to nearby Church House in Westminster 
to avoid casualties, but on 26 September the Old Palace Yard was 
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hit, while on the 8 December the cloisters of St Stephens were 
badly damaged. Worse was to come on 10 and 11 May 1941 
when incendiary bombs caused fires in the Commons Chamber, 
and the roof of the Palace of Westminster. This was a particu-
larly heavy raid, a final spiteful flourish over London before the 
Nazis turned their attention to invading the Soviet Union. Other 
important parts of the complex were damaged, and outside, fac-
ing Parliament Square, the statue of Richard the Lionheart was 
hit, his sword bent but still gripped firmly in hand. Symbolically, 
parliamentary sovereignty was buckled but unbroken.77
Disruption to everyday life was another key intention of the 
Luftwaffe. The most famous shopping district in West London – 
comprised of Oxford Street, Regent Street and Bond Street – 
 sustained considerable destruction during the Blitz. The John 
Lewis Department Store, for example, an iconic Victorian depart-
ment store was one of a number of large retail outlets badly 
damaged or totally destroyed between Marble Arch and Oxford 
Circus. There was less to buy in the shops anyway, due to ration-
ing, but familiar outlets on the British high street were changed 
forever. The visitor to Oxford Street today, walking westwards 
from Oxford Circus, will notice how the north side of Oxford 
Street was almost completely rebuilt after the war.78
Between the wars radio had emerged as the new modern means 
of mass communication. The BBC enjoyed a near monopoly over 
broadcasting in Britain, so destroying the BBC would have been 
a massive propaganda victory for the Nazis. On 15 October 1940 
BBC Broadcasting House on Langham Place was hit by a 277kg 
delayed action HE bomb which damaged a number of offices and 
floors of this famous Art Deco building. A number of staff tried 
to remove the bomb by hand but it went off, killing seven BBC 
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employees. A parachute mine struck Broadcasting House on the 
8 December 1940, killing a police constable, wounding several 
passers-by, and creating a deep crater in Portland Place which 
was filled with water due to damage to the sewers. During the 
same raid, the beautiful All Souls Church on Langham Place, a 
masterpiece of Georgian religious architecture, was also badly 
damaged. Across the capital well-known buildings were damaged 
or destroyed leading to great satisfaction for the Nazis. Yet one of 
the worst air raids of 1940, the so-called ‘Christmas Blitz’ in late 
December, caused a significant if nuanced propaganda victory for 
Britain.
It is difficult to grasp now how dark those nights of the  December 
Blitz were. Britain stood alone in 1940 as the sole surviving non-
neutral democracy in Western Europe. London had been battered 
almost every night since early September, and many well-known 
and much-loved buildings and neighbourhoods lay in ruins. 
Then on the 28–9 December 1940 the capital city endured a par-
ticularly brutal raid which hit the City of London, and the area 
of East-Central London around St. Paul’s Cathedral, particularly 
hard. Yet the cathedral itself, with its distinctive and beautiful 
dome, survived with almost miraculous endurance while much 
of the vicinity around it was incinerated. It was also protected by 
the St Paul’s Watch.
In Sarah Waters’ novel e Night Watch  (2006), the experiences 
of three women are interwoven with the air raids on London. A 
particularly evocative scene around St Paul’s Cathedral creates the 
atmosphere in the streets of the darkest nights in the Blitz, but 
also provides the context for reflection on the nature and purpose 
of the war. As one woman questions whether St Paul’s should have 
been bombed in lieu of poor homes in Bethnal Green, another 
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counters that the survival of the cathedral means something, 
despite the desolation all around it:
while we’ve still got this and all it stands for, I mean, el-
egance, and reason, and – and great beauty – then the 
war is still worth fighting. Isn’t it?79
In London, along with other local authorities required by the gov-
ernment to undertake a ‘bomb census’ of damage and destruction, 
the London County Council (LCC) commissioned bomb  damage 
Figure 4: Memorial to the people of wartime London at St Paul’s 
Cathedral (photograph by author, 2017).
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maps. These itemized and spatially represented destruction 
according to a colour scale from black meaning ‘total  destruction’ 
through to yellow, namely ‘blast damage; minor in nature.’ The 
maps also represented the exact spots hit by the V1 and V2 reprisal 
weapons in 1944–5.80 They were also a useful tool for assessing the 
type and level of rebuilding required for a particular bombsite. 
The bomb map depicting the extensive damage around St. Paul’s 
cathedral suggests something of a miracle of survival.
So much has been written about St Paul’s it can be difficult to say 
anything original, but the episode does reveal in relief many key 
themes of this book. The cathedral, designed by Sir  Christopher 
Wren, represented the rebirth of London after the Great Fire of 
1666, a symbolism that was not lost on many commentators at 
the time, nor since. A famous photograph by Herbert Mason for 
the Daily Mail, showing the dome standing tall and undamaged 
despite the smoking ruins around it, introduced a motif that was 
to be found in many other media, notably newsreels, documen-
tary and fiction feature films, about the Blitz.81 The photograph, 
however, was also presented to the German public on 23  January 
1941, in the magazine Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung. Under the 
headline ‘Die City von London brennt’ (‘The City of London on 
Fire’) it depicted how the Luftwaffe were destroying London. Yet 
few in Britain would have seen that interpretation.
St. Paul’s had also been portrayed a few months earlier in the 
documentary film London Can Take It(1940). Directed by Hum-
phrey Jennings, an eminent British documentary filmmaker, and 
narrated by the American journalist Quentin Reynolds, London 
Can Take It was made just a few weeks into the London Blitz. 
Directed primarily at American audiences to demonstrate the 
bravery of the British under fire, the Germans inadvertently 
offered propaganda opportunities to the government, a theme 
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repeated in later bombing campaigns during the twentieth cen-
tury. The heaviness of the Christmas Blitz also exposed the limita-
tions of saturation bombing. Over an image of the cathedral, the 
calmly spoken words of Quentin Reynolds were reassuring:
A bomb has its limitations. It can only destroy buildings 
and kill people. It cannot kill the unconquerable spirit 
and courage of the people of London. London can take 
it.82
And London continued to take it until May 1941. As one middle-
class woman noted ‘In the badly bombed places, mostly working-
class districts’:
the courage of these people has been marvellous. These 
same people in my opinion have always shown courage, 
courage to face unemployment, courage to face bad con-
ditions, sickness, and all the other evils it has been their 
lot to bear.83
She was writing in November 1940, the month the air raids tran-
sitioned across the British Isles as the Nazis sought to degrade and 
destroy the entire industrial and military capacity of their enemy. 
Poor people in the provincial cities would also bear the brunt of 
the bombing most heavily.
‘The Ordeal of the Provinces’
The German Invasion Plans for the British Isles gave brief but 
mostly accurate descriptions of the major industrial cities and 
port cities in Britain and of their location. As the plans also 
stated, however, ‘mining operations’ were also sewn into the 
landscape of the major industrial conurbations, extending in coal 
belts out over nearby countryside, into valleys and nearby hills. 
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Coal  mining was one of the staple industries of the industrial 
revolution, and creating, like the great industrial cities, tightly-
knit working-class communities often packed into poor quality, 
high-density terraced homes. The Nazi planners of the air raids 
on British cities were fully versed in these realities, terming the 
slums and poorest housing areas ‘homes of misery.’84 The Nazis 
were impressed by the generally ‘excellent road system, however, 
arguing that troop movements would be ‘helped by the density 
of the road network, but partly hindered by the many factory 
buildings and  settlements’.85
The civil defence apparatus was far from uniform across the 
country, however. Many local authorities had done their best to 
instigate the provisions of the ARP and Civil Defence legisla-
tion, while others had been more dilatory. Levels of expenditure 
on public and household air raid shelters varied widely between 
different towns and cities. In the poorest areas where many ter-
raced houses had at best a backyard or no outside space at all, it 
proved impossible to erect air-raid shelters, leaving many feeling 
defenceless. Londoners had been able to use some of the Under-
ground tube stations as deep public shelters, but no other major 
city in Britain was possessed of an underground system so almost 
all shelters were built on the surface or just below it. Across Brit-
ain, the Luftwaffe often found it easy to fly above barrage bal-
loons, anti-aircraft guns and searchlights, and many bombs often 
fell onto flimsy Anderson shelters, both communal and private.86
Local authorities were forced to re-learn the lessons of the Lon-
don Blitz. Yet the government appeared to some contemporary 
critics as remote from the operational difficulties facing local 
councils. Using the weekly Home Intelligence reports compiled 
for the Home Intelligence Division of the Ministry of  Information, 
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Malcolm Smith shows how many people worried about the short-
comings in air raid preparations. There was often too much 
reliance on charities in the immediate aftermath of the raids, 
particularly the Women's Voluntary Service (WVS) and complaints 
about overcrowded rest centres and food supplies. The Blitz had 
contradictory effects, for example exposing comparative strengths 
and weaknesses in local authority preparations for  bombings, 
while strengthening a sense of both local and nationwide 
defiance. Despite that, civic pride was often ramped up by the 
strong belief that, despite the death and destruction, and the inade-
quacies in ARP and emergency provision, a particular town or city 
had ‘taken it’ and triumphed over adversity. Overall, Smith con-
cludes that a sense of collective confidence during the provincial 
Blitz remained mostly intact but was sometimes unduly under-
mined by inadequate coordination and provision of resources.87
A common misconception of the Blitz in the United Kingdom 
is that London was the only city under attack from September 
1940 until the Nazis also turned their fire on other cities and 
towns in mid-November. Yet even before the Blitz on London 
began, other urban areas in the UK had been attacked from the 
air. As the Battle of Britain drew towards a defeat for Germany, 
the first significant raid on a major British city took place in Car-
diff and Newport on 10 July when over seventy German planes 
attacked the South Wales docks. In July and August, Birming-
ham, Coventry, Hastings, Liverpool, Newcastle and Southampton 
were all subject to air raids, signifying that when the main Blitz 
on the provinces began, industrial and coastal towns and cities 
were going to be key targets for the Luftwaffe. From the middle of 
November, the bombing of the major cities intensified as the Nazi 
campaign grew heavier and more frequent spreading beyond the 
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capital city.88 Initial success during the early extension of the Luft-
waffe campaign to the provinces was brutally encapsulated in the 
heavy air raid on the West Midlands city of Coventry.
The Bombing of Coventry
Of all the provincial cities bombed by the Nazis, Coventry was the 
first to suffer the almost complete annihilation of its city centre. 
As Tony Mason shows, the first raid on Coventry had been on 
18 August 1940, when both industry and housing were bombed. 
There were twenty-four further raids on the West Midlands city, 
but by far the heaviest attack on Coventry came on the night of 
14–15 November. About 450 bombers attacked the West Mid-
lands city for over eleven hours. In the wake of that terrible raid, 
over two-thirds of the historic city centre was smashed to pieces, 
over 560 people lay dead, and at least 860 people were seriously 
injured.89 Further death and destruction followed. The city’s beau-
tiful mediaeval cathedral lay in ruins, and remains so today, an 
iconic reminder of the sacrilegious destruction of places of wor-
ship during air raids.
Tony Mason was writing in 1986, some four years before the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Blitz. He was ahead of the many aca-
demic histories of the Blitz and of wartime Britain written since. 
Although much of Coventry was devastated, he showed that the 
factories and workplaces were soon repaired and producing essen-
tial munitions and other supplies. He also emphasised that the 
saturation bombing of Coventry gave rise to popular and media 
myths that disintegrated under scrutiny, from the alleged col-
lapse of civilian morale to the notion, shared by many citizens of 
the city, that Coventry was deliberately sacrificed by Churchill to 
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fool the Germans into thinking British air defences were weak.90 
As Frederick Taylor notes, the BBC and the print media, under 
the watchful eye of the Ministry of Information, usually referred 
obliquely to the air raids on ‘a southern town’ or ‘a Midlands town’ 
in order to play down the damage and as far as possible deny the 
Nazis any attempt to audit the true extent of destruction. After 
the air raids on Coventry, however, the city was named so that 
the British government and media could demonstrate the hei-
nous depths to which the Germans sank when gloating about the 
destruction of Coventry. This may have encouraged many in peo-
ple to feel their city was a sacrificial lamb, but that was untrue.91
The government was almost always reading the thermometer 
of morale and when the phenomenon of ‘trekking’ occurred, 
alarm bells rang. Trekking was the voluntary flight of people 
from the city to the relative safety of the countryside prior to 
nightfall. Viewed officially as potentially symptomatic of a mass 
adverse reaction to air raids, the Labour Home Secretary Her-
bert Morrison was fearful that ostensible manifestations of mass 
demoralisation might be exploited by the enemy. Along with Lord 
Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Production, he visited Cov-
entry to inspect munitions and aircraft parts manufacture. King 
George VI visited Coventry to express solidarity and reassure the 
local population they were in his thoughts.92 Yet a recent study of 
the Blitz has argued that trekking was less a symptom of declining 
morale and mostly a rational response to the bombings.93 People 
were removing themselves and their families away from danger, 
and also relieving the pressure on the ARP and emergency service 
workers.
After all that, Coventry remained resilient. During the raids and 
in their immediate aftermath, the city lived on throughout the 
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war, only to be rebuilt to a comprehensive and ultimately unsuc-
cessful modernist city plan that replaced bombsites with cold pre-
cincts and uninspiring public buildings. This is discussed further 
in chapter seven.
Coventry was one of the smaller urban-industrial centres in 
Britain, but the almost complete destruction of its city centre led 
to its special place in the history of air raids in the Second World 
War. It was also one of the so-called ‘arms towns’, along with Bir-
mingham, Bristol (and Avonmouth) and Sheffield producing 
munitions in the factories. During the course of the Blitz from 
November 1940 to May 1941 citizens in the industrial heartlands 
of the United Kingdom endured the Nazi onslaught.
Front Line also focused on the experience of the port cities of 
Cardiff and Swansea in South Wales, Liverpool in the North West 
of England, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Southampton on the 
South Coast, Hull in North East England, Glasgow (Clydeside) in 
Central Scotland and Belfast in Northern Ireland. All were subject 
to heavy bombardment, at different times. Liverpool and Mersey-
side on the north-west coast of England was the second most-
bombed conurbation after London. The city had taken small air 
raids during August 1940 but on the night of 28–9 November over 
350 tons of HE bombs smashed into the city. In common with 
East London the docks were a primary target, and the warren 
of small, often dilapidated terraced streets was heavily bombed. 
 Liverpool was attacked for three nights at the end of August 1940, 
and many other raids followed. During December 1940 and May 
1941 further raids took a terrible toll on Liverpool. The May raids 
alone killed 1,900 people and injured or seriously wounded 1,450 
others.94 Extensive damage to the housing stock resulted in wide-
spread homelessness in a city that already possessed large tracts 
of impoverished housing and some of the worst slums in Britain.
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Literary memoirs provide vivid information on living through 
the air raids. The writer Helen Forrester, a young woman in war-
time Liverpool, recalled how as London was blitzed ‘we became 
more and more apprehensive that our turn would be next.’ For-
rester describes in vivid detail her experiences of running home 
through the centre of Liverpool during the days of violence tar-
geted on the Merseyside city. She dipped in and out of air raid 
shelters where some people were simply taking cover, others were 
singing, and others praying as they worked their rosary beads. 
ARP wardens would order her to stay put but like so many peo-
ple she had other ideas as she headed for home. Forrester expe-
rienced feelings of rage as she witnessed German planes, spiteful 
and murderous in the night sky, and saw and heard explosions 
and flares as the bombs fell near to where she was running:
The city was in turmoil, with service vehicles zipping 
recklessly through the battered streets. There seemed to 
be a very big fire at the beginning of Dale Street, and 
behind the buildings past which I ran up to the far end 
of Lime Street, there was obviously another very heavy 
conflagration, which I afterwards was told was St. John’s 
market burning. Roasted in it were most of the turkeys 
which Liverpudlians had dreamed of eating on Christ-
mas day, and to hear the talk in the shopping queues af-
ter the holiday, one would imagine that the loss of the 
turkeys was more deeply mourned than the loss of three 
hundred and sixty five men, women and children who 
died during the three days of the Blitz.95
Forrester experienced the full gamut of emotions during air raids, 
from hatred toward the enemy, relief at respites from the bomb-
ing, fatigue from the efforts of running and walking through 
the dangers of an attack, sorrow at the loss of much-loved and 
familiar buildings and landmarks, to the dark sense of humour 
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reflected in her wry observations on the loss of a turkey dinner as 
opposed to living people.
England’s ‘second city’ Birmingham was near to Coventry in 
the West Midlands. Larger than its neighbour, it shared a modern 
industrial manufacturing base, much of it given over to muni-
tions production. Birmingham was bombed in August and suf-
fered many raids between August of 1940 and April 1941. The 
world famous Birmingham Small Arms factory was badly dam-
aged, along with many other industrial premises. Thousands of 
homes were destroyed, but as Adams and Larkham note, while 
extensive, the damage was spread across the second city, rather 
than being heavily concentrated in a few areas.96
In Scotland, Glasgow and Clydebank were historically associated 
with traditional manufacturing industries, alongside the docks and 
military installations along the River Clyde, providing an extensive 
strategic target for the Luftwaffe. Clydebank, to the west of Glasgow, 
‘was hit by two nights of devastating raids’ on 13–14 March 1941. 
The destruction and mortality rates were horribly high, due to the 
extensive domestic architectural form of the high-density and often 
overcrowded tenement blocks in the Glasgow region. In common 
with London and other cities during their first air raids, ARP ser-
vices found it very difficult to cope. About 35,000 out of a population 
of 50,000 in Clydebank were made homeless. The Scottish Regional 
Commissioner ‘described the Clydebank Blitz as a “major disaster”’.97
Bristol in south-west England had been bombed since August 
1940 but suffered its heaviest raids on 24 November, when attacks 
on the docks and on the aircraft factories, obvious strategic targets 
for the Nazis, killed 207 people and left over 180 seriously injured. 
Heavy explosives and incendiaries laid waste to large tracts of the 
city. Further west in South Wales, another important port city, 
Swansea, suffered a ferocious 100-bomber raid in  mid-January 
Air Raids in Britain, 1940–45 57
1941. In addition to severely damaging the Prince Albert Dry 
Dock, thousands of incendiaries fell upon the city. And the fol-
lowing February Swansea suffered heavy bombardment on three 
successive nights.98 As John Ray notes, Swansea developed its own 
heroic story of ‘blood, sweat and tears’ during that bitter winter, 
and the January raid enabled the ARP and fire services to learn 
and perform more effectively in the subsequent attacks.99
Other port and naval cities also suffered extensive bombing, nota-
bly Plymouth, Portsmouth and Southampton on the south coast, and 
the larger urban areas of Hull, and the Newcastle-Upon-Tyne conur-
bation in north-east England. Their fate was finally visited upon Bel-
fast, on the banks of the River Lagan in Northern Ireland. The Lagan 
in East Belfast was home to the great Harland and Wolff shipyards, 
and other shipyards, docks and factories. In what was the penulti-
mate month of the Blitz, Belfast was attacked on 7–8 April and again 
a week later. The pattern of death and destruction was strongly simi-
lar to other port cities: the docks and nearby factories were badly hit, 
while the surrounding streets of terraced houses suffered extensive 
bomb and fire damage. Both Catholic and Protestant districts came 
under attack The fire services of both Britain and the Irish Republic 
were required to supplement the city’s auxiliary and official fire bri-
gades.100 Initial official estimates of casualties were ‘too low’:
and possibly 800 to 900 people were killed, and a fur-
ther 1,500 injured. About 1,600 houses were destroyed, 
28,000 were damaged, and some 20,000 civilians were 
rendered homeless.101
Many lodged with friends and relatives; some took refuge in rest 
centres; others did what so many others had done before them 
and voluntarily evacuated the city as ‘ditchers’, known on the Brit-
ish mainland as ‘trekkers’.102
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Figure 5: V2 Memorial, Chiswick, West London (photograph by 
author, 2017).
Morale: Impact and Aftermath
Morale refers to the confidence and discipline of an individual 
or group. Any major collapse of civilian morale was held by the 
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government and local authority officials to potentially undermine 
the social life of cities, possibly cause anarchy and chaos, threaten 
industrial production, and destroy the ability to fight the enemy. 
How did the people of London and the great provincial cities of 
Britain respond to the air raids in 1940–1? The answer lies in the 
experience of the working-class East End of London as the first 
district to be heavily bombed from 7 September. Mass Observa-
tion (MO), the eyes and ears of the government was on the scene, 
because the East End was a testing ground, in a sense, for all of 
those pessimistic predictions about civilian behaviour and morale 
discussed in the previous chapter. As head of MO, Tom Harris-
son, was also a member of the Morale Committee of the Min-
istry of Information. A social anthropological organisation, MO 
consisted of volunteers, mostly middle class, who moved among 
the people, writing down what they saw and heard, in notebooks. 
Conscripted by government, MO and its volunteers contributed 
to the intelligence received by the Ministry of Information.
In Living rough the Blitz (1976) Harrisson was clear that 
propaganda about national unity ignored continuing class divi-
sions and snobberies. He was critical of inadequate provision of 
air raid shelters and other weaknesses of civil defence, and his 
reports on Birmingham and Coventry, among other cities, never 
shied from highlighting panic, and the despair and anger of many 
caught up in the raids.103 Using one of many excerpts from MO 
materials, Harrisson vividly described the shock of people hud-
dled together in an air raid shelter in East London following the 
end of heavy bombing:
When the all-clear goes, about 4.30 a.m., there is a groan 
of relief. But as soon as the first people get outside the 
shelter, there are screams of horror at the sight of the 
damage…smashed windows and roofs everywhere…
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smoke streaming across the sky from the direction of 
the docks. People rush and scramble out of the shelter 
doorway, and there is a wild clamour of shouting, weep-
ing and calling for absent relatives.
Harrisson went on to describe the general loss of everyday order, 
the ‘turmoil of comings and goings’, the fearful evening rush out 
to the relative safety of the suburbs and the nearby countryside.104
Across Britain, Mass Observation materials and other contem-
porary reports provide historians with a mixed picture. Draw-
ing extensively on MO materials, Beavan and Griffiths focused 
upon the working-class communities most heavily affected by 
air raids. MO was the intellectual and methodological creation 
of left-leaning wing middle-class academics who often resorted 
to regional and class-based stereotypes in their readings of the 
popular mood. So East London cockneys and ‘northerners’ in 
the heartlands of the industrial revolution would endure the 
raids with cheerful fortitude, born of their lifelong experience of 
a community of poverty. Similarly, sailors’ wives in the port cit-
ies were used to enduring loneliness and hardship. In Coventry, 
by contrast, where new industries such as engineering and motor 
car manufacturing lay alongside new suburban housing estates, 
locals lacked the fortitude of the older industrial working class.105
There was certainly evidence that many people were trauma-
tised by the violent interruption into their lives and their homes. 
Historical trauma studies is a growing field, and in relation to air 
raids, historian have made some important points about the hid-
den history of psychological damage caused to civilians, which sits 
uneasily with triumphalist tropes about the ‘Blitz spirit’. Further-
more, as Hazel Croft argues, unlike military personnel returning 
from the battle front, whose claims to psychiatric disorders could 
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be verified, it was more difficult for civilians on the Home Front to 
make a special case for themselves as suffering from what would 
now be incorporated within the umbrella term of ‘post-traumatic 
stress disorders’.106 It is possible to infer from Croft’s that work 
untold numbers of people carried psychiatric disorders into their 
post-war lives. As Noakes has argued, in a similar vein, the social 
taboo on expressing fear during wartime has tended to marginal-
ise narratives of fear in post-war testimonies of the Blitz and other 
air raids.107
Nonetheless, by May 1941 the collective will had held. Harrisson 
summed it all up thus: ‘the predicted crack in nerves did not send 
a large slice of Londoners gibbering in 1940. The hospital beds 
and poised psychiatrists waited, unemployed.’108 In broad terms, 
and with local variations, this pattern was replicated nationwide, 
leading to a mostly heroic official interpretation of the Blitz and 
of the Home Front more widely. Wartime propaganda insisting 
upon national unity and shared resistance to the enemy was the 
origin of this heroic interpretation. Put another way, a narrative of 
brave popular resistance to aerial bombardment was at the heart 
of the ‘Peoples War’. Wartime social unity, the argument goes, 
created a new national mood for a better society: from the ‘Peo-
ple’s War’ to the New Jerusalem. The reality was very different, as 
Selina Todd argues, but many looked beyond sectional, regional 
and class divisions in the hope of a more egalitarian future.109
The Blitz and Social Change
One of the earliest interpretations of the Blitz as a catalyst for 
social change was by Richard Titmuss, a social scientist and civil 
servant. His Problems of Social Policy, published in 1950, amounts 
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to the first notable history of the Home Front.110 The mass par-
ticipation of civilians in wartime employment, higher levels of 
voluntarism than in peacetime, shared suffering and the contri-
bution of ostensibly all classes and groups in society engendered 
an atmosphere of heightened egalitarianism that encouraged the 
transition from the warfare state to the welfare state. The wide-
spread support for the Beveridge Report in 1942, with its call for 
greater levels of social policy, appears to support this perspective. 
Politically, the Labour Party had the most to gain from an alleged 
new sense of egalitarianism forged between people of different 
classes who huddled together in air raid shelters, served alongside 
each other fighting fires or tending to the wounded, or ostensibly 
brought closer together by the experience of evacuation. For the 
first time, provincial middle-class households were up close and 
personal with the poverty and illiteracy of the poor urban chil-
dren billeted within their home. The Labour Party Manifesto for 
the general election of 1945 explicitly linked its post-war agenda 
to the collective efforts initiated by the events of 1940:
The problems and pressures of the post-war world 
threaten our security and progress as surely as - though 
less dramatically than - the Germans threatened them 
in 1940. We need the spirit of Dunkirk and of the Blitz 
sustained over a period of years.
The Labour Party’s programme is a practical expres-
sion of that spirit applied to the tasks of peace. It calls for 
hard work, energy and sound sense.111
This neat relationship between the Blitz and subsequent social 
policy was challenged by the Scottish Marxist historian Angus 
Calder. His e Myth of the Blitz  is highly-regarded as revisionist 
history by many. His position is summed up on its back cover:
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The Myth of the Blitz was nurtured at every level of soci-
ety. It rested upon the assumed invincibility of an island 
race distinguished by good humour, understatement, 
and the ability to pluck victory from the jaws of defeat 
by team work, improvisation and muddling through.
In fact, in many ways, the Blitz was not like that. Sixty 
thousand people were conscientious objectors; a quar-
ter of London’s population fled to the country; Churchill 
and the Royal Family were booed while touring the af-
termath of air raids. Britain was not bombed into class-
less democracy.
Calder has been hugely influential in bursting the myth bub-
ble, but his own approach was not without problems. He mostly 
ignored Front Line, 1940-41: e Ocial Story of Civil Defence 
in Britain which was by no means an upbeat whitewash of the 
official preparations for and responses to the German air raids. 
Conceding that that the strategy of air attacks on civilians was 
neither new nor unforeseen, the government admitted that ‘Some 
things were not anticipated; some guesses were wrong.’112 British 
military and political planners also initially underestimated the 
extent of the damage that would be caused, and therefore the con-
sequent level of homelessness and reparations required.113 Calder 
underestimated this measure of official self-criticism in his dis-
cussion of Front Line, merely pointing out that some people who 
had lived through the Blitz in Bristol and Croydon felt their story 
had been under-represented.114
It would be unfair to criticise Calder for ignoring the heroism 
of the emergency services, or the stoicism of the British under the 
bomb. He gives some recognition to both while creating a more 
nuanced picture of the Home Front which focuses upon divi-
sion and discordance. Throughout the war, Calder argues, Britain 
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remained a society cleaved by class inequalities and status divi-
sions. Within the sphere of politics he highlights fear and loathing 
in Whitehall of the strength of communism and pro-Soviet senti-
ment during the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He fastens upon the propensity 
of some trades unionists to go on strike despite the need to meet 
essential production targets, a responsibility which most trades 
unionists and almost all Labour leaders agreed with throughout 
the war. Calder also exaggerates the appeal of pacifism in Wales 
and Scotland to question the myth of national unity.115
The relationship of the Blitz to the qualities of ‘Englishness’ and 
the predominance of English national identity is also explored by 
Calder. He anticipates later revisionist work by historians such 
as Susan Grayzel, Lucy Noakes, Sonya O. Rose, and H.L. Smith 
whose gendered analysis reflected upon the very different and 
unequal experiences of women as opposed to men on the Home 
Front.116 Rose and Smith also explore the problematic relationship 
of the language of unity and of ‘national identity’ across different 
ethnic groups in wartime Britain. For Rose, ‘identity politics’ was 
a commonplace in 1940s Britain, hence no single or universally 
accepted promotion of ‘Britishness’ was possible.117
Certain views that Calder espoused, however, allow us to ask 
questions about the overall integrity of his position, and thus to 
reclaim a more positive version of mass behaviour during the 
Blitz that by no means denies a complex understanding of civil-
ian morale. Calder claims he was angered by the way the Labour 
Party promulgated the myth of the Blitz for its political agenda. At 
the very beginning of the Myth of the Blitz he notes that the book 
was commissioned ‘in the early eighties soon after the war for 
the Malvinas’.118 He railed against Margaret Thatcher’s evocation 
of ‘Churchillism’ in 1981, while his use of the Argentinian name 
for the Falklands suggested support for the highly contestable 
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claim that the islands were historically Argentinian territory.119 
That Argentina was ruled by a neo-fascist dictatorship which 
invaded British sovereign territory goes ignored. Yet both Argen-
tina and Nazi Germany were aggressive right-wing dictatorships 
exploiting foreign policy to stir-up domestic support through the 
intended oppression of foreign populations.
Calder’s interpretation of the film Hope and Glory (1987) fur-
thermore, an autobiographical movie written and directed by John 
Boorman about the Blitz in suburbia, draws a dubious distinc-
tion between the experience of air raids over outer London com-
pared with the suffering in the more heavily-bombed inner-city 
areas. Boorman was raised in Carshalton in Surrey, and Hope and 
Glory depicts family life in the classic suburban semi-detached 
home during the Blitz. He hated the suburbia of his childhood, 
and later decried it as the birthplace of Thatcherism, a reactionary 
lower-middle-class culture of limited horizons and petty priva-
tism thriving among the tidy houses and trim lawns.120 A socialist, 
Calder was also offended by the perceived politics of suburbia. 
He admired Boorman and made the perfectly ridiculous state-
ment that like Boorman he was ‘ashamed of his suburban origins’. 
He goes on to provide a reductionist view of suburbia during the 
war and afterwards, dismissing the notion of suburban volunta-
rism and linking forward to the era of reconstruction discussed 
in chapter six:
‘Suburban values’ and the suburban lifestyle, created in 
the new housing estates of the inter-war period, did have 
in 1940 a flourishing future ahead of them. Ravaged by 
the Luftwaffe or not, the working-class areas of British 
cities were due to be devastated by town planners; while 
in the Sixties, poor people were shifted from ‘communi-
ties’ into tower blocks, the suburbanites who despised 
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them continued to mow the lawn every Saturday, make 
tea in trim little kitchens, and keep up with the ever-
more-affluent Joneses.121
Such stereotypical and static images of suburbia jar with the often 
nuanced approach in e Myth of the Blitz. Worse, his anti-sub-
urbanism marks Calder out as an elite historian surveying ‘the 
masses’ with a particularly critical eye on the lower middle classes 
who populated suburbia. In fact, thousands of suburban clerks, 
uniformed workers, self-employed business people and ‘house-
wives’ who were living in semi-detached homes joined up to 
become ARP wardens, fire fighters, emergency medical service 
volunteers, and munitions workers. Social capital in the suburbs, 
both in peace and wartime, has been proven to be just as high if 
not higher than in other areas of the city or in rural villages. And 
that was true for working-class suburban council estates, too.122
Overall, Calder does not give due attention to the suburban 
Home Front. As two eminent historians of London have argued, 
however, by the end of the war the impact of air raids on the 
capital city was as wide as the metropolis itself. During the Blitz 
bombs and incendiaries by no means spared the suburbs, while 
later air raids and V-weapons attacks hit outer London hard. As 
White argues, the bombs respected no notion of the ‘two Lon-
dons’, inner and outer.123 Furthermore, despite attacking suburbs 
more than a few times in e Myth of the Blitz, Calder ignores 
them in his index.
Drawing upon MO reports and other official readings of morale, 
however, the fluctuations in popular mood and sentiments during 
and after air raids are cleverly portrayed, as are the petty tensions 
and class-based resentments engendered by evacuation. Overall, 
however, Calder accentuated the negative while acknowledging 
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the positive. His analysis may be compared with that of Juliet 
Gardiner, who places voluntarism and humanitarian impulses at 
the centre of her approach, while accepting that pre-war social 
divisions continued during and after the conflict. Unlike Calder, 
however, and in common with Titmuss, Gardiner emphasises the 
glue of morale, the huge contribution of voluntarism despite dif-
ferences and division, the ‘unity of resolution and purpose’ during 
the Blitz and the socio-political dividend:
A social contract, no matter how informal and unspo-
ken, had been forged during those months of attack. 
People who ‘took it’ should be entitled to ‘get it’, if ‘it’ 
meant better housing, a fairer education system, more 
job opportunities. It was partly for this reason that when 
the Beveridge Report was published in December 1942, 
a year and a half after the Blitz, what was essentially a ti-
dying-up operation of welfare provision assumed iconic 
status, appearing to offer a new beginning, a safety net 
from the cradle to the grave, an attack on the five ‘giant 
evils’ in society: squalor, ignorance, want, idleness and 
disease.124
Robert MacKay and Andrew Thorpe come to similar conclusions. 
During the early days of the Blitz, while people were evacuat-
ing or grubbing around in the ruins to salvage what they could, 
a sense of despair was mostly absent. MacKay’s emphasis upon 
‘the enhanced sense of being part of a group’ did not rule out dif-
ference and even division, but as he argued such cohesion was 
strengthened by government propaganda on posters, newspa-
pers, radio and film. It was also boosted by participation in such 
hands-on organisations as the ARP, AFS (Auxiliary Fire Service), 
the Home Guard and the WVS.125 The events of 1940, namely the 
evacuation of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the Blitz from 
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September, instilled in the British people a sense of ‘moral author-
ity’ and of national community. With the first and arguably worst 
phase of the Blitz over, due to the terrible novelty of the experi-
ence, the British were able to bear the later months with resigna-
tion or fortitude, or both.126 And for Malcolm Smith, that spirit 
and sense of unity lasted long into the post-war years.127
Targeting Heritage: The Baedeker Blitz
On 28 March 1942 over 230 RAF planes attacked the medieval 
city of Lubeck in Germany, using the ‘double blow’ technique by 
following the first bombing raid with a second equally destruc-
tive one. Although Lubeck was of negligible military value due 
to its peripherally located industries, much of its manufacturing 
remained untouched or only partly damaged. But its wooden-
beamed housing and chocolate-box architecture was razed to 
the ground. Over 300 local residents were killed, while 16,000 
were rendered homeless.128 The assault on Lubeck prompted the 
so-called Baedeker Raids on beautiful English cities. And when 
planning their raids, and seeking to maximise destruction to Eng-
lish heritage sites, the Germans had an easy-to-use guidebook at 
hand.129
The Karl Baedeker Company of Leipzig had begun publish-
ing their travel guides during the 1830s, but few budding tour-
ists could have grasped the irony that aids to cultural tourism 
would become tools to assist in the destruction of much-loved 
and much-visited centres of heritage. By the beginning of the 
Second World War, the Baedeker Great Britain was in its ninth 
edition, having been updated and republished in 1937, the year 
that Germany, Italy and Japan completed their pact, Guernica was 
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bombed by German airplanes, and France extended its defensive 
Maginot Line to the German border.
Baedeker’s Handbook for Great Britain was written by H.A. Pie-
hler, a British-born travel writer who motored extensively around 
the country recording his impressions. ‘Bath’, wrote Piehler, ‘is a 
handsome city’. Its beautiful location in the Avon Valley was noted 
alongside its ‘unrivalled’ status ‘among English provincial towns 
for its combination of archaeological, historic, scenic and social 
interest.’ Its Georgian streets and town houses were praised while 
Bath Abbey was awarded an asterisk, the Baedeker ‘mark of com-
mendation’.130 Exeter, the county town of Devon, was described as 
an attractive ancient city on the banks of the River Exe. Its quaint 
public buildings, attractive streets, city walls and beautiful cathe-
dral were foremost among its considerable range of attractions.131 
Further East, Canterbury in Kent was given extensive treatment. 
Described as nothing less than ‘the ecclesiastical metropolis’ of 
England and ‘an ancient city, with numerous quaint old houses’, it 
was historically significant as the seat of the Archbishop of Can-
terbury. The cathedral was awarded two asterisks. Other ancient 
religious buildings and notable features in Canterbury were also 
starred with an asterisk.132
Norwich in Norfolk was noteworthy for its irregular building, 
and its beautiful cathedral was awarded a number of single aster-
isks for some of its most significant features. Norwich was also 
home to thirty old East Anglian churches which nestled alongside 
many other ancient and interesting buildings defined by unique 
architectural ‘flushwork’.133 And in the heart of the North, the pic-
turesque ancient city of York was praised for the conservation of 
its city walls (one asterisk) and its network of quaint mediaeval 
streets and variety of old buildings. York Minster, standing proud 
70 The Blitz Companion
above the surrounding streets, earned two asterisks, signifying 
high levels of approval from the Baedeker guide.134
In his introduction, the editor of the 1937 Baedeker Handbook 
to Great Britain thanked the Deans of the Cathedrals visited, and 
the officials of the cities and towns for the information they had 
offered to the author. He noted the importance of ‘fair dealing 
and courtesy’ from the traveller to England.135 From April to June 
1942, over 1,000 people were killed by the Baedeker Raids, and 
hundreds were seriously injured. Significant losses were sustained 
to the country’s heritage. Exeter was bombed in April and May. 
The shopping centre was destroyed by high explosives, incendi-
aries and parachute mines. At Bath over two nights in late April 
the railway station was demolished, and many historic buildings 
including churches were burned down or smashed by HE bombs. 
Norwich was bombed on 12 April and at the end of June, losing 
the historic St. Julian’s Church and many attractive old buildings. 
At York, raids on 28–9 of April destroyed the mediaeval Guild 
Hall, and damaged many houses and buildings in the city cen-
tre. And in the final raids on Canterbury on 31 May and 1 June, 
although the loss of life was mercifully small, the ‘ecclesiastical 
metropolis’ lost a number of churches, two schools, the Corn 
Exchange, the City Market and many houses and shops.136
Architecture embodies memories, and familiar buildings shape 
and reinforce how people feel about their built environment. 
When something as ostensibly permanent as a church, cathe-
dral, town hall or any ancient public building is obliterated, not 
only the environment but the memory of the environment is dis-
rupted.137 Beyond the bereavement of those who had lost loved 
ones, and the pain and suffering endured by injured people living 
in these beautiful cities, many survivors grieved for the buildings 
Air Raids in Britain, 1940–45 71
they had known and loved, and the streets they had grown up in. 
As Michael Hebbert argues, the street is a locus of collective mem-
ory, a hub of social life, where personal identity and urban iden-
tity fused. Hebbert points to other contexts of destruction such 
as slum clearance, urban renewal and highway building, where 
residents attempted to defend their communities from the devel-
oper or the local authority.138 But citizens under the bomb were 
powerless. Beautiful streets and buildings had lain at the heart 
of the historical identity of the cities, and now they lay in ruins. 
These had also been spaces of sociability where people worked, 
enjoyed leisure, or worshipped. So the legacy of destruction went 
deep: loss was felt immediately and brought about feelings akin to 
grief for something that could not be brought back.
Of course, such emotions were not just confined to those who 
lived in the cities attacked during the Baedeker Raids, but were 
common to anyone who saw their little corner of the world left in 
ruins by bombs and fires. Prior to the war the British Medical Jour-
nal published an article in July 1939 on ‘demolition melancholia’. 
The term, coined by a Medical Officer in Sheffield, was applied 
to those who, mostly elderly and mostly women, had experi-
enced profound feelings of loss on ‘the sudden dispossession of 
a lifelong home to which the patients have probably developed a 
strong emotional attachment’.139 The state of mind referred to here 
was caused by removal from an old home to a new house in the 
suburbs or beyond. But the complex of feelings induced by the 
brutal overnight destruction of known and familiar worlds must 
have included displacement, mild depression, loneliness and an 
inability to adapt to new circumstances. Such emotions, of course, 
are felt by many people in similar circumstances of destruction. 
Hence the historical study of air raids and their consequences 
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possesses a powerful relevance to the growing academic fields of 
Disaster Studies and Trauma Studies.140
The Revenge Weapons, 1944–5
In January 1944 German bombers returned to London for a 
relatively small-scale re-run of the conventional HE and fire-
bombing raids they had visited upon London some four years 
earlier. An unwelcome reminder of the earlier campaign, the air 
raids of early 1944 were dubbed the ‘little Blitz’, and killed over a 
thousand people.141 Yet during the summer of 1944 worse was to 
come, and it would manifest itself in a frightening new weapon. 
For some months rumours had been circulating in Britain about 
a flying bomb that had no pilot and which could be guided almost 
mysteriously through the air at great speed to attack the capital 
city.142 This was the V1, the ‘V’ standing for vengeance. The Allied 
bombing campaign against German cities and industrial towns 
had intensified during 1943 and into 1944. Hitler, outraged by 
these damaging intrusions into the Fatherland, was keen to see 
the development of the flying bomb expedited to its deadliest 
effect.
The inventor of the vengeance weapons was the rocket scien-
tist Wernher von Braun. His conceptual expertise was converted 
into deadly hardware by slave labour at the research base in Peen-
emünde, on the Baltic Coast of Germany.143 The first V1 launched 
against Britain fell not on London but on Gravesend in Kent. But 
on the 13 June, however, a warm summer day in London was 
cruelly interrupted by the first V1 rockets to hit the capital city, 
smashing into a railway bridge in Bow, East London, cutting the 
railway line.144
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Launched on Britain from bases in Northern France between 
June and September 1944, the flying bomb possessed a distinc-
tive sonic signature, a rattling and chugging sound, a little like an 
intermittent moped somewhere on high. Then the noise would 
suddenly cease, as the fuel was cut off, and the bomb fell to the 
ground. This was not a highly accurate technology, and many fell 
harmlessly into the sea or onto open countryside. Those that did 
get through however brought a new phase of death and destruc-
tion. Many Londoners became weary and fearful at the incessant 
threat and irregular strikes of the doodlebug. Home Intelligence 
reports described exaggerated and fabricated stories about deaths 
and destruction circulating among the public, and identified a 
significant lowering of morale in June and July, 1944.145 Increas-
ing numbers of voluntary evacuees left London, and there were 
more complaints about the inadequacy of shelter provision, and 
symptoms of ‘strain’ and ‘weariness’. Herbert Morrison was booed 
while in East London.146 More Anderson shelters were produced, 
along with the indoor home shelters or Morrison shelters, origi-
nally introduced by the government towards the end of the Blitz 
in 1941.147 These would prove to be of little use against the next 
fearsome weapon to hit London.
The V2 flying rocket was much more difficult to defend against 
than the doodlebug. Its faster, higher searing power made it almost 
impossible to deter. The final version of the flying rocket was test 
launched in Germany in August 1944, and on 18 September 1944 
the first V2 to hit England smashed into the west London suburb 
of Chiswick, destroying a pair of interwar semi-detached homes 
in Staveley Road. Croydon and other south London boroughs 
were hit by many V2 attacks, but two were particularly tragic. In 
New Cross in Deptford, 168 people were killed while Christmas 
74 The Blitz Companion
shopping in Woolworth’s department store, while soon after-
wards Smithfield Meat Market in Farringdon 115 people lost their 
lives. V2s also hit central London; the upscale department store 
of Selfridge’s was also damaged during the pre-Christmas rush 
to buy presents.148 The fiction feature film Operation Crossbow 
(1965), a British spy thriller about wartime attempts to sabotage 
the V2 programme, contains some vivid scenes of flying rockets 
smashing into the streets of London, killing anyone at the point 
of impact. (See Fig. 5).
The V1 and V2 attacks brought the suburbs back into the war, 
again exposing the failure of Angus Calder to view the suburban 
experiences of air raids in a serious and detailed manner:
V1s alone damaged to some degree 54,000 houses in 
Croydon and 18,000 out of 22,000 in Sutton and Cheam. 
Twice as many V2s fell on outer London as on inner, and 
the frontline status of London’s Essex suburbs later in 
the war was sufficient to win it the nickname ‘Doodle-
bug Alley’.149
By the end of the war V-weapon craters pockmarked the metropo-
lis. The V1s killed over 5,000 people and injured 15,000, while the 
V2s that smashed into London from September 1944 to March 
1945 caused over 2,700 fatalities.150 These losses were perceived 
as particularly tragic and futile as the war drew towards its close. 
London did not suffer the V2 alone, moreover. They were fired 
on Paris as the Germans were defeated during August 1944. The 
port city of Antwerp in Belgium was liberated in September 1944, 
but the retreating and resentful Germans took revenge with a hail 
of flying rocket attacks which smashed into the city during the 
months of November and December 1944, killing both civilians 
and military personnel. After London, Antwerp was the most 
heavily attacked city by the V2. A tragedy reminiscent of some of 
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those visited upon London occurred at the Rex Cinema in central 
Antwerp in mid-December when a flying rocket killed 567 people, 
nearly 300 of them American, British and Canadian soldiers.151
Conclusion
The Nazi Blitz on London, the Baedeker Blitz, sporadic air raids 
and the V-weapons only partly succeeded in their intention to 
destroy the built environment of British cities. More impor-
tantly, they failed to destroy the morale of the British people. 
Although many citizens felt fear, trepidation and sometimes 
panic, the overriding patterns of behaviour were defined by 
bravery, heroism and stoicism, with a dose of cheerful humour 
thrown in for good measure. A key word here is ‘resilience’, 
the ability of a city and its people to survive and renew after a 
devastating event.152
London had suffered sustained aerial bombardment first, and 
‘took it’ more than most cities, but even those urban areas that 
suffered relatively higher levels of environmental destruction 
when their size is considered, notably Coventry and some of the 
port cities, demonstrated resistance and resilience. The Blitz on 
Britain revealed that those dire pre-war prognostications of anar-
chy and chaos, and the anticipated collapse of civil society, simply 
did not materialise. The British had proved the pre-war experts, 
both military and political, wrong. Even during the V-weapon 
raids from 1944–5 the increasing fragility of spirit among many 
Londoners refused to break down. Hence Londoners and Brit-
ish people more generally were establishing an important pattern 
that can be traced in almost all subsequent air raids. The Blitz, and 
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Introduction
During the Second World War the Germans bombed most of their 
neighbouring countries to the east, north and west. In 1941 the 
relatively forgotten air raids on Soviet cities began following the 
collapse of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the failure of the Blitz on Brit-
ain. For their part, the USSR also engaged in attacks on the allies of 
Nazi Germany at various times during the war. The British began 
bombing German cities in August 1940 and stepped up the Allied 
bombing campaigns from 1942, assisted by the United States Army 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Clapson, M. 2019. e Blitz Companion. Pp. 77–95. London: University of  
Westminster Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997/book26.d. License:  
CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
78 The Blitz Companion
Air Force (USAAF). Significant bombing raids were also mounted 
by British and American air forces on  Nazi-occupied European 
countries, notably France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Italy was 
also bombed both by the Allies and the Nazis.
Much of this has been covered by Overy in his peerless histories 
of the bombing war in Europe. Furthermore, a convenient short 
cut into his and others’ work on the effects of bombing on cities 
and civilians can be found on the webpages of the Centre for the 
Study of War, State and Society at Exeter University, where Overy is 
based. Drawing upon these materials and other sources, this chap-
ter focuses upon the experiences of European urban populations 
as the bombs rained down. While it would be impossible in a book 
of this scope to provide a completely representative picture of all 
air raids and their victims, the chapter does focus upon the most 
significant or infamous bombing raids and their consequences 
for civilians. Key themes and similarities with the experience and 
behaviour of civilian populations are identified across counties.
Blitzkrieg over Europe
The German attacks on Barcelona and Guernica during the Span-
ish Civil War provided minor dress rehearsals for the massive 
suffering inflicted by Nazis upon European cities from Septem-
ber 1939. On the first day of that month, Operation Wasserkante 
was launched against the Polish capital city, Warsaw. Blitzkrieg 
had begun, and with it, the Second World War. The Luftwaffe 
entered the war with over 4,300 combat aircraft, and deployed 
over 1.5 million military personnel during the invasion of Poland. 
Although the Nazis had carefully studied Polish strengths and 
weaknesses, and possessed overwhelmingly favourable resources, 
the Poles resisted bravely. But heavy air raids on the people and 
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urban fabric of Warsaw during the early days of September 1939 
led to a bloody and hugely destructive victory for the Germans.153 
Anyone searching online for images of the Warsaw Blitz can find 
many photographs of environmental destruction, and harrow-
ing images of the people killed, maimed or left homeless by the 
bombings. The air raids were significant not only for their indis-
criminate targeting of the urban population, but for the barbaric 
manner in which German fighter pilots wilfully selected individ-
ual civilians in the open spaces of Warsaw, and strafed them with 
machine gun fire.
In April 1940, Denmark and Norway were targeted for invasion 
by the Nazis. Sweden remained neutral throughout the war, while 
Finland was an ally of Germany. On 10 May 1940, however, Nazi 
Germany simultaneously invaded Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. Four days later the Luftwaffe mounted a further 
infamous bombing raid on the historic Dutch port city of Rotter-
dam. Dive bombers attacked mostly military and commercial tar-
gets, and communications. Although no incendiary bombs were 
deployed, the resultant fires killed almost one thousand people, 
mostly civilians. Over twenty thousand buildings were burned 
down and 78,000 people rendered homeless. Rotterdam yielded 
quickly to the invasion forces, but even historians who have been 
sometimes sympathetic to Nazi war narratives have viewed the 
bombing of Rotterdam as excessive: the Germans had ‘sewn the 
wind’ and would reap a terrible harvest later in the war.154
Polish cities would again be bombed in late June 1941 as Hitler 
launched Operation Barbarossa, the abortive attempt to invade 
the USSR in pursuit of Lebensraum (German living space). The 
Nazis followed a strategy of interdiction, an attempt to disrupt 
and destroy Soviet materiel, personnel and supply lines. Many 
civilians were killed in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the 
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Ukraine and Soviet Russia. The initial air war instigated a terrible 
period of German war crimes and atrocities in Eastern Europe in 
1941, including the mass starvation of over 3 million people and 
thousands of summary executions. The Nazis deported, executed 
and tortured about a million Jewish people during Operation Bar-
barossa, which came to an end as the Red Army prevailed in the 
winter months of 1941, during the five-month Battle of Stalingrad. 
The Luftwaffe initially enjoyed air superiority during the early 
phase of the campaign, and Soviet cities were heavily bombed. 
Minsk suffered twenty-one air raids in June and July 1941, and 
Moscow was attacked from 21 July to 22 August. Neither of these 
urban campaigns were very successful in military terms, argues 
Overy. Loss of civilian life was slight, but on 22 September Hitler 
called for Leningrad ‘to be erased from the earth.’155 The city was 
bombed during the autumn and winter of 1941, and again in April 
1942. Despite Hitler’s apocalyptic claim, bombing and destruction 
was on a relatively small scale. High casualty rates in the Battle 
of Stalingrad, and a significant lengthy bombing of Moscow and 
Leningrad, failed to lead to the capitulation of Soviet citizens. The 
Soviet Civil Defence Programme and the Self Defence Groups that 
mobilised against the Germans were certainly operating within a 
totalitarian system, but they played a significant role in defeating 
the expansionist plans of the Nazis.156
The failure of Operation Barbarossa is widely viewed by mili-
tary historians as a turning point in the Second World War. Nazi 
Germany suffered heavy losses of men and materiel in an igno-
minious defeat, which now presaged a more coordinated response 
by the Allies, particularly after the USA entered the European 
arena in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941. And those nations that had supported the Nazi 
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invasion – Hungary, Romania and the Slovaks – suffered retalia-
tory air raids from the Russians towards the end of the war, as did 
Finland, used as a launching pad for Nazi air raids. Helsinki was 
subject to three heavy air raids in 1944, but according to Overy 
they had little impact on the city and its people, nor on the out-
come of the war.157
The Ordeal of France
France was subjected to over a quarter of the Allied bombing in 
wartime Europe.158 From the Blitzkrieg and the Fall of France in 
1940, through campaigns to target Nazi V-weapon launch sites 
during 1944, and the heavy bombing during the fight to liber-
ate the French from Nazi occupation, many towns and cities 
suffered extensive levels of destruction. Almost 60,000 French 
civilians were killed, and twenty of the largest industrial cities 
were declared ‘bombed out’ during the Second World War.159 
Most were in north-eastern France. In Alsace-Lorraine for exam-
ple industrial and mining areas were bombed the urban centres 
of Metz, Mulhouse, St. Dié and Strasbourg suffered extensive 
destruction.160
Lyndsey Dodd extends the notion of the ‘Blitz’, traditionally 
associated with Britain, to the French civilian experience of bomb-
ing, arguing that the ‘Blitz’ was a transnational phenomenon.161 
Using oral history, she provides an often emotional account of the 
devastation to homes, streets, communities and families in the 
industrial region around Lille in north-eastern France. She also 
portrays the effect on the individual. Since the later twentieth cen-
tury social history has witnessed an increasing focus on the body 
as the locus of historical change, and Dodd shows how the fragile 
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bodies of children were affected by the invasive and cruel nature 
of bombing, and provides vivid images of distorted corpses being 
extricated from bombsites. Her oral history focuses upon subjec-
tivity: the way her oral respondents experienced, remembered 
and processed what they went through.
While the ‘Blitz spirit’ was alive amongst those who lived in the 
ruins of French urban communities, the theme of the ferocious 
disruption to people and places is powerfully evident in oral tes-
timonies. ‘Finding home intact was a relief,’
After that life continued in the monotonous bombscape. 
Walking through once familiar streets, Cécile saw ‘ru-
ined houses, ruined houses, ruined houses. All down the 
street – another one, and another.’ Lucien too illustrated 
such stunned disbelief: ‘Now it was just a field of ruins. 
The whole district destroyed. We walked for months and 
months in ruins. There was nothing to repair it with.162
Overy details the wider social impact of the bombing of French 
cities during 1943–4, and the outrage and resentment that many 
French people felt. In Lorient and Nantes for example, the ferocity 
and destruction of Allied air raids in the autumn of 1943 led the 
Germans and French to combine forces to put out fires, patch up 
buildings and repair infrastructure. The area bombings of Nantes 
also exposed weaknesses in the evacuation scheme organised by 
the French government. Many perished unnecessarily.163 Large 
tracts of the urban-industrial sprawl of north-eastern France lay 
in ruins by the time liberation was secured in the summer of 1944.
The Bombing of Italian Cities
Over 60,000 people were killed by air raids in wartime Italy. This 
tragedy was triggered on 10 June 1940 when the Italian leader 
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Benito Mussolini declared war on Britain and France. Now that 
Britain had its metaphorical back to the wall, and the Nazis had 
occupied Paris, Mussolini felt he was on the winning side. In Brit-
ain, Italians were swiftly interned, and the RAF began its bombing 
campaign firstly upon Italian military positions, but soon after-
wards against cities. The day after Italy took up arms against the 
Allies, Turin was bombed, and other Italian cities came under 
attack, notably Milan, Genoa, Taranto and Naples. As the Univer-
sity of Exeter’s Centre for the Study of War, State and Society web-
page notes, the historic heart of Venice was spared. But during the 
campaign to oust the Italian fascist dictatorship, heavy bombing 
was inflicted on the historic capital of Rome. In northern Italy, 
Genoa, Milan and Turin were among the leading urban centres 
to come under attack, while in southern Italy Naples and Taranto, 
and Palermo and other Sicilian cities were bombed by the Allies, 
particularly the USAAF. The Germans also bombed Italy follow-
ing the Allied landings, but in vain, as the Italians surrendered to 
the Allies on 8 September 1943.164
The historic period between the surrender and the final defeat 
of fascism in the summer of 1945 witnessed further Allied and 
German air raids on Italian cities. As in all other air campaigns 
over cities, the death and destruction visited upon urban popula-
tions profoundly distorted the environment, and tragically dis-
rupted people’s lives. The fusion of personal experience with the 
degraded cityscape is expressed beautifully on website of the Cen-
tre for the Study of War, State and Society:
Cities became symbolic and emotional spaces which 
had to be defended by their inhabitants when their ‘soul’ 
was wounded by bombs: for many civilians, an outrage 
to their home town was an outrage to the motherland. 
Grazia Alfieri Tarentino, a young woman in Milan from 
84 The Blitz Companion
1941, for example, expressed a painful resentment of the 
enemy when she saw La Scala theatre burning: it was 
‘all that had remained of the heart of the city’. In Oc-
tober 1944, when a bomb killed 200 school children in 
the Gorla working class district of Milan, she witnessed 
the pain and the tragedy of innocent children. The whole 
city was in mourning on the day of the funerals, the 
women in black beside the small white graves:
On the church square, among the silent crowd, some-
one dared to say: ‘these are the Anglo-Americans, assas-
sins of children’. Among the sincere pain, propaganda was 
insinuating; on the walls posters appeared with images of 
death to remind those who persisted in refusing to believe 
it, that the so-called ‘liberators’ were the enemies …. Ideas 
were confused.165
The resentment felt towards the forces that were effectively liber-
ating Italy from fascist occupation and Nazi aggression is palpa-
ble, while the reference to the wounded ‘soul’ of the city implicitly 
references the spiritual desolation many Italians felt as practis-
ing Roman Catholics who held their country to be sacred terri-
tory. Ultimately, however, ill-feeling towards the liberators cannot 
ignore the fact that Mussolini brought the bombs upon Italy.
The RAF Bombing Campaigns Against German 
Cities, 1942–5
The British bombing of Berlin in August 1940 and the smaller 
raids of 1940–1 can be viewed as an early and particular stage in 
the RAF campaign against Germany. British propaganda boasted 
that the RAF was inflicting serious damage on the Nazi war 
effort, but while reassuring, that was far from the truth. The RAF 
engaged in relatively minor attacks on industry, infrastructure 
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and military targets, with limited success. The attacks on Lubeck 
and Rostock were small if highly destructive strikes. In the sum-
mer of 1942, however, the RAF changed tactics.166
When Bomber Command installed Air Marshall Arthur 
‘Bomber’ Harris in February, 1942, the area bombing campaign 
against Germany was significantly ramped up. Concerned that 
the reputation of Bomber Command was waning in Whitehall, 
Harris wanted his air fleet to be much more effective, more deadly 
and destructive, than in previous raids. His famous statement that 
the British had to kill as many ‘Boche’ as possible in order to win 
the war echoed the point made by Baldwin some ten years earlier, 
that victory meant killing more men, women and children of the 
enemy.167 This was expressed in the bluntly described policy of 
‘de-housing’, of rendering the civilian population homeless and 
helpless.168 His justification was that Nazi Germany had started 
the war and mass aerial bombardment, known as area bombing, 
would help to end it. Under the proactive leadership of Harris, 
Bomber Command initiated a programme of massive air raids 
to destroy industrial capacity, infrastructure and housing, and to 
create chaos and submission, the very conditions that Hitler had 
unsuccessfully attempted to create during the Blitz.
With elite officials in the RAF, Harris planned his first signature 
bombing event, the Thousand Bomber Raid on Cologne on the 
30–1 May 1942, which continued until 17 August. The RAF web-
site notes that the exact number of bombers used on the first two 
nights of the raid is unclear, but the figure was most likely up to 
one thousand. Over 3,300 buildings were destroyed, most of them 
by fires. Large-scale firms were put out of action, roads and railway 
lines were incapacitated, and the power supply was destroyed in 
many areas of the city. Hospitals, churches, schools and university 
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buildings, and many shops and places of leisure were razed to the 
ground. Over 13,000 homes were completely destroyed, 6,360 
were seriously damaged and 22,270 less badly damaged. These 
statistics are from an RAF source that notes ‘These details of 
physical damage in Cologne are a good example of the results of 
area bombing’:
Similar results can be expected in those of Bomber 
Command’s raids, which were successful during fol-
lowing years. The estimates of casualties in Cologne are, 
unusually, quite precise. Figures quoted for deaths vary 
only between 469 and 486. The 469 figure comprises 411 
civilians and 58 military casualties, mostly members of 
Flak units. 5,027 people were listed as injured and 45,132 
as bombed out. It was estimated that from 135,000 to 
150,000 of Cologne’s population of nearly 700,000 peo-
ple fled the city after the raid.169
German cities thus witnessed the phenomenon of ‘trekking’ in 
common with British cities under the bomb. The experiences of 
female and child evacuees also demonstrated strong similarities 
with their British counterparts, including feelings of separation 
from family members; rationing and squabbles over food; petty 
or more significant tensions between hosts and evacuees; and 
worries over the loss of the home. A high number of evacuees 
in a city also greatly increased overcrowding and exacerbated the 
struggle to find safe and suitable accommodation. For these rea-
sons, many German evacuees unwittingly emulated their British 
counterparts during the Phoney War: they went back to whence 
they had left, despite official warnings to the contrary.170
When the USAAF began operating from British bases later in 
1942, the capacity for combined bombing offensives between the 
Americans and the British was mobilised to devastating effect. By 
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1943 the British had developed more sophisticated aids to their 
bombing operations, for example a scanning device known as 
the H2S apparatus, which allowed for a more accurate bombing 
of  German urban areas by providing ‘an outline of the city and its 
buildings.’171 The device was first deployed against Hamburg in Jan-
uary 1943, initiating a phase of bombing from March to July of that 
year aimed at Aachen, Krefield, Duisburg, Dortmund, Essen, Wup-
pertal, Dusseldorf, Cologne, Munster, Berlin, Nuremberg, Frank-
furt, Stuttgart and Munich. During the Battle of the Ruhr a number 
of these cities were attacked more than once, and some over many 
nights.172 On the 16–17 May 1943 the RAF instigated one of its most 
famous raids, the attack on the dams of the Mohne and Eder Reser-
voirs, subject of e Dam Busters (1955), a popular British war film 
about the ‘bouncing bombs’ that skimmed across the reservoirs. 
While historians have argued that the military value and the indus-
trial damage of the Dam Busters raids can be overstated, there was 
some impact upon morale. Germans were shocked and saddened at 
the intrusion and at the tales of an ‘incredible deluge’.173
The raids on Dortmund on 23–4 May 1943 saw 2,000 tons of 
bombs dropped, and a death toll of about 15,000 people. Visit-
ing Dortmund after the bombing, the German Minister of Propa-
ganda Joseph Goebbels found the destruction ‘virtually total’ and 
was only cheered by the ‘respectable’ number of planes brought 
down.174 As Stargardt argues, the noise of the raids on Dortmund 
was audible in Cologne, and casualties were rendered higher than 
they might have been by the flooding of air raid shelters caused by 
the bombing of the Mohne dam.175 Contemporary estimates put 
mortalities at 17,000 in Dusseldorf and 27,000 in Wuppertal.176
John Betjeman expressed sentiments that many British men 
and certainly airmen would have agreed with as the Allied bomb-
ing campaign began. In his poem Westminster Abbey he exhorted 
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God to ‘bomb the Germans’ but to ‘Spare their women for Thy 
Sake’.177 Betjeman was also railing against the destruction of beau-
tiful English churches by air raids. Many churches in Cologne 
were smashed to pieces, while the cathedral mostly survived. 
The attack on Cologne was hailed by Bomber Command and 
the British government as proof positive that the RAF were now 
successfully fighting back against the Germans. Yet despite such 
propaganda value the philosopher A.C. Grayling has shown how 
well-prepared the German authorities and German people were 
for the heavy raids on Cologne. While he does not explore the 
degree to which such efficiency was superimposed on the Ger-
man population by the Nazi regime, it could be countered that 
the extensive consent to the regime by millions of Germans did 
not require much coercion.178 German preparations for the attack 
on Cologne greatly ameliorated the death and destruction meted 
out by the raid. As Grayling notes, the city had prepared ‘public 
shelters for 75,000 people’:
with twenty-five deep special bunkers for a further 7,500 
(and twenty-nine additional such bunkers in the process 
of being built). A total of 42,000 small air raid shelters 
had been provided under or next to houses for apart-
ment buildings or residents. Fourteen auxiliary hospitals 
had been constructed, giving an extra 1,760 emergency 
beds. The total cost of air-raid defences in Cologne prior 
to the 1,000 bomber raid was thirty-nine million marks. 
It was money well spent. The 1,000 bombers dropped 
2,500 tons of high explosives and incendiaries, and de-
stroyed centuries of history; the German dead num-
bered 469.179
The raid on Hamburg in the summer of 1943 was the larg-
est following Cologne. The Allies were increasingly deploying 
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 phosphorous incendiary devices to start fires that spread rapidly, 
and Hamburg was to suffer hugely from them. The specific inten-
tions for Hamburg revealed the wider rationale of, and perceived 
justification for, the area bombing of German cities. On 27 May 
1943 Bomber Command’s Operations Order No. 173 made it clear 
that the importance of Hamburg as the second city of Germany 
with a population of over 1.5 million ‘needs no further emphasis’:
The total destruction of this city would achieve immeas-
urable results in reducing the industrial capacity of the 
enemy’s war machine. This, together with the effect on 
German morale, which would be felt throughout the 
country, would play a very important part in shortening 
and winning the war.
The ‘Battle of Hamburg’ cannot be won in a single 
night. It is estimated that at least 10,000 tons of bombs 
will have to be dropped to complete the process of elimi-
nation. To achieve the maximum effect of air bombard-
ment this city should be subjected to sustained attack.
Intention: To destroy Hamburg.180
Bomber Command and the RAF were to operate under cover 
of darkness, while the strategy called for the USAAF to follow 
through with ‘heavy daylight attacks.’181 Given the strength of 
German air defences, and the vagaries of the weather, meticulous 
planning preceded the sustained bombing of Hamburg. Lancas-
ter, Halifax and Stirling bombers carried sizeable loads of pow-
erful HE bombs but ‘a large number of incendiaries are to be 
carried in order to saturate the Fire Service. The proportion of 
high explosive bombs to be carried may be increased after wide-
spread fire damage has been achieved.’182
The tragic and defining consequence of the raids on Hamburg 
was the terrible overnight firestorm that consumed the city and 
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Figure 6: Statue to Sir Arthur Harris, St. Clement’s Danes, 
 Aldwych, London. The inscription reads: ‘In memory of a great 
commander and of the brave crews of Bomber Command, more 
than 55,000 of whom lost their lives in the cause of  freedom. 
The nation owes them all an immense debt’ (photograph by 
author, 2017).
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its population. As Musgrove argues, Harris was delighted with 
the scale of the devastation wrought by the RAF, quoting from 
the Bible that the Germans ‘had sewn the wind, and now they 
reaped the whirlwind’.183 The Hamburg raids lasted for a week 
and resulted in about 40,000 civilian deaths. Much of Hamburg 
was razed to the ground by the terrible firestorms which raged 
through the city.184 People were burnt to ashes, suffocated by the 
lack of oxygen, or died from heat exposure which raised their 
body temperature to intolerable levels. The city was strewn with 
corpses, and the authorities faced a monumental task in clearing 
them away while dealing with practical problems such as gaining 
clean water for the survivors, and rendering buildings safe.185
Many German cities were badly damaged and others bombed 
close to complete destruction by the Allies. Yet the destruction 
of Dresden in eastern Germany, the seventh largest city in the 
country, has been the subject of intense historical attention. The 
‘Florence of the Elbe’ was subjected to bombing raids on 13–14 
February 1945, just a few months before the war in Europe came 
to an end. ‘Operation Thunderclap’ had been planned since July 
1944 as a late knockout blow to the German city, further evidence 
of Harris’s unwavering belief that air power was a key force in 
winning wars.186 In the novel Slaughterhouse 5 by Kurt Vonnegut, 
the narrator Billy Pilgrim is an American ex-prisoner of war who 
was in Dresden when the bombs fell. Years later Pilgrim flicks 
through a copy of the Gideon Bible he finds in his motel room, to 
look for ‘tales of great destruction’ reading ‘Then the Lord rained 
upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the 
Lord out of Heaven; and He overthrew those cities, and all the 
plain, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew 
upon the ground’.187
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Vonnegut must have been aware that the raid on Hamburg in 1943 
was code-named Operation Gomorrah. Dresden was to suffer a 
similar cataclysm. From their bases in Britain nearly 800 RAF 
Lancaster Bombers delivered over 2,646 tons of bombs tons of 
bombs over Dresden, including 1,180 tons of incendiaries, while 
USAAF B-17 Flying Fortresses unloaded over 460 tons of bombs 
the following day. The resulting firestorm devastated its cultural 
treasures as over 15 square miles of the city were devoured by 
flames. Over 75,000 out of 220,000 homes were destroyed.188 The 
German military was forced to use fire in mass cremations of 
the dead, in order to avoid the spread of disease, and to quell the 
stench of putrefying burnt flesh.
One of the earliest historians to interpret the bombing of 
Dresden as an unnecessary atrocity by the Allies was the 
 now-discredited British writer David Irving. e Destruction of 
Dresden (1963) claimed that the firestorms in Dresden were the 
culmination of the allied war on Germany’s cities and civilians. 
Irving estimated that 135,000 people were killed in the February 
air raids, an unscientific estimate that he later revised, and that 
other historians have also questioned. Exact mortality rates are 
impossible to verify due to the unaccounted number of refugees 
and the number of almost completely incinerated corpses that 
did, or did not, receive mass burials. In Slaughterhouse 5 Vonnegut 
references Irving, and as Billy Pilgrim emerges from the under-
ground abattoir, where he had heard the bombing overnight, he 
observes that ‘135,000 Hansels and Gretels’ had been ‘baked like 
gingerbread men’.189 As Overy argues, however, the original esti-
mate by the President of Police for Dresden of about 25,000 mor-
talities is probably the most accurate estimate, although a further 
1,858 skeletons were dug up during the reconstruction of the city 
after 1945.190
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Dresden was so comprehensively wrecked that little of the city 
was left standing at the end of the war. Thousands of refugees had 
also made their way there from the Eastern Front, and this influx 
amplified the death toll. Leading politicians in Britain, includ-
ing the Prime Minister, now questioned the validity of blanket 
bombing. Cynics may view the following assessment by Churchill 
as one based upon public relations and utilitarian consideration, 
rather than any humane sense of remorse:
It seems to me that the moment has come when the 
question of bombing of German cities simply for the 
sake of increasing the terror, though under other pre-
texts, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into 
control of an utterly ruined land. We shall not, for ex-
ample, be able to get housing materials out of Germany 
for our own needs because some temporary provision 
would have to be made for the Germans themselves. The 
destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against 
the conduct of allied bombing.191
But it also asked a serious question of the corruption and selfish-
ness of local Nazi officials whom, as Kevin Wilson argues, were 
lax when setting up air and civil defence facilities for Dresden: 
‘The city authorities had woefully neglected the building of shel-
ters except for themselves’.192 This failing should be accounted for 
when assessing the mortality rate after the February raids, and 
the devastation to the built environment.The bombing of Ger-
man cities represented an intensive campaign of conventional air 
raids deploying HE bombs of varying payloads, parachute mines, 
and incendiary devices. For Bomber Command, as for Churchill, 
Eisenhower and Truman, aerial warfare hastened the end of the 
German war, degrading the urban infrastructure and demoralis-
ing its citizens. The Blitz on Britain had demonstrated the failure of 
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intentions by Nazi military planners, and there was little hard evi-
dence to support the Allied interpretation of German capitulation. 
As Beck argues, ‘it seems clear that the bombings tended to draw 
people together in a community of striving against adversity.’193 
Nicholas Stargardt presents a more nuanced picture of German 
morale and responses to air raids, showing how many used the 
language of ‘taking it’ as did the British during the Blitz. Some tried 
to sleep through the raids, others immediately set about clearing 
away rubble or broken glass from their homes, some demonstrated 
‘strong hearts’ and ‘even developed a kind of pride in what they 
endured’. Others displayed their ‘nerves’ more readily.194 Moreover, 
many Germans manifested anti-Jewish feeling during the air raids, 
blaming the responsibility for them on ‘World Jewry’, unsurprising 
given the anti-Semitic ideology of the Nazi regime. Yet many ordi-
nary Germans simply did not believe the raids on the dams were 
a consequence of ‘Jewish terror’ despite what the Nazi Party told 
them, and blamed the English instead.195
Conclusion
Writing during the early post-war years, the esteemed military 
historian Michael Howard argued that air raids, if anything, ini-
tially strengthened morale by increasing a sense of defiance and 
hatred of the enemy. He admitted, however, that bombing in the 
later stages of war created apathy and war-weariness, but rarely 
the ultimate defeat of civilian fortitude.196 The air raids and their 
consequences discussed in this chapter appear to confirm this 
judgement, even for heavily-bombed Germany.
So whither the reputation of ‘Bomber Harris’? Max Hastings 
views him as sometimes vulgar and narrow-minded, but also as 
a driven and shrewd Commander in Chief, whose indifference to 
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German suffering during the area bombing campaigns contrasted 
with his passionate commitment to his aircrew. He was deeply 
saddened at the losses incurred by the often terrifying raids, and 
often given to bouts of emotional anger.197 For Henry Messenger, 
Harris may have been ‘blinkered, boorish and stubborn’ but he 
inspired his crews to take enormous risks.198 In similar vein to 
Hastings, Messenger argues that the strategy of continuous area 
bombing has been subsequently proven to have been a mistake, 
‘but during much of the war there was no way of knowing this.’199 
Henry Probert, in his study of Harris, even includes an evalua-
tion made in 1959 by the Nazi architect and confidante of Hitler, 
Albert Speer, that the unpredictability and sustained heaviness 
of the raids caused Germany enormous problems, possibly more 
so than defeat on the Russian Front.200 Whether the comparison 
stands or not, within the context of a bitter, continuing and un-
won war, tactics and tragedy were united in the unwavering belief 
of Harris that area bombing was a successful strategy.
Despite the complexity of morale and its ultimately resilient 
nature, some lessons learned or at least believed to have been 
learned from the air raids on Germany were applied by the Amer-
icans to the bombing of Japan from late 1944. Incendiaries had a 
huge and destructive potential in a land known for its traditional 
use of lightweight building materials, and its high concentrations 
of buildings and populations in mountainous country where set-
tlements were only possible on a large scale on the coastal plains 
and some inland areas. The campaigns in Japan were to prove that 
air power could assist the winning of wars.

CHAPTER 5
The Conventional and Atomic 
Bombing of Japan
Introduction
The remarkable history of modern Japan began with the arrival of 
Admiral Perry from the United States during the 1850s.201 Centu-
ries of self-imposed isolation came to an end. During the follow-
ing decades and long into the twentieth century Japan underwent 
a torturous modernisation process. Industrialisation and urbani-
sation swept through the country. Large multi-faceted corpora-
tions came into existence, many supported by modernisers in the 
Japanese government who looked to Germany and the United 
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States as exemplars of commercial and manufacturing econo-
mies. Liberals in Japan were impressed by British parliamentary 
democracy and the social reforms of the Victorian and Edward-
ian years, and pushed for Japan to become more democratic, less 
hide-bound by religious and patriarchal traditions. Against these 
ambitious projects traditionalists in Japan invoked isolationism, 
the samurai military code, and the religious culture of a patriar-
chal Shintoism to prevent westernisation and the perceived pol-
lution of moral values. A powerful reactionary, militaristic and 
conservative coalition of politicians versus a smaller clique of lib-
eral reformers cleaved Japanese society and politics prior to, and 
during, the Second World War.202
Presided over by Emperor Hirohito, 1930s Japan aligned itself 
with the fascist dictatorships of Germany and Italy, creating the 
Axis Powers. This triangulation between Europe and the North 
Pacific led to catastrophe for the Japanese that few in the coun-
try envisaged prior to the air raids on Pearl Harbor in December 
1941. This incursion brought the USA into the war and marked a 
huge step on the road to the devastation and defeat of Japan.
The Pacific War and the Conventional Bombing of 
Japanese Cities
A foretaste of the conventional air campaigns over Japan came 
during the ‘Doolittle Raid’ in April 1942, named after their mis-
sion leader Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle. Also known as 
the first Tokyo Raid, sixteen US bombers attacked military and 
industrial targets in and around the Japanese capital as payback 
for the attack on Pearl Harbor. A number of civilians were killed, 
and a small number of American pilots were captured and exe-
cuted. While returning from the raid, however, some members 
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of the air crews made it to China where they bailed out or crash 
landed due to inadequate fuel supplies.203
With help from many friendly Chinese people, most of the pilots 
made it home following ‘America’s first World War Two victory’. 
Yet Doolittle and his crew had inadvertently and tragically sowed 
the seeds of a vicious revenge taken by the Japanese against the 
Chinese who had assisted the American airmen. In his study of 
the Doolittle Raid and their aftermath, James M. Scott argues that 
the Japanese began their terrible revenge from June 1942. Subse-
quently, the Japanese Air Force mounted raids on the Chinese city 
of Chaozhou, killing over 10,000 people, leaving 27,000 destitute, 
and devastating the urban infrastructure and agriculture of the 
surrounding region. Many suffered from the appalling treatment 
that the Japanese had meted out to the Chinese since the ‘Rape of 
Nanking’ in 1937.204 The ferocity of Japanese behaviour in China 
was symptomatic of the wider course of Japanese history. The his-
toric nature of Japanese military culture was a legacy of hundreds 
of years of atavistic isolationism that explained the conservatism 
and intransigence of hyper-nationalist Japanese leaders until the 
very end of the War in the Pacific.
In his famous address to the US Congress in May 1943, Church-
ill summed up Allied war aims for Japanese cities in stark terms. 
‘It is the duty of those who are charged with the direction of the 
war’:
to begin the process, so necessary and desirable, of laying 
the cities and other munitions centres of Japan in ashes, 
for in ashes they must surely lie before peace comes back 
to the world.
It was an apocalyptic vision of urban destruction in the cause 
of global democracy. Churchill was well aware of the power of 
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bombing to turn cities to ashes. The firestorms caused by the area 
bombing in Germany had also convinced the USAAF that incen-
diary devices would be particularly effective in Japan, where light 
construction materials and wooden houses would go up in flames 
relatively quickly.205
Tokyo was attacked from the air many times from Novem-
ber 1944. American air raids on Japan were celebrated in Target 
Tokyo, an official military documentary film dedicated to all per-
sonnel on the mission. Narrated by the actor who would become 
President, Ronald Reagan, the film begins with preparations 
for the bombing campaigns in American air bases. Unasham-
edly patriotic, visuals and voiceover play to the fact that young 
American men from all walks of life and states of the country 
are serving their nation. This was an American trope of wartime 
unity and national effort, wherein a vast teeming continent could 
come together in the singular aim of defeating Japan. The iconic 
B-29, or Superfortress, is also celebrated in the film: ‘designed to 
carry more destruction, to carry it higher, faster, farther than any 
bomber built before’.
Taking off from Saipan, the bombers fly high and away, reach-
ing Tokyo as Reagan states ‘Within a radius of fifteen miles of the 
Imperial Palace live seven million Japanese’:
people we used to think of as small, dainty, polite, con-
cerning themselves only with floral arrangements and 
rock gardens, and the cultivation of silk worms. But it 
isn’t silk worms, and it isn’t imperial palaces these men 
are looking for. In the suburbs of Tokyo is the huge Naka-
jima aircraft plant. Well bud, what are you waiting for?206
The bomb doors open to expose the expansive city below. Mar-
tial music accompanies the sight of B-29s raining HE bombs 
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on Tokyo. No destruction is pictured but the Battle for Japan is 
declared underway.
Yet from March 1945 the bombing of Japan was intensified. 
Authorisation for the firebombing of Japanese cities was given 
by General Curtis LeMay. In charge of the Eighth Air Force, he 
led bombing missions over Germany from late 1942 until he 
was transferred into the Pacific War operations, taking charge 
of 21st Bomber Command in July 1944. Having witnessed the 
firestorms in Germany, LeMay felt that firebombing would 
shorten the war in Japan. During the final year of the war the 
USAAF engaged in a huge and coordinated firebombing of 
 Japanese cities. In addition to HE bombs, incendiary devices 
now rained down upon hundreds of thousands of  commercial 
and municipal buildings and on homes made of wooden frames 
and interior paper walls.
The Great Tokyo Air Raid on 9–10 March 1945 threw into relief 
the nature and consequences of the new campaign. Nearly three 
hundred B-29 bombers unloaded over 1,665 tons (1,510,463 
kilograms) of incendiaries. Over 100,000 people were killed, 
mostly by the conflagration that engulfed the Shitamachi district 
of Tokyo and its environs. Thousands were burned alive, others 
suffocated as the oxygen was consumed by fire. A million were 
rendered homeless and almost 16 square miles (41.4 square kilo-
metres) of Tokyo were, as Churchill had wished, in ashes.207
An oral history of the Japanese people at war provides vivid 
memories of the effect on those below the bomb doors. With faint 
but discernible echoes of the ‘Phoney War’ in Britain, one woman 
recalled being sent home with her friends from their evacuation 
area in a nearby town just days before the raid because of the rela-
tive infrequency of attacks. Then the incendiaries began hitting 
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the school and other public buildings as people rushed to the air 
raid shelters. Flames soared from factory windows, people rushed 
into the nearby park, while others threw themselves into the river 
to escape the searing heat. Many were drowned. Others burned to 
death in streets and shelters. And many also rushed to the safety 
of the nearby countryside, a common form of escape from air 
raids.208
Japan is a mountainous and wooded country whose lowlands 
host the vast majority of the population in towns and cities of 
varying sizes. Across the length and breadth of the main island of 
Honshu, the smaller northern island Hokkaido, and the southern 
island of Kyushu, American area bombing did enormous dam-
age. The architectural historian Neil Jackson points to important 
differences between the Japanese and European experiences of 
urban bombing. European cities were bombed to almost com-
plete destruction over relatively long periods but their ruins 
remained partly inhabitable. The urban bombing experience in 
Japan, however, saw large swathes of cities razed to the ground in 
just a few hours by incendiary bombing.209 Homelessness became 
an immediate and pressing issue.
Even swifter devastation was visited on Hiroshima and Naga-
saki in August 1945: both of these southern Japanese cities were 
wiped out in less than three minutes by the atomic bomb.210 The 
atomic bombings held within their impact and the devastating 
aftermath a question mark for the future survival of humanity. 
Three important questions can be asked here, which historians 
profoundly disagree upon. First, why did the USA knowingly kill 
so many innocent civilians in the final phase of the war? Second, 
did the devastating raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki actually ter-
minate the Pacific War, or was this caused by other factors, thus 
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rendering the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki unnecessary 
tragedies? Third, were the atomic bombings of Japan ethically and 
morally worse than the conventional air raids that killed greater 
numbers of people?
The Manhattan Project
In order to understand the widespread deadly and destructive con-
sequences of the atom bomb, and the reasons why it was deployed, 
some knowledge of its provenance is necessary. The atomic bomb 
was developed in the USA during the course of the Second World 
War. While forever associated with American technological 
prowess and power, the Manhattan Project drew upon weapons 
research in Europe. As Paul Ham argues, the ‘Paris Group’ of sci-
entists for example first discovered the power of nuclear fission 
in 1939, while the wartime Maud Committee in Britain initiated 
the Tube Alloys programme to develop a British atomic weapon. 
While German bombs were raining down on London and other 
British cities the Maud Committee was, in effect, unwittingly pre-
paring the ground for the instantaneous destruction to be visited 
upon Japan. The British atomic weapons programme and some 
key personnel were subsumed into the Manhattan Project once 
the USA entered the Second World War.211
Fear that Nazi Germany might reach the terrible achievement 
of atomic weaponry before the Allies drove research and devel-
opment into the controlled destructive potential of uranium and 
plutonium. A further justification for the Manhattan Project in 
the USA and the development of the atomic bomb was the great 
strides that Nazi Germany made in guided missile and rocket 
technology during the Second World War, technology that had 
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visited death and destruction on British and European cities 
in 1944. Supposing the Germans been a few steps ahead of the 
Allies, and particularly the Americans, the terrible counterfactual 
scenario could have seen the Nazis dropping atomic bombs on 
London and New York. As President Truman noted privately at 
the Potsdam Summit in July 1945, ‘It is certainly a good thing 
for the world that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this 
atomic bomb.’212
The USSR, although an ally against the Germans following the 
collapse of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1941, was also deemed to be 
a post-war threat, lending further urgency to the Manhattan Pro-
ject. Chief among the foreign experts heading up the research was 
Julius Robert Oppenheimer, a Jewish physicist investigating the 
formula at which uranium would reach the critical mass that led to 
a ferocious chain reaction. He calculated the critical mass of ura-
nium-235 to make the atomic bomb effective, and together with 
his team of brilliant expat physicists developed the construction of 
graphite blocks embedded with uranium that formed the atomic 
bomb.213
The first nuclear bomb in history was not dropped from the air 
but was detonated in the New Mexico desert on 16 July 1945. As 
an American scientific advisor to the government wrote:
in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New 
Mexico, the first full-scale test was made of the implo-
sion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in his-
tory there was an explosion. And what an explosion!214
Following the death of Roosevelt in 1945, Harry S. Truman was 
sworn in as the US President. According to the Truman Library 
website, the favourite poem of the president was Locksley Hall 
by Tennyson, with its prognostications of celestial warfare.215 
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 Truman informed Churchill and Stalin of the momentous event 
in New Mexico at the Potsdam Summit which began on 17 July. 
 Truman and his Secretary of State for War Henry Stimson were 
persuaded by US scientific advisors that dropping the atom bomb 
on significant Japanese targets would hasten the end of the war 
and save American lives. As Robert Griffith has argued, however, 
in a paragraph worth quoting at length, the decision to use atomic 
weapons raises ‘chilling moral questions’:
To what extent was the decision influenced by racial 
prejudice and by the institutionalised wartime depiction 
of the Japanese as evil and inhuman? Before using the 
bomb should the United States have demonstrated its 
terrible destructiveness – perhaps in Tokyo harbour, as 
some scientists suggested at the time – or at least have 
provided an explicit warning? Was the use of atomic 
bombs, weapons that in a blinding instant killed tens of 
thousands of men, women and children, immoral? Was 
the bombing any more immoral than the reliance on 
weapons that produced the millions of other deaths dur-
ing World War 2, than the aerial assaults on London or 
Dresden, or than the awful firebombing of Tokyo? What 
is one to say of a weapon that not only kills, but through 
radiation and the resulting genetic damage, continues to 
kill long after the debris settles?216
‘Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic’, 
argued Truman:
we as the leader of the world, for the common welfare 
of humanity, cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old 
capital [Kyoto] or the new [Tokyo]. [The] target will be 
a purely military one and we will issue a warning state-
ment asking the Japs to surrender and save lives.217
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Accusations of racism sometimes form too quickly on the lips 
and keypads of many left and liberal academics today, but it is 
not unreasonable to highlight the brutal behaviour that led to the 
stereotypes.218 Truman would have been fully aware of the terrible 
atrocities committed by the Japanese against the Chinese during 
the later 1930s and the Second World War, while in the arenas 
of combat between Japan and the Allies, American and British 
prisoners of war were tortured, starved, kicked, doused in petrol 
and set on firm, beaten, or beheaded. Over 150 Australian sol-
diers were bayoneted to death after being tied to trees. And in 
one unconscionable episode, an American crew were dissected by 
Japanese doctors who extracted vital organs and performed inva-
sive brain surgery while their victims were alive and conscious.219
Truman was writing on 25 July. The Japanese government was 
issued with the Potsdam Declaration the following day, in which 
Britain, China and the US called for unconditional  surrender 
from Japan. The Japanese government rejected the declaration. 
And while some Japanese politicians were softening their stance 
on surrender, fearful of the consequences, others were not so 
inclined. This culture of defiance persisted despite the fact that 
much of the Japanese economy was unable to function. The 
Soviet Union was by then fighting back Japanese forces in China, 
bringing further humiliation, but no declarations of surrender.220 
Hence to hasten victory, the Americans decided to target the port 
cities of Hiroshima in Honshu, the largest of the Japanese islands, 
and Nagasaki, in the island of Kyushu. Both contained industry 
and military facilities, and were not associated with large num-
bers of prisoners of war.
On the early morning of 6 August 1945 a Boeing B-29 Super-
fortress infamously named ‘Enola Gay’ flew from the American 
Pacific Base on the island of Tinian toward the city of Hiroshima, 
The Conventional and Atomic Bombing of  Japan 107
a large industrial, commercial and maritime centre with a popu-
lation of 350,000 people. Piloted by Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, the 
B-29 was carrying Little Boy, a 9,000-pound uranium-235 device 
attached to a parachute. It detonated some 200 metres above the 
hypocentre marked by the domed Industrial Promotional Hall. 
Apart from a few steel-framed and reinforced concrete buildings 
almost everything within a two-kilometre radius of the hypocen-
tre, including some 50,000 buildings and homes, was obliterated. 
Estimates vary, but at least 70,000 people died almost instanta-
neously, and at least 40,000 more subsequently perished from 
cancer and other terminal illnesses related to the radiation that 
seared through the city and its suburbs.221
The death and destruction caused by Little Boy might have been 
the context for a Japanese surrender. Griffith points to the judge-
ment of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in 1946 that 
Japan was about to surrender even if no atomic bombs had been 
dropped. This has been a keystone of the anti-war position toward 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki ever since, and also of those who view the 
atomic bombings as a ‘crime against humanity’. The philosopher 
A. C. Grayling, for example, also appears to accept uncritically 
the view that the Japanese were ‘suing for peace’ months before 
the atomic bombs were detonated.222 As Robert Maddox argues, 
however, while the Japanese were certainly on the verge of defeat, 
the real problem was ‘how long Japanese militarists were willing 
to go on fighting in hope of gaining a negotiated peace through 
Soviet intercession’. In that hiatus, many thousands of American 
lives could have been lost.223 The distinguished Japanese histo-
rian Mikiso Hane argues that the influential militarists and many 
right-wing nationalist politicians were prepared to fight not only 
to the death, but even to call for ‘one hundred million’ to commit 
the glorious sacrifice of death or suicide to defeat the enemy.224 
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In other words, Japanese leaders were prepared for the  collective 
suicide of a nation. Hastings agrees, pointing out that many 
Japanese generals preferred death to humiliation, while the war 
party in the Japanese government remained intransigent to 
the last, even following the Nagasaki bombing.225 As a former 
President of the Japanese Medical Association stated bluntly but 
honestly:
When one considers the possibility that the Japanese 
military would have sacrificed the entire nation if it were 
not for the atomic bomb attack, then this bomb might be 
described as having saved Japan.226
That was a brave statement to make in the face of strong nation-
alist currents of opinion in Japan that refuse to this day to say 
sorry for the Japanese war record. A toxic combination of Japa-
nese intransigence and American determination led to the dev-
astation of Nagasaki just three days after the incineration of 
Hiroshima. Smaller than Hiroshima, Nagasaki was a maritime 
city with shipyards and a sizable naval presence. A B-29 Superfor-
tress, Bockscar, piloted by Major General Charles W. Sweeney and 
Tibbets, flew from Tinian, detonating a 10,000-pound plutonium 
bomb nicknamed Fat Man. Within seconds the blast from the 
bomb killed over 30,000 people, causing injuries and suffering to 
many thousands more. Because Nagasaki was partly surrounded 
by a hinterland of ravines and hills the spread of the radiation 
blast was less extensive than Hiroshima, but the devastation was 
still considerable.227
Having steadfastly refused to surrender, the Japanese now 
did so. In his speech declaring the end of Japanese hostilities, 
Emperor Hirohito showed himself to be a master of understate-
ment. He was also something of an existentialist, grasping the ter-
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rible realities that came with total war and now atomic weaponry. 
The sacrifice of dignity would save not only Japanese lives, but the 
existence of humanity:
But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite 
the best that has been done by everyone  – the gallant 
fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence 
and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the de-
voted service of Our one hundred million people – the 
war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s ad-
vantage, while the general trends of the world have all 
turned against her interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and 
most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, 
indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent 
lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it re-
sult in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japa-
nese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction 
of human civilization.228
It is no exaggeration to argue that the blinding light of the atomic 
bombs put an end to what many Japanese refer to as kurai tanima, 
the ‘dark valley’ of the 1930s and the Second World War.229 Yet the 
bomb alone did not end the war. It was the most spectacular man-
ifestation of the air campaign over Japan, operating in synthesis 
with the advances made by the American navy, and the USSR 
attack on Japanese forces in China in the summer of 1945.230
Yet the fallout from those blasts has reverberated throughout 
post-war history, polarising public and professional opinions, and 
creating a powerful pacifist sentiment in Japan which gained con-
siderable sympathy worldwide. More than that, as Oppenheimer 
and many experts in the summer of 1945 realised, the history of 
the future had now changed irrevocably from what it had been 
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before the bomb detonated in the New Mexico desert. Atomic 
weaponry could not be un-invented, and the shadow of nuclear 
catastrophe became a background insecurity for everyone on the 
planet who was aware of the bomb as the Cold War evolved from 
the late 1940s.231
The Effect on Civilians and the City
The environmental devastation to Hiroshima and Nagasaki has 
been widely depicted and described. Contemporary photographs 
and films by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey evidence 
an obliterated landscape, with only a few reinforced concrete 
buildings standing in ruins above the incinerated remains of the 
buildings and natural landscape. In Hiroshima, the skeletal frame 
of the dome of the Industrial Promotional Hall in the heart of the 
city marked the spot where the detonation of Little Boy occurred 
some metres above it. Like St Paul’s Cathedral, it is crowned by 
a dome. Yet all around the charred trees, flattened shops, offices 
and houses, and the twisted tram lines, reflected the common-
place devastation wrought by aerial bombing and the accompa-
nying firestorm.
Over 100,000 people had been killed instantly by the atomic 
bombs, a shocking statistic yet representing a lower death toll than 
the mortality rate caused by conventional air raids on Japan. The 
nature of the mass injuries and deaths at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
was entirely new, however, creating ‘injuries never before seen on 
mortal creatures’:
the cavalry horse standing pink, stripped of its hide; peo-
ple with clothing patterns imprinted upon their flesh; the 
lines of schoolgirls with ribbons of flesh dangling from 
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their faces; doomed survivors, hideously burned, with-
out hope of effective medical relief; the host of charred 
and shrivelled corpses.232
Testimony from a survivor from Hiroshima vividly describes the 
impact on the bodies of civilians:
I was a 14-year old high school boy at the time of the 
atomic bombing. Students at that time were mobilized to 
tear down certain houses to make firebreaks in the city. 
I was 1.7 kilometres (1 mile) from ground zero on the 
morning of August 6, 1945, so I suffered many serious 
burns on my face and hands, which left large scars known 
as keloids. On the same day, my mother was killed by 
the bomb as were many of my friends and teachers. All 
these sorrows came to me all at once. I was suffering and 
ashamed of my keloid burns all the time, and I did not 
know how to make a living. I felt like shouting at the top 
of my voice in despair. But I could only murmur, ‘If only 
the A-bomb had not been dropped!’ I was completely 
overwhelmed with grief, which resulted in the autism 
from which I suffered for a long time after the war.233
My father has a special ID which is called e Certi -
cation of Victims of the Atomic Bomb. It guarantees he 
can receive free medical care until he dies.234
In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, survivors sought 
shelter as well as medical treatment and water to relieve their 
burns. Many were traumatised by the violent loss of loved ones, 
and the horribly disfigured human casualties dying in front of 
them. Hundreds of others trekked into the nearby countryside 
out of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, away from homes, streets and 
neighbourhoods that had been extinguished forever. Others kept 
walking as far as the next bomb-torn town. In the graphic novel 
series Barefoot Gen, among many testimonies of a survivor of 
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the atomic bombings, the terrible disruption and death wrought 
by the bomb is sketched in gory detail from the perspective of a 
young boy whose family home was obliterated by the blast.235
Those who survived the atomic bombings in August 1945 
possess a uniquely Japanese noun to describe them: they are the 
hibakusha, or ‘bomb-affected people.’236 Beyond the survivors 
of the concentration camps of the Second World War, theirs 
are among the most harrowing accounts of how war disrupts, 
degrades and destroys lives. In his moving account of the hiba-
kusha, Ham interviewed many whose lives had been changed 
for ever, yet who were enormously brave: a woman whose 
face and body bore  terrible scars but who refused to accept a 
date with a man she did not like because she would not let her 
appearance affect her self-esteem; a young girl, whose body was 
burnt, infected, crawling with maggots, and unrecognisable to 
her father who picked her up from the hospital, yet who lived 
while her pretty friend who appeared to have been unblemished 
by the bomb died in terrible pain from radiation sickness a few 
days after the detonation. Age was no barrier to succumbing 
to terminal illness.237 Yet the stories of survival, of the endur-
ance of pain and suffering, represent the fact that even the 
most appalling bombing did not ultimately break the will of the 
people on the ground.238 This lesson had not been learned by 
the Nazis who attacked London again in  1944–5, despite the 
Blitz of 1940–1, nor was it absorbed by the Allies whose ambi-
tion to bomb the German people into submission was mostly 
unfulfilled.
Towards the end of the 1940s the American psychologist Irving 
L. Janis argued in Air War and Emotional Stress that ‘chronic psy-
chological disorders were rarely produced by heavy bombing 
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attacks’. He concluded that while enhanced levels of anxiety, apa-
thy, depression, pessimism and stress were observed in the popu-
lation under the bomb, these were temporary.239 Tom Harrisson 
of Mass Observation drew upon these conclusions as proof that 
even the worst episodes of heavy aerial bombardment, be they 
on British, German and Japanese cities, would not definitively 
destroy the resilience of their citizens.240
More than that, however, the sense of defeat felt in the immediate 
aftermath of the bomb was transformed into powerful sentiment 
of opposition to nuclear weaponry, a process of commemoration 
and memorialisation that, whilst unique to those Japanese civil-
ians who overcame the atomic bombs, shared key similarities 
with memorialisation in other countries. The important histori-
cal legacy of the hibakusha is discussed further in chapter eight.
Verdict
A documentary film by the US War Department in 1946, sharing 
the title of Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, emphasised the 
justifications for the attacks on the ‘arsenal cities’ of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. The film was made for members of the American 
armed forces. That the bombs helped to shorten the war is a key 
theme, and the US War Department did not hold back when 
depicting the devastation to the two cities. It also drew upon the 
testimony of a Roman Catholic Priest to detail the death and 
injuries to the bodies of the Japanese.241 Yet the American inter-
pretation was not one of uncritical triumphalism, and the film 
ends by asking whether the future has to be one of destruction.
One of the pilots who dropped the bomb on Nagasaki, Charles 
Sweeney, returned to the city soon after the war. His feelings were 
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fairly straightforward, as far as this testimony allows, although 
more complex emotions may be hidden beneath his words:
‘I took no pride or pleasure then, nor do I take any now, 
in the brutality of war, whether suffered by my people or 
those of another nation,’ he wrote. ‘Every life is precious. 
But I felt no remorse or guilt that I had bombed the city 
where I stood.’
‘The true vessel of remorse and guilt belonged to the 
Japanese nation, which could and should call to account 
the warlords who so willingly offered up their own peo-
ple to achieve their visions of greatness’, he said.242
The American feature film Above and Beyond (1952) tells the 
story of Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, the B-29 pilot who was trained 
to release the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Tibbets was played 
by the American actor Robert Taylor, who had served in the US 
Naval Air Corps during the Second World War, and was better-
known for his starring roles in Westerns. A key scene depicts 
Enola Gay banking as it turns away from the blinding flash below, 
and the realisation of Tibbets of the magnitude of his task, now 
completed.
In his autobiography, Tibbets recalls how he felt about flying 
over Hiroshima to drop the bomb. ‘In the buildings and on the 
streets there were people, of course’:
but from 6 miles up they were invisible. To the men who 
fly the bombers, targets are inanimate, consisting of build-
ings, bridges, docks, factories, railroad yards. The tragic 
consequences for humanity are erased from one’s thoughts 
in wartime because war itself is a human tragedy.243
Such sensitivities raise questions about simplistic views of war-
fare as the product of testosterone-driven machismo. In his play 
The Conventional and Atomic Bombing of  Japan 115
Happy Birthday, Wanda June (1970), made into a film of the same 
name, Kurt Vonnegut introduces the fictional character of Colo-
nel Looseleaf Harper, a pilot of the B-29 that bombed Nagasaki. 
Alongside the dark humour there are insights into war, con-
nections with the macho hunter of wild animals, and hints of 
post-traumatic stress disorder. This is another trope about war 
in general and bombing in particular: it is an extension of com-
petitive masculinity, a powerful sexual tendency to humiliate, 
dominate, destroy or control. As the writer Oliver Kamm argues, 
sometimes a lack of sophistication and negativity runs through 
Vonnegut’s writings.244 Men were peacemakers too. And those 
who facilitated the development of the atom bomb held nuanced 
views of it. During the Falklands War, moreover, Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher was gung-ho for military intervention com-
pared with some male Conservative politicians whose objections 
to war were viewed as a ‘deficiency in the spirit of machismo.’245 
Ultimately, the decision to drop the bomb was not taken lightly.
Paul Boyer argues that the atomic bomb became a powerful 
motif in post-war American culture. But any notion that the USA 
or the West in general was universally triumphant about the cata-
clysmic events in August 1945 is misleading.246 Many who visited 
the country soon after the war were aghast at what they wit-
nessed. In 1946, the journalist Martin Halliwell wrote a report for 
e Spectator magazine entitled ‘December in Hiroshima’, which 
asked a series of significant questions about the dropping of the 
atom bomb that are still discussed today:
Would a bomb of such known destructive capacity, if 
ready say 6 months earlier, have been dropped without 
warning on a town in Europe? It is difficult to escape the 
feeling that the Japanese, by their remoteness from the 
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Western scene, have been regarded as teeming guinea-
pigs for whom no particular pity need be felt. This is not 
of course a Christian conception.
Was a strategy worked out for the use of the atomic 
weapon, and who conceived the plan for dropping only 
two bombs, the second of which, at Nagasaki, was actu-
ally on a secondary target? It is again difficult to picture 
a responsible commander authorising the release of so 
novel an engine of destruction. Anywhere but on its pri-
mary target, or in the sea on the way home. (The Naga-
saki bomb burst over the centre of the town and left the 
docks intact.)
Is there ultimately anything to choose between the 
Japanese massacre of 60,000 civilians in Manila, and 
the Allied massacre of 70,000 to 120,000 civilians in 
 Hiroshima? The Japanese worked by hand, in cold blood, 
and were responsible for countless outrages against indi-
viduals, too horrible to describe; the Allies worked from 
the air, also in cold blood, and do not even care to know 
what suffering they caused.247
Halliwell was observing a landscape of devastation that would 
have moved most visitors to an emotional reaction. Less than 
eighteen months ago, Hiroshima had been a living noisy coastal 
city. Now its gutted terrain was slowly being repopulated and 
rebuilt, a haunted radioactive shadow of its former self. But his 
judgment was distorted. The comparison between Manila and 
Hiroshima was specious, given the wider geography of atroci-
ties inflicted by Japan on its enemies. And there was certainly a 
lot ‘to choose’ between atomic bombing from a distance and the 
face-to-face slaughter of many millions of innocent civilians. The 
annihilation of Hiroshima was the product of what Hastings calls 
a total bomb for a total war.248 The architects of the bomb knew 
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that swift incineration of large numbers of people was inevitable, 
but preferable to the outcomes outlined above.
Conclusion
Cultural echoes of the Japanese military code still exist in contem-
porary Japan. In December 2016 during his visit to Pearl Harbor, 
the Japanese Prime Minister offered condolences but no apology 
for the attack in December 1941.249 This is partly because he was 
pressured to show no remorse by many Japanese conservatives 
who accepted expressions of honour to the war dead, but felt it 
shameful to demonstrate contrition for acts of murder committed 
in combat. That US President Barack Obama did not apologise 
for the atomic bombing when he visited Hiroshima, including the 
Peace Park, in 2016 also lent the American-Japanese interactions 
an air of tit-for-tat.250
The absence of an apology offends the hibakusha, and chal-
lenges the pacifist view that mass casualties from area bombings 
can only have negative consequences. The atomic bombing seared 
into the Japanese national consciousness, providing an enduring 
and catastrophic reminder of their martial stubbornness. The 
American ‘occupation’ of defeated Japan, moreover, from 1945 
to 1952 has been viewed by a number of revisionist historians as 
an essential, if sometimes complex, phase in the democratisation 
and modernisation of the land of the rising sun.251
In total, the Americans bombed 215 Japanese cities of vary-
ing size, killing over 330,000 people and destroying 2.3 million 
homes. Entire neighbourhoods were levelled to ashes while many 
cities had over half of their urban fabric swept away by fire and 
ruinous bombings.252 The atomic bombings can be construed 
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figuratively as two almighty exclamation marks at the conclu-
sion of the air raids that Japan endured before its ignominious 
defeat. National identity was profoundly wounded by the attacks 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.253 Across the urban lowlands of 
this mountainous and heavily forested country, furthermore, the 
immensity of the environmental destruction required extensive 
reconstruction. The next chapter focuses upon the three coun-
tries where bombing and its consequences was heaviest: Britain, 
Germany and Japan.
CHAPTER 6
The Global Phoenix: From 
Destruction to Reconstruction,  
1945–60
‘You have to give this much to the Luwae: when it 
knocked down our buildings it didn’t replace them with 
anything more oensive than rubble. We did that.’ (Prince 
Charles, Mansion House speech attacking modern 
architecture and post-war town planning, 1987.)254
Introduction
Airborne destruction left large areas of towns and cities in heaps 
of rubble. Bombsites and ruined buildings created an almost 
apocalyptic landscape. All heavily-bombed urban areas faced 
significant housing shortages. Homelessness and overcrowding 
required immediate solutions. Broadly speaking, the years from 
1945 to 1960 have been termed by urban and planning historians 
the era of post-war reconstruction. Alongside the clearing away 
and renewal of bombsites, government prioritised new housing 
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to address the accommodation crisis caused by both destruc-
tion but also the cessation of home building due to more press-
ing wartime priorities. New modern buildings and cityscapes 
were also embraced to promote visions of the future rather than 
remind citizens of the past. As Nick Tiratsoo argues, however, 
reconstruction was a process, involving politicians in central and 
local governments, architects, town planners, private interests 
and companies, and the wider public.255 In a similar vein, Cath-
erine Flinn argues that grand visions for post-war reconstruction 
were undermined by ‘restraints and realities’, a point she makes 
for Britain but which is relevant to all countries rebuilding them-
selves after 1945.256
In Britain, Germany and Japan the experience of reconstruction 
threw into relief the renewal of cities across the world. This chap-
ter focuses upon key themes in their reconstruction, highlight-
ing some key similarities and differences. It concludes by drawing 
out important global trends evident in reconstruction, and their 
interplay with national and local specificities in the reconstruc-
tion of bomb-damaged countries.
British Reconstruction
In May 1940, as Britain ‘stood alone’ against Nazi-occupied 
Europe, Churchill pushed through the Emergency Powers Act, 
empowering the state with unprecedented levels of control over 
both the public sphere and private lives. The extension of the state 
provided the broad context for growing debates about the need 
to plan. The government took on an enormous apparatus of pow-
ers from 1939 to 1940. There were ministries of supply, economic 
warfare, food, information, health, home security, labour, and 
works and buildings.
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By 1941, as the bombs were still falling, a professional coalition 
of town planners, architects, politicians, civil servants, socialists, 
liberal reformers and left-wing journalists began to integrate the 
notion of a fairer society in post-war Britain with the re-planning 
and rebuilding of towns and cities. Following the ‘People’s War’, 
nothing less than the modernisation of the built environment 
was promised as an essential component of the New Jerusalem, 
a brave new modern world that would arise from the rottenness 
of the blitzed and blighted city. Housing was at the heart of this 
reconstruction promise. A Mass Observation poll in 1945 found 
that homes and the need for many more of them eclipsed all other 
social policy issues among the British electorate. The Labour 
Party made the most elaborate promises for new-build homes per 
year, which goes a long way to explaining their election victory in 
1945.257
A leading figure in the promotion of planning was Sir John 
Reith. The former director general of the BBC between the wars, 
Reith was an efficient administrator who became Minister of 
Works and Planning from 1940–2. Based in the bombed-out 
heart of the capital city, he famously called upon the London 
County Council (LCC) and other local authorities to ‘plan boldly’ 
when drawing up reconstruction schemes. Undertaken by the 
indubitably patrician architect-planner Sir Patrick Abercrombie, 
with the assistance of the architect J.H. Forshaw, the County of 
London Plan was published as early as 1943.258 Its publication was 
promoted by the media and in exhibitions, signifying strongly 
to the public that this war would be won and a new London 
would be built from the ruins. Yet the County of London Plan 
was superseded by the much grander Greater London Plan, which 
also included the extensive suburban boroughs of outer London. 
Damage and destruction continued to be visited upon British 
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cities towards the end of the war by the vengeance weapons. The 
Greater London Plan called for not only the reconstruction of 
central London and the renewal of blitzed and blighted areas, 
but for large new flat-filled housing estates, and an extensive new 
road infrastructure across the capital city to accommodate the 
growing demand for motor cars. Significantly it also endorsed the 
principle of decentralisation: of thinning out the population of 
London by ‘decanting’ mostly working-class households to large 
new council estates (social housing projects) built in the country-
side beyond  London.259
Abercrombie and Forshaw took centre stage in the educational 
film London: e Proud City (1946). Made for the Ministry of 
Information it outlined the ambitious reconstruction plans for 
the capital city to any members of the general public who cared 
to watch it. Yet despite the emphasis upon public information, 
which was replicated in other cities across Britain, the majority 
of the public were more motivated by the need for housing rather 
than by participation in planning. Apathy and self-interest were 
more common than an active interest in urban renewal. Most 
people had experienced the war as an interruption into normal-
ity, and wanted a return to a comfortable private life as opposed 
to a new era of communal participation in architectural and town 
planning debates.260
Furthermore, despite the intellectual effort that informed the 
Greater London Plan, it was mostly never implemented. This can 
be explained to a large degree by the influence of powerful local 
landowners, party political differences on the LCC and continu-
ing divisions between modernisers and traditionalists among 
the architects and towns planners of the LCC. The traditionalists 
wanted to rebuild in neo-classical, Victorian or Georgian styles, 
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not the modern functional buildings that Prince Charles would 
later attack in his Mansion House speech. Furthermore, smaller 
competing local borough plans and improvement initiatives 
helped steer the Abercrombie Plan onto the rocks. Only the aptly 
named Churchill Gardens in Pimlico, an estate of modern flats 
near the River Thames, stands as a testament to what might have 
been. The reasons for the failure reflect what Adams and Larkham 
term ‘a lack of joined-up thinking’, a pragmatic planning culture 
rather than a clear and efficacious framework for implementation. 
One of the largest-scale modernisations of any western European 
city, to be rebuilt out of blitz and blight, never came to pass.261
The major conurbations of Birmingham, Glasgow and Man-
chester and the larger port cities of Bristol, Hull, and Liverpool, 
also required radical urban surgery after the war, as did the 
smaller port cities such as Plymouth, Portsmouth and Southamp-
ton. Medium-sized industrial cities were also re-planned as a con-
sequence of the extensive destruction caused in 1940–1. Across 
Britain local authorities in blitzed towns and cities began prepara-
tions and plans for post-war rebuilding, although as Larkham and 
Lilley demonstrate, many local authorities did not produce plans 
at all.262 A huge stimulus to post-war reconstruction planning was 
provided by the instigation of the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning in 1943. As the Allies laid waste to German cities from 
1943–5, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning was laying 
the foundations for British urban reconstruction.
The Labour Party, converted to interventionist Keynesian 
economics, and committed to the social policy reforms outlined 
in the Beveridge Report, became the major political vehicle for 
the boldest vision of reconstruction. Many leading Labour politi-
cians also had links with the garden city movement.263 While the 
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Labour Party general election manifesto in 1945 made no specific 
promises about the imminent apparatus of town planning, the 
Labour government passed two important pieces of legislation 
that would frame the reconstruction of post-war Britain: namely 
the New Towns Act of 1946 and the Town and Country Planning 
Act of 1947.
The New Towns Act created the first wave of fourteen Brit-
ish planned new towns: eight were introduced around London 
to relieve ‘blitz and blight’. The London new towns alone housed 
over a million people by the end of the last century, proving that 
the Blitz had accelerated a longer-term trend in urban disper-
sal.264 Although the conflict from 1939 to 1945 had created the 
opportunity for a programme of new towns, decentralisation was 
not a new idea born of the bomb and the need for thinner cities. 
The garden cities of Letchworth from 1903, and of Welwyn from 
1919, were planned and built as antidotes to suburban sprawl and 
the chaotic industrial centres. They provided working models 
for the post-war new towns.265 The interwar years also witnessed 
official debates about and enquiries into the urban problems of 
overcrowded, insanitary and polluted areas of Britain’s industrial 
cities.266 During the 1930s slum clearance programmes made 
some advances, although Nazi bombs would prove to be an effec-
tive slum remover.267 Building new homes beyond the metropolis 
proved cheaper, because land was less expensive.
The new towns were planned according to zoning principles. 
Unlike the mixed-use town and city centres that had grown up 
over centuries, employment and industrial areas were zoned sepa-
rately from residential districts, in order to prevent noise and pol-
lution within safe housing areas. Again, this was a principle which 
had been pioneered at Letchworth and Welwyn Garden Cities, 
and in a number of municipal housing schemes between the wars, 
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where housing was spatially separated from places of employ-
ment, and from the commercial activities of the town centre.268
Creating a sense of community in the new towns was an impor-
tant element of social reconstruction. The residential areas were 
designed to American ‘neighbourhood unit’ principles, wherein 
facilities such as shops, schools, places of worship and recrea-
tional spaces were within walking distance from the front door. 
The neighbourhood unit was also viewed by socialist politicians 
as the right tool for recreating the ‘Blitz spirit’, the alleged mood of 
wartime unity across the class divide. As Lewis Silkin, the Minis-
ter for Town and Country Planning, argued to the House of Com-
mons during the reading of the New Towns Act, the new towns 
were to be divided into neighbourhood units:
each unit with its own shops, schools, open spaces, com-
munity halls, and other amenities. [I] am most anxious 
that the planning should be such that the different in-
come groups living in the new towns will not be segre-
gated. No doubt they may enjoy common recreational 
facilities, and take part in amateur theatricals, or each 
play their part in a health centre or a community centre. 
But when they leave to go home I do not want the better-
off people to go to the right, and the less-well-off to go 
to the left. I want them to ask each other ‘are you going 
my way?’269
Here in a speech to parliament was the idealised Blitz spirit of 
cross-class unity appropriated for a vision of egalitarian decen-
tralisation. For Suzanne Cowan, however, politicians and plan-
ning officials often drew upon the myth of wartime unity to 
legitimise grand reconstruction schemes, despite little evidence 
of a galvanised egalitarianism within the post-war British class 
system.270
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Meanwhile, what of the blitzed city centres? In the short term, 
even before the end of the war, prefabricated housing was intro-
duced to whittle away at the edges of the housing shortage. Yet the 
wartime promise by Winston Churchill of half a million new ‘pre-
fabs’ after the war was not met – only 157,623 had been built by 
1949.271 Even in towns which suffered relatively little bomb dam-
age the moratorium on housing construction during the war led 
to the provision of prefabs as a temporary solution to the hous-
ing crisis.272 But grander more permanent schemes were required. 
Many wartime and early post-war plans were drawn up for the 
bomb-damaged cities. Some were brave new urban worlds, grand 
visions for a modern townscape, which included the comprehen-
sive redevelopment of bombsites. Others were significantly more 
modest in ambition, and across the country plans were imple-
mented to varying degrees of success.
Classic examples of large-scale comprehensive redevelopment 
include Coventry City Centre, the Plan for Plymouth, the massive 
road-centred rebuilding of Birmingham, and the Barbican scheme 
in the City of London. The Barbican has been widely praised as 
a modernist vision for urban living. Drawn up by the architect-
planners Chamberlin, Powell and Bon, it was a confident vision 
for city living to replace a massive bomb site. Completed during 
the late 1960s, hence later than most reconstruction projects, the 
Barbican may be viewed as a prototypical ‘urban village’ intended 
for 7,000 residents living and working in close proximity to the 
City of London. Its brutalist architecture and pioneering high-rise 
towers, however, have not been popular with traditionalists. Yet 
the quality of the buildings, and the success of the ‘urban village’ 
created there proved that large-scale planning superimposed onto 
an extensively bomb-damaged district, could work.273
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In Coventry, the city centre was certainly completely redesigned 
and rebuilt according to the modernist plan by Donald Gibson. 
The reconstruction of this Midlands city was the most famous 
British example of comprehensive redevelopment. About 7 per 
cent of the city’s housing stock had been destroyed by the Blitz 
so the council was under pressure to build lots of new homes, 
and quickly. Many living in Coventry yearned for a new city: ‘The 
Jerries cleaned out the core of the city, a chaotic mess, and now 
we can start anew.’274 The Plan for Coventry was being publicly 
discussed as early as 1942, and was steered into place after the 
war by a Labour council. Yet the new cityscape that emerged from 
the ruins threw into sharp relief the strengths but many weak-
nesses of modern town planning. By the mid-1950s Coventry had 
gained a smart new pedestrianized shopping precinct; modern 
department stores; an upgraded road system that replaced the 
mediaeval chaos of the older city centre, and large new housing 
estates comprised of terraced homes, semi-detached houses and 
blocks of flats. The new housing areas were designed to neigh-
bourhood unit principles, as were the new towns, to foster a sense 
of local community. And in a gesture of confidence in the future, 
and of reconciliation with former enemies, the boldly designed 
new Coventry Cathedral was inaugurated in 1962, and is situated 
alongside the ruins of the older place of worship.275
Yet for many the city centre looked unimaginative and soul-
less, and by the 1970s it had a run-down appearance. As Tirat-
soo has argued, the reconstruction of Coventry was influenced 
by a cautious socialist council during the early post-war years, by 
differences between the political parties on the council and their 
consequences for public expenditure, by financial constraints 
imposed from central government, and by conflict between the 
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different ministries in government. During the 1950s the Con-
servative government rejected some of the proposals in the plan 
because they were considered too expensive.276 A new city centre 
was constructed in Coventry, but it was hardly an expression of 
the gleaming New Jerusalem promised by the Labour Party in its 
general election campaign in 1945.
The only other city of comparable size to be comprehensively 
redeveloped on such a scale was the port city of Plymouth, where 
the architect-planner Sir Patrick Abercrombie was given sway. 
Plymouth had experienced over 600 air raid alerts; over 4,000 
people were killed or injured. Over 22,000 properties were hit, 
4,000 of them completely destroyed.277 The city appears to have 
avoided many of the difficulties and problems facing planners 
elsewhere. The powerful political dynasty of Lord and Lady Astor 
explains much of this success, as they supported the scheme. The 
plan was robustly modern, containing provision for new hous-
ing neighbourhoods, a rationalised road system for the city cen-
tre and the outskirts, and many modern public and commercial 
buildings. Today, Plymouth city centre is a conservation area. 
Conversely, in Hull, the Abercrombie scheme met the same fate 
as the Greater London Plan: it was never properly implemented.278
The picture was uneven across the country, but similar issues 
affected other significant reconstruction schemes in other towns 
and cities where the results were often disappointing. In Bir-
mingham, for example, the chief planner and architect Herbert 
Manzoni completely re-planned the city centre according to the 
principles of zoning. The retail areas were pedestrianised; slums 
were cleared away and modern housing estates comprising both 
houses and flats were built. But it was the road scheme for which 
Manzoni’s plan became famous. He was influenced by the Swiss 
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modernist Le Corbusier, who had called for the clutter of nar-
row courts and small streets designed for the packhorse to be 
swept away, to be replaced by modern streamlined thoroughfares 
to facilitate the ever-growing number of motor cars. The inner 
ring around the city centre and the dual carriageways from the 
centre to the outskirts of small streets were superimposed upon 
the bombed but historic landscape of urban-industrial Birming-
ham.279
The reconstruction of Birmingham continued into the 1960s, 
when the iconic new Bull Ring shopping centre was unveiled. 
Using oral testimonies, Adams and Larkham found that many 
living in Birmingham during reconstruction were impressed and 
proud at the new city arising from the ruins. Yet some memories 
were also characterised by nostalgia for pre-war Birmingham, 
and concern at the loss of surviving old buildings due to the radi-
cal nature of the plan.280
By the 1950s contemporary cultural critics bemoaned the slow-
ness of reconstruction, but were also critical of the loss of the 
utopian vision at the end of the war. Bombsites were castigated 
as ‘horrid empty spaces’, haunted by the ghosts of the dead and 
of the communities that had existed before the bombs.281 The 
bombsites around St Paul’s Cathedral, for example, were flagged 
by critics of the government as proof that Britain was too slow to 
rebuild.282 It also appeared to have become not a vibrant egalitar-
ian urban public community but a shabby inward-looking subur-
bia, the very thing that Angus Calder and others hated so much. 
This was ‘subtopia’, the disappointing reversal of the utopia that 
many had expected in 1945.283 Yet there were good reasons for 
this. Many plans were quite humdrum. Other more ambitious 
visions for a brave new urban landscape were tempered by 
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 financial constraints, by conflicts of interest between public and 
private organisations, by the changing political composition of the 
local councils, and sometimes simply because of a shortage of con-
struction materials. A similar story unfolded in other countries
The Reconstruction of Urban Germany, 1945–60
For ordinary Germans, the first priority was to clear the 
streets, and make houses habitable where it was possible, 
make new ones where it was not, and repair the utilities. 
But how? A fifth of the nation’s men were dead, many 
were injured, traumatised, incapable of working: who 
was going to embark on the Herculean task of simply 
clearing the rubble from the endless ruins?284
The answer to the question lies partly in the German nation, but 
also in the United States of America, and to a lesser degree the 
British and the Soviet Union. Each of these powers controlled 
zones of occupation in a defeated Germany.285
As Jeffry Diefendorf has argued, possibly the biggest problem 
facing the post-war reconstruction of Germany was the absence 
of any effective German state until 1949, and therefore the dearth 
of any national framework of reconstruction.286 The USA was the 
wealthiest of the occupying powers, but any notion that the Amer-
icans footed most of the bill for urban reconstruction is false.287 In 
the contexts of housing construction, and the large scale rebuild-
ing of bombed-out urban areas, the imprint of the American 
Military Government on urban Germany remained surprisingly 
modest. German reconstruction demonstrated some compelling 
similarities with the British experience. An obvious one was the 
pressing need for a massive house-building programme. Another 
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was the tension between modern architecture and town planning 
compared with widespread support for traditional and historicist 
urban designs (The opening quote by Prince Charles shows him 
to be a traditionalist with historicist leanings). A further key simi-
larity was the role of many different agencies and organisations 
seeking to influence or modify town plans.
Air raids on Germany left not only the built environment 
but the political structures of Nazism in ruins. The Americans 
attempted to modernise and democratise German town planning, 
within the wider context of political re-education and economic 
re-modelling. This created a tension between American forward 
 thinking and a more conservative culture of German aspira-
tions for the urban future. Within the context of rising tensions 
between the American and the Soviet zones in early post-war 
Germany, the US Military Government invited the leading mod-
ernist architect and town-planning consultant Walter Gropius to 
Berlin in August 1947. An émigré to the USA from interwar Ger-
many, Gropius argued perceptively that ‘there is a political corpse 
buried in Germany’s rubble, and it is the job of reconstruction 
planners to ensure that it isn’t revived.’288 Viewing urban mod-
ernisation as compatible with democratisation, Gropius favoured 
the American small town ideal, with its open meetings and appar-
ently active levels of neighbourliness and political participation.289
Urban planning and development in Germany had long been 
dominated by powerful local elites and a bureaucratic apparatus 
that the USA was barely able to modify. This was partly about 
American priorities, as urban policy was ‘never a central concern’ 
compared with the wider rehabilitation of democracy and the 
German economy.290 But the severe housing shortage required 
urgent attention. The failure of the Nazi regime to provide a 
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major house-building programme, and the influx of refugees, 
exacerbated the shortage of homes caused by air raids. It took 
Marshall Aid to kick-start the much-needed housing programme 
in West Germany, along with deficit financing.291 Even then, the 
US administration was fairly modest in its investment. West Ger-
many received $1,472 million in economic aid, significantly less 
than Great Britain or France, and only some of that was allocated 
for physical reconstruction.292 There were also significant cultural 
and material differences between the Americans and Germans 
over the types of homes to be built. The US favoured the export-
ing of many modern prefabricated homes to Germany, and the 
use of lighter building materials, such as wood. The Germans pre-
ferred more solid traditional masonry and stone. As Diefendorf 
shows, however, the American authorities did manage to promote 
the building of cheaper modern houses and apartments. The con-
struction of mass housing also assisted the recovery of the shat-
tered German economy.293
Germany was not the sole preserve of the US Military Govern-
ment, however. While the British, bankrupted by the war, were 
much less able to forge the modern future of Germany through 
finance and global influence than the USA, they were more ener-
getic when it came to promoting a more centralised yet demo-
cratic town planning apparatus. In Hamburg, western Germany, 
where over 25 per cent of housing was damaged or destroyed by 
the Allies, post-war plans were already being drawn up before the 
war ended. The modernist planner Konstanty Gutschow, who had 
cooperated with the Nazis in urban design, was instrumental in 
drawing up a plan which decentralised a significant section of the 
population to a new ‘city’ alongside the River Elbe. The road sys-
tem was modernised, including an autobahn ring road around 
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Hamburg. More green spaces were planned, and the housing 
shortage was addressed through a construction programme 
of high-density town housing and apartment blocks. The plans 
were completed after the war but were not as fully implemented 
as Gutschow would have liked. Nonetheless, Hamburg adopted 
a more comprehensive modern plan when compared with other 
German cities.294 All across Germany, however, tensions between 
traditional rebuilding with historic-looking buildings and the 
pre-war street pattern versus a more modernist template perme-
ated the architectural and town planning professions in Germany. 
This tension was also evident in German public opinion.
Public buildings in the smaller chocolate-box cities such as 
Lubeck were reconstructed to re-capture their historical heritage. 
This is termed facsimile reconstruction, where the emphasis of 
rebuilding is on continuity and the reminder of the past.295 Hence 
in Munster, the town hall or Rathaus was rebuilt to resemble its 
pre-war medieval glory. This was referencing a romantic view of 
the past which many modernisers and American officials were 
suspicious of. Hence in other larger cities what Diefendorf terms 
‘the reconstruction of civic authority’ meant bringing legitimacy 
to local government administrations many of whose personnel 
were associated with Nazi activities and oppression before lib-
eration at the end of the war. In Stuttgart the nineteenth-century 
town hall was destroyed by bombing, and following a competi-
tion among local architects for the best design, in which no clear 
winner emerged, during the early 1950s the Lord Mayor pushed 
for a more modern design to represent the new city being built 
from the rubble, and the post-war spirit of democracy.296 Nazi 
Germany had of course been a police state, so in some cities new 
police headquarters were also built to represent a break with the 
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recent past. In Cologne an austere but elegant police building was 
opened in 1955. Praised by leading architectural and planning 
experts, the design was less popular with the mainstream media. 
And as Diefendorf argues, a distinct lack of public engagement 
in the merits or otherwise of the Police HQ possibly implied a 
reluctance to engage with the nature of policing under the Third 
Reich.297
In many major German cities the popular desire for historical 
continuity reflected a preference for the known and familiar city 
of the pre-war years. In Cologne in central Germany, and Munich, 
in the Bavarian Deep South, public opinion and many leading 
local professionals and organisations favoured an emphasis upon 
re-building to the traditional cityscape. Although this did not 
always occur, and many unpopular modern buildings were con-
structed, post-war re-planning emphasised the need to resurrect 
the character of vernacular architecture and the symbolic local 
and national importance of grandiose monumental buildings. In 
Cologne, furthermore, the Catholic Church assumed responsibil-
ity for repairs to the many churches damaged by the Allies. As 
Diefendorf argues, today some central city churches are under-
used, ‘but they do constitute dominant features in the old heart 
of the city.’298
Among the most difficult urban reconstruction processes was 
that of Berlin, the ancient Prussian capital and the seat of Nazi 
power since 1933. Alongside the need to remove the imprint of the 
Third Reich, Berlin faced significant problems. Environmentally, 
the extent of its destruction was ‘staggering’. Politically and admin-
istratively, Berlin was divided between East and West by 1949.299 
Hence post-war planners viewed the extent of the destruction as 
a significant opportunity to liberate Berlin from its reactionary 
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past, and to create a visionary new modern city. As in other cities 
across Europe, however, grand ideas were confronted by practical 
difficulties. The Americans injected huge sums of reconstruction 
capital into West Berlin during the 1950s, following partition, pri-
oritising modern factories, offices, retail and hotels. Housing was 
less of a priority, and the entrenched influence of traditionalists 
in town planning and architecture departments often acted as a 
bulwark to the modernisation project of the USA.300
In East Berlin, by contrast, austere modern buildings, workers 
flats and wide boulevards, notably the Stalin Allee, were viewed 
by many modernists on both sides of the Iron Curtain as an 
impressive modernisation of the urban landscape. By the end of 
the 1950s, architecture and town planning had become a ‘battle-
ground’ in the German Cold War, with East and West Berlin try-
ing to outdo each other with competitions for the regeneration 
of city districts. And in a belated, unwitting admission that pre-
fabrication was required in communist East Germany, the Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev called in 1954 for less-boastful Stalinist 
buildings and a drive for prefabrication and modern materials to 
address the lingering housing shortage.301
In East Germany, those living within the Soviet zone of occu-
pation developed a more centralised and straightforward if 
undemocratic apparatus for reconstruction even before the 
establishment of the GDR in 1949. Following the passing of the 
‘law for rebuilding the cities of the German Democratic Republic 
and the capital of Berlin’ in September 1950, the East German 
state undertook something of a land-grab of private holdings and 
property, often without compensation. Privately-owned housing 
was allowed to continue, but much of the land was nationalised.302 
In 1951, key areas of cities were designated for large-scale 
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reconstruction plans. Properties required for reconstruction pur-
poses were requisitioned by the Ministry for Planning, Building 
and the Building Industry. ‘Derived in part from Soviet models’ 
the GDR principles of reconstruction adopted a very different 
model from West Germany:
They called for the immediate repair of designated war-
damaged urban areas, restoring certain monuments of 
‘national’ cultural importance, such as the Zwinger in 
Dresden, and construction representative arteries such 
as the Stalin Allee (later Karl-Marx-Allee) in Berlin. The 
sixteen principles called for the rebuilding of compact, 
dense cities with monumental, representative forums in 
modern form, including magisterial avenues and towers 
to serve as cultural centres and sites for political demon-
strations. Clearly defined city centres and major squares 
were to define cities that were technically modern and 
socially responsible, reflecting the aims of the new so-
cialist society.303
Hence communist reconstruction emphasised the unifying and 
symbolic importance of shared public space to a much greater 
degree than the West. Planners and politicians looked forward to 
‘model socialist cities’ defined by a public socialist urbanity rather 
than Western privatism or the fascism associated with pre-war 
German cities. Dresden, to take a key example, saw some of its 
older central areas rebuilt within the German baroque style. City 
squares were redesigned to emphasise their public function, while 
some key buildings were left in ruins as reminders of what the 
Anglo-American Allies had inflicted upon the city, notably the 
Frauenkirche. Large-scale plans for Soviet-style blocks of worker’s 
flats around the city centre were implemented to varying degrees, 
partly due to a failure by the local authority to fasten upon and 
implement a single strong plan. Even in a country with ostensibly 
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more powerful governance, bold schemes were not always fully 
realised.304
Ultimately, how successful were German reconstruction efforts? 
As Diefendorf argues, there were many disappointments after 
1945, evidenced by the failure to enact visionary plans, a rash of 
modest or unpopular houses and commercial and public build-
ings, and a sense that much of the fifteen years to 1960 had been 
a missed opportunity. On both sides of the German border the 
housing problem was close to a solution by the late 1950s, how-
ever: many significant housing programmes had created large 
residential areas of light, airy and often spacious apartments and 
town houses.305
Reconstructing the Japanese City, 1945–60
Partly in common with Germany, Japan was an ‘occupied’ coun-
try under the political and military jurisdiction of America until 
1952.306 An awesome task of reconstruction was initiated, demon-
strating some key similarities with house building programmes 
and urban repairs in other countries. But this chapter also focuses 
upon the unique nature of Japanese urban rebuilding in the dev-
astated landscapes of conventional and atomic bombing.
As Tiratsoo and his co-writers have argued, over 200 towns and 
conurbations in Japan were bombed by the Allies in the Second 
World War, and 115 of them were later officially designated as 
‘war-damaged cities’:
By the time the conflict ended in 1945, destruction 
was immense: approximately 2.3 million houses (or 20 
percent of the stock) destroyed or seriously damaged; 
63,000 hectares of land burnt out; 330,000 persons killed 
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and a 426,000 injured. The large cities were particularly 
badly affected. Tokyo suffered most, with 712,000 hous-
ing units damaged, followed by Osaka (311,000), Kobe 
(128,000) and Yokohama (98,000).307
The accomplishment of reconstruction was also immense. 
As Carola Hein argues, ‘Japan’s cities have risen from the utter 
destruction of the Second World War with astounding speed.’308 
In the immediate aftermath of war hundreds of thousands of 
wooden temporary homes were constructed, but in common 
with the prefabs in Britain and in other countries, these were 
mere patches over a critical nationwide housing shortage. Most 
of the reconstruction projects in Japan were pragmatic and 
piecemeal, concerned to provide low-rise cheaply-built wooden 
housing, erect new public and commercial buildings, and renew 
roads, railways and manufacturing plants. A much larger solu-
tion was required for the longer term, hence in December 1945 
the National Government had established the guidelines for the 
Policy for the Reconstruction of War-Damaged Areas, embrac-
ing building methods, land-use planning, modern construction 
materials and higher construction standards.309 Its record would 
prove to be uneven.
The reconstruction plans for Tokyo and Osaka, both large 
conurbations, were initially ambitious but, in common with the 
Abercrombie Plan for London for example, went largely un-real-
ised. The reconstruction of smaller cities in Japan demonstrated 
some important similarities with post-war planning projects in 
other countries, while highlighting some specificities of the Japa-
nese path towards urban modernisation in the decade following 
the end of the Second World War. The vast majority of the mil-
lions of homes built during the reconstruction era of 1945–55 
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 resembled much of the pre-war housing destroyed by conven-
tional and atomic bombing: ‘flimsy wooden constructions and 
slum-type housing dominated many areas until the 1960s.’ The 
modern high-rises and the emergence of mass apartment-style 
housing now so prominent in Japan was a product of the 1960s 
and since, not the era of reconstruction.310
Under the auspices of the Americans, the Japanese Cabinet 
appointed the War-Damage Rehabilitation Board (WRB) in 
October 1945 to oversee reconstruction and in particular acceler-
ate the drive to build much-needed homes. Local newspapers in 
Japan were important voices both in promoting public interest 
in re-planning and in calling for local needs to be addressed as 
quickly as possible.311 Town planning was not only a local and 
national activity. International diffusion of town planning and 
architectural theories and concepts between the wars had influ-
enced pioneering modern Japanese town planners. The post-war 
planning of Tokyo, for example, was led by Hideaki Ishikawa, a 
long-standing head of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government town 
planning department. He had been active in overseeing the enact-
ment of the Air Defence Act (1937) for the capital city, which 
called for more open spaces to be given over to military use, and 
for the arrangement of evacuation procedures, fire-fighting and 
other aspects of the civil defence apparatus. After the devastation 
wrought by the USAAF over Tokyo, Ishikawa drew up the post-
Blitz comprehensive plan, calling upon Anglo-American town 
planning principles that emphasised zoning, neighbourhoods, 
and road planning for motor traffic. A significant improvement 
to the badly damaged railway network was also called for. The 
Tokyo Local Town Planning Committee first met in March 1946 
and worked with the WRB, other government ministries, and 
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private and commercial organisations, to promote house build-
ing and the new plan. But implementation problems soon arose. 
Despite the efforts of newspapers, public involvement in plan-
ning was ‘very limited’, echoing British experience. The WRB was 
sometimes riven with tensions between new post-war officials 
suspicious of continuing pre-war civil servants associated with 
the militant nationalism of the 1930s. The organisation some-
times also suffered with insufficient funding from government, 
which affected its ability to negotiate land-readjustment schemes 
required for new-build, and a close relationship with local town 
councils and prefectures was not always forthcoming.312 Only 
one third of the destroyed homes in Tokyo had been rebuilt by 
1949. An Emergency Housing Plan of 1945, furthermore, to pro-
vide over 300,000 emergency prefabricated homes was largely 
a failure by 1949.313 And in that year the so-called ‘Dodge Line’, 
a new financial regime imposed by the USA, also cut back on 
reconstruction expenditure. Tokyo had hardly advanced in the 
years since 1945, except for the growing sprawl of cheap hous-
ing, often in shanty towns and overcrowded residential areas, to 
accommodate the homeless, and the growing number of Japanese 
families.314 Hence reconstruction enables us to understand why, 
today, ‘Japan’s large cities are made up of dense, vital, apparently 
unplanned neighbourhoods.’315
The re-planning of Osaka, the ‘second city’ of Japan, shared 
some key similarities with Tokyo. Osaka was the leading and 
industrial and commercial centre in Japan by 1939, subsequently 
enduring over thirty heavy bombing raids in 1945. Osaka lost 
over 310,000 homes and over 50 square kilometres of the built-up 
area were damaged or destroyed. As in Tokyo the local version 
of the newspaper Asahi Shinbun began a series on the need for 
reconstruction as early as August 1945, and ambitious plans for a 
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bright new Osaka were drawn up. These were to be implemented 
by the City Corporation Reconstruction Section, the Osaka Local 
Town Planning Committee, the WRB and various government 
ministries. Yet conflict between the different wards, tensions 
between more cautious conservative politicians and the socialist 
mayor, and shortages of labour, material and money conspired to 
reduce the effectiveness of the plans by 1950.316
The re-planning of metropolitan Tokyo and Osaka was vastly 
different in scale to reconstruction in smaller provincial cities, yet 
bold visions for smaller urban centres in Japan were also modified 
by time and process. Nagoaka, an inland city with a population 
of less than 75,000 people in 1945, was visited by the USAAF on 
the first two nights of August 1945, razing most of the city centre 
to the ground. Almost immediately after the war’s end planning 
became an important subject of local debate, with the origi-
nal schemes calling for comprehensive land-use planning and a 
more modern cityscape. A Reconstruction Measures Committee 
for Nagoaka was established. Local newspapers enthused about 
the new vision. The plan was originally based upon rigid zon-
ing between residential, ‘exclusive commerce’, commerce, heavy 
industry, light industry, railways, public buildings and new green 
spaces. A new commercial district in the centre, high-density dis-
persed residential areas towards the outskirts, and upgraded roads 
and railways were at the heart of the plan, which was approved by 
the WRB in July 1946. Divisions between the planners, however, 
a sometimes dilatory attitude by local authorities, and obstinate 
landowners objecting to land-use changes, all led to modifica-
tions in land-readjustment, street layouts, and a reduction in the 
original scale and scope of the plan. Nagaoka was declared the 
first Japanese city to be reconstructed by 1953, but in reality the 
process was by no means ended.317
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Difficulties in implementation affected other medium-sized 
Japanese cities. At Maebashi, for example, an original plan was 
drawn up by Kenzo Tange, who would go on to design the Hiro-
shima Memorial Peace Park, and become one of the most influ-
ential modern architects in Japan. Yet public distrust and even 
opposition to his plans, financial concerns, anger at compensation 
payments for land-use changes, and also the ‘folly’ of wide new 
roads which evidenced a possible cultural affection for the older 
pre-war street pattern, encapsulated public suspicions, many of 
which were aired in open meetings. It took a more united front 
between the city council, the WRB and the Ministry of Construc-
tion, based in Tokyo, to get a less illustrious plan implemented 
by the mid-1950s.318 And in Sendai, early post-war planning for 
the width and route of a major stretch of road revealed sharp dif-
ferences in public opinion, the power of vested interests of local 
landowners, and local scandals over funding and bribery.319
In common with Germany, the renewal of cities and the con-
struction of public buildings to promote a newer more democratic 
urban society was often a delicate matter. Japanese national pride 
had been severely wounded by the defeat, and grand symbolic 
reconstruction projects symbolising modernity, or an ‘out-with-
the-old, in-with-the-new’ mentality were not deemed appropri-
ate. As Hein argues, this was in contradistinction with some of 
the bolder urban renewal schemes in heavily-bombed European 
cities in the Netherlands and Poland.320
Reconstruction: Some Wider Conclusions
The built environments of Britain, Germany and Japan were 
ostensibly ‘reconstructed’ by the end of the 1950s. In each country, 
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despite the difficulties outlined above, the housing shortage had 
been addressed, but by no means completely solved. In Britain, 
the Labour governments of 1945–51 failed to build enough houses, 
a reason why Labour lost the general election in 1951. Conservative 
governments of the 1950s prioritised home building, with some 
success.321 In East and West Germany, an impressive number of 
homes were built by 1960, and in Japan piecemeal urban extensions 
and myriad planned new suburban settlements mostly accommo-
dated a rapidly growing post-war population.
In post-war Europe, urban reconstruction also played a sig-
nificant role in the modernisation of urban landscapes, and in 
stimulating economic growth through the multiplier effect of 
large-scale construction industries demanding primary and sec-
ondary goods and a massive labour supply. In Germany, however, 
as in Japan, the rebuilding of the bombed-out towns and cities 
possessed other layers of significance. A new urban environment 
was part of an American project to remodel former reactionary 
systems of rule, and the citizenries under them, into democracy, 
modernity and prosperity. This powerful synthesis of post-war 
imperatives was intended to negate atavistic politics and more 
immediately to act as a bulwark to communist influence during 
the early Cold War.
Key themes and issues in reconstruction identified in Britain, 
Germany and Japan also moulded the character of reconstruction 
in two countries with political traditions of strong state interven-
tion, namely Soviet Russia in Eastern Europe, and France in the 
west. In France, the state took a more consistent centralist and 
managerial position towards reconstruction project areas. In the 
heavily-bombed north-east, the French Minister for Reconstruc-
tion deemed the Alsace-Lorraine region to ‘have suffered most of 
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all’.322 Yet even in the country of the grand projet, a combination of 
practical and political problems mediated the outcomes. As Hugh 
Clout argues, ‘before definitive reconstruction might begin’:
a vast array of emergency tasks had to be accomplished, 
which included investigating the extent of the damage, 
organising labour, clearing rubble and ruins, making ur-
gent repairs, installing temporary accommodation, em-
ploying architects and planners to prepare master plans 
[and] finding accountants to verify claims for compen-
sation.323
A cultural preference for vernacular architecture in the Alsace 
region also undermined a much-vaunted plan for Saint-Dié, 
drawn up by Le Corbusier, but in the Lorraine by contrast recon-
struction eventuated in a ‘mundane functionalism’ characterising 
much of the built environment by 1960.324
In the Soviet Union, following the ‘Great Patriotic War’ huge 
areas of urban-industrial regions lay in ruins. Stalin placed great 
emphasis upon social unity to act as the glue for what would be 
a vast reconstruction project across the war-damaged regions. 
In common with Britain, to a degree, victory became part of the 
‘foundational myth’ for Soviet society, a celebration of triumph 
that was to transcend sectional differences and accompany mod-
ernisation. Yet the myth of national unity as a foundation for 
post-war reconstruction in Soviet Russia has been critically inter-
rogated, with propaganda far in excess of popular enthusiasm for 
the wartime re-planning and reconstruction programmes.325
Soviet cities were planned to be standardised, but to include 
inspiring and rational spaces for a productive, engaged but 
never challenging proletariat. Across the communist world, 
post- conflict cities were reconstructed according to Soviet-style 
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 planning  principles. In Poland, for example, Warsaw had suffered 
terribly during the war. Its renewal was adopted by the Soviet 
authorities as a potent symbolic of communist renewal from 
the ashes of barbaric fascism, and as an egalitarian alternative to 
western capitalism.326
But socialist planning was also beset by internal divisions and 
practical problems across the eastern bloc. The plan for Warsaw 
‘was focused on the value of bringing back what was to be erased’, 
namely the historical pre-war image of the city destroyed by the 
German and Soviet air raids.327 In the port-city of Gdansk, by 
contrast, as with bombed-out maritime cities in other countries, 
reconstruction became a more nuanced process of balancing the 
pre-war heritage with ‘the new urban thinking of Modernism’ in 
its overall urban design.328 Soviet town planning was exported 
without any meaningful public consultation across the USSR 
and later to other communist countries. As the following chapter 
shows, post-war North Korea and Vietnam were also influenced 
by Soviet-style urban reconstruction.
Ultimately, the global phoenix was an international manifesta-
tion of urban resilience. As Vale and Campanella have argued, 
no matter what might be thrown at them from the air, ‘cities are 
among humankind’s most durable artefacts’:
Whether they are reconstructed to accommodate and 
restore ongoing urban life or rebuilt to serve as sites for 
periodic visitation and commemoration, it has become 
exceedingly rare for a major city to be truly or perma-
nently lost.329
Lessons from the reconstruction of post-blitzed cities have wider 
relevance to other major disasters visited upon urban areas, 
whether by earthquakes, hurricanes or tsunamis. Most of all, they 
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have thrown up key themes in the reconstruction of cities destroyed 
in conflicts since the Second World War. Those themes are clear. 
Destruction creates new opportunities for urban renewal. Plan-
ning for the post-war era becomes a policy imperative even while 
the conflict is raging. Plans are implemented to varying degrees of 
success due to social, economic, political and practical pressures. 
Housing is always a priority in reconstruction due to the loss of 
homes during conflict. Cities and their surviving citizens become 
experiments for new directions in architecture and urban design, 
experiments often mediated by a desire to rebuild the pre-war 
cityscape. This last point reminds us that cities are also sites of a 
violent disruption to the urban fabric and to people’s experience 
and memories of their city. These themes deserve to be continually 
emphasised by historians lest their significance become neglected 
in urban development born of trauma.
CHAPTER 7
American Bombing of  
Civilians since 1945
Introduction
This chapter assesses the nature and consequences of American 
air campaigns since 1945, and their impact upon people and 
urban places. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and American 
involvement in the Vietnamese War from the mid-1960s until 
1973 witnessed extensive air raids whose efficacy and legitimacy 
has been interrogated by historians since. The broader contexts of 
these conflicts were the legacy of European and Japanese imperi-
alism, and the polarisation between communism and capitalism 
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that defined the Cold War. Following the collapse of Soviet Com-
munism in Eastern and Central Europe, however, the Americans 
also participated in the NATO air raids during the Balkan Wars 
(sometimes referred to as the Yugoslavian Wars during the 1990s). 
So did the British and other member countries of NATO but the 
USA has been the target of most of the criticism of the bomb-
ings since. In the Middle East following the terrorist attacks on 
New York in September 2001, the USA also took the lead in UN 
actions to defeat the dictatorship in Iraq, and later in Libya and 
Syria. The USA has also been active in attacking the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, sometimes with tragic consequences 
for the local populations.
The Korean War
The causes of the Korean War are complex. As the world was divided 
between capitalist and communist blocs, Korea became a site of 
brutal conflict in the war for hegemony between western and com-
munist expansionism. The Korean Peninsula had been fought over 
by both the Chinese and the Japanese, and Korea became a Japanese 
‘protectorate’ during the early years of the twentieth century. From 
the Korean perspective the Second World War was effectively a war 
of liberation from Japanese occupation, but following the defeat 
of Japan, Soviet Russia installed the North Korean guerrilla leader 
Kim Il-sung as the new head of state. He had fought the Japanese 
both before and during the Second World War, an unlikely ally of 
the Americans who from 1945 supported South Korea. In other 
words, a former ally became the new enemy.330
Some five years after the horrors of the Second World War 
came to an end, the Korean peninsula was thrown into a terrible 
conflict that cost millions of lives, caused hundreds of thousands 
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of  casualties and created an eastern version of the Iron Curtain 
between North and South Korea. The crossing of the thirty-eighth 
parallel into North Korea, by UN forces led by the American 
General Douglas MacArthur, was rebutted by a Chinese  invasion 
across the Yalu River, forcing the Americans south.331 Subse-
quently, the USA successfully helped to defend South Korea from 
the communist invasion during the summer of 1950, but from the 
winter of 1950–1 the situation deteriorated, leading the USA and 
their allies to engage in an aggressive and prolonged air campaign 
over the Korean peninsula. A Movietone newsreel in 1950 was 
titled Korea: Air Blitz Checks Reds is further evidence of transna-
tional application of the word during the early Cold War.332
‘What hardly any Americans know or remember’, argues the 
American historian Bruce Cumings:
is that we carpet bombed the North for three years 
with next to no concern for civilian casualties. [The] air  
assaults ranged from the widespread and continual use 
of fire-bombing (mainly with napalm) to threats to use 
nuclear and chemical weapon, finally to the destruction 
of huge North Korean dams in the last stages of the 
war.333
Cumings goes on to argue that the air war on Korean civilians 
was an extension of the air campaigns against Germany and Japan 
during the Second World War, but in contrast to those urban-
industrial societies, North Korea was an agrarian third world 
country.334 One such example was the attack on the German dams 
by the RAF and the USAF destruction of dams in North Korea 
toward the end of the war. In May 1953 the Americans bombed 
five large dams, causing major flooding, wiping away roads and 
railways, saturating rice fields and drowning many people.335
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A further criticism points to American hypocrisy, and the 
US condemnation of German and Japanese atrocities against 
 civilians while claiming justification for Allied bombing raids in 
the  Second World War. Now from 1950 it applied a conventional 
 bombing strategy to North Korean cities. American military 
 leaders, including General MacArthur, expressed reservations 
about  civilian casualties and the resultant negative propaganda, 
 calling for precision bombing of military targets. Despite a stra-
tegic  distinction between legitimate military objectives and the 
need to avoid civilians, ‘a dynamic of escalation’ led to the mass 
bombing and burning of key cities such as Sinuiju, Kanggye, 
Manpojin and the later capital of North Korea, Pyongyang.336
In his magisterial history of the Korean War, Hastings comes 
to similar but less condemnatory conclusions. He agrees that air-
borne destruction of almost all towns and cities of any size in the 
Korean peninsula, the bombing of industry and infrastructure, 
and the terrible losses of civilian population caused by air raids, 
failed in the most important sense, because there was no victory 
of the UN in North Korea. Hastings concludes that the lessons 
from the Second World War were being unlearned as ‘intensive 
strategic bombing could kill large numbers of civilians’:
without decisive impact upon the battlefield or even 
upon the war-making capacity of an industrial power. 
Bombing could inflict a catastrophe upon a nation with-
out defeating it. North Korea was a relatively primitive 
society which contained only a fraction of the identifi-
able or worthwhile targets of Germany or Japan.337
The inevitability of mass civilian deaths in the context of mass 
bombing led to a parallel propaganda war between communists 
and western governments. Communists in Britain, for example, 
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tried to persuade public opinion that the aggression was the sole 
preserve of the USA and their British allies. The Daily Worker, the 
newspaper of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), ran 
many articles on the barbarity of American and British military 
actions in North Korea. One of its contributors, Monica Felton, an 
outspoken critic of American and British bombing. A civil serv-
ant and town planner, in 1951 Felton famously walked off the job 
as ‘Chairman’ of Stevenage New Town Development Corporation 
to travel to North Korea with the Soviet-backed Women’s Inter-
national Democratic Federation. In her self-published pamphlet 
What I Saw in Korea (1951), she countered what she saw as the 
cynical reluctance of British newspapers to ‘tell the truth’ about 
the Korean War. She elaborated in merciless detail on the destruc-
tion of towns and villages, the slaughter of women and children, 
the wrecking of Christian churches, the bombardment of hospi-
tals, schools, public buildings and shops, the institutions of eve-
ryday life that were vulnerable against the might of  American 
air power, claiming ‘we did not see one place that that had not 
been completely and utterly destroyed’. She described the deaths 
and devastation in the city of Sinuiju, ‘about as large as Wolver-
hampton’, which was in complete ruin.338 The comparison with 
Wolverhampton, a sizeable industrial city in the Midlands, was to 
indicate the scale of the destruction to her British readers through 
a familiar reference. ‘Korea today is a ruin so absolute’ she wrote, 
‘that no one can see it without getting the most clear and terrible 
warning of what a third world war would inevitably mean.’339 In 
linking the American bombings in Korea to the spectre of nuclear 
catastrophe, just six years following the atomic bombings of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, Felton strengthened her position a leading 
woman peace campaigner, with a growing following in Japan.340
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How did the North Koreans respond to this sustained assault 
from the air? The American historian Bradley K. Martin shows 
that just as North Korean and Chinese soldiers built a network 
of military tunnels, ‘civilians likewise dug into mountainsides 
to construct underground factories that could withstand bomb-
ing raids. Children, according to official accounts, kept going to 
school during the war “while their pencil cases rattled”’. As Mar-
tin also argues, however, according to the testimony of defectors 
from the subsequent regime, most North Koreans were so war-
weary they just wanted the conflict to end, no matter which side 
prevailed.341
For some US historians the terrible death toll resulting from the 
Korean War amounted to nothing less than an ‘American holo-
caust’.342 Over 40,000 Americans were killed, a figure that includes 
over eight thousand missing in action. South Korea endured 
over 1.3 million casualties including 415,000 deaths, while North 
Korean casualties numbered about 2 million, including 1 million 
civilians and over 520,000 soldiers. About 900,000 Chinese sol-
diers perished in the conflict.343 Many of the civilians in the North 
were killed by bombing, but many were also killed by soldiers, 
illness and starvation.
As with previous modern wars, widespread destruction pres-
aged renewal. North Korean urban areas became the context for 
a massive programme of reconstruction, financed partly and with 
some practical assistance from communist allies. Pyongyang and 
other cities were planned according to the Soviet theory of the 
‘microdistrict’ which emerged in Russian town planning dur-
ing the mid-1950s. This resulted in model housing estates based 
around ‘an integrated model’ that emphasised standardised mod-
ern housing, and the social control of everyday life based on the 
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arrangement of urban public space. Built from the mid-1950s 
until the mid-1970s, North Korean residential dwellings took 
the form of row-housing or large Soviet-style blocks of medium-
rise flats organised around open spaces and communal facili-
ties.344 Beyond these modern developments, however, much of 
small-town North Korea and the rural areas remained mired in 
inadequate housing, while the elite enjoyed superior residential 
conditions.345
The American bombing left other legacies, one being a last-
ing hatred of the USA in North Korea, which has since been 
continuously exploited and stimulated by the regimes of Kim Il 
Sung, Kim Jong Il, and now Kim Jong Un. As a number of writ-
ers, including Christopher Hitchens have observed, North Korea 
is the closest approximation to the totalitarian hell that George 
Orwell described in his novel 1984, where the television is a prop-
agandist tool of the state, constantly mobilising its people to hate 
and to prepare for war with the USA.346 This oppressive totalitar-
ian society is also overlaid by hideous levels of poverty.347
It is pause for thought that had the United Nations successfully 
destroyed the communist forces in Korea by 1953 – the counter-
factual scenario – the entire peninsula might have followed the 
path of South Korea. While the North placed itself on permanent 
war footing, repeatedly reminding its citizens of the threat of 
American nuclear or conventional attack from the air, the South 
became a strong ally of the USA. Since the end of the Korean 
War, it transitioned through authoritarian regimes to the greater 
levels of social and political freedoms enjoyed since the 1980s, 
the decade when the South Korean economy became one of the 
fastest growing in Asia. These achievements helped to explain 
the International Olympic Committee’s decision to award the 
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Olympic Games to the South Korean capital, Seoul, in 1988, 
despite the background threat of North Korean air strikes. Such 
threats have lasted to this day.
From Korea to Vietnam
The Korean War was a relatively short-lived conflict compared 
with the history of military intervention in Vietnam. The origins 
of the Vietnam War predated the Korean War and lasted long 
after the DPRK and South Korea ceased direct hostilities. The 
Vietnam War was in no small part a legacy of French colonial 
rule, which was followed by the occupation of Vietnam by the 
Japanese during the Second World War. The French collaborated 
with the Japanese in a colonialist echo of Vichy betrayal. During 
that conflict the communist Ho Chi Minh had assisted the Allies 
in fighting the Japanese in Vietnam but as with Korea, those who 
fought for liberation now turned against Western imperialism. In 
the years after the Second World War, Vietnam was divided into 
two countries, the communist North and the American-backed 
South.
In 1946, less than year following the end of the Second World 
War, the First Indochina War began. Despite collaborating with 
the Japanese occupation, following the Potsdam Conference 
France was reinstated as the colonial ruler with the assistance of 
Britain and the USA. The Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh and 
supported by Soviet Russia, resisted. So too did the People’s Army 
of Vietnam (PAV), led by Vo Nguyen Giap. The Viet Minh had 
been fighting during the Second World War against the Japanese 
occupation of the French colony of Vietnam, and on VJ Day even 
initiated a short-lived government in Hanoi, the Democratic 
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Republic of Vietnam. This was routed by the French, leading to 
a guerrilla war which the Viet Minh fought from their strong-
holds in the villages of rural North Vietnam while French forces 
occupied the cities. A decisive turn came in 1949 when Commu-
nist China also began to support the Viet Minh against perceived 
French imperialism. Despite support from the Americans, the 
French lost the war to the communist forces in 1954 following 
the ignominious defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. A lack of 
air support from the USA for French forces helps to explain this 
defeat, as did significant Chinese support for the Viet Minh.348 In 
1955, the Vietnam War began. It would last for nineteen and a 
half years, and cost 3.8 million lives.349
The Geneva Accords signed between France and Vietnam 
established a communist government in North Vietnam on one 
side of the demilitarised zone, and transitional arrangements 
for the South on the other. French forces withdrew completely 
from Vietnam. From 1956 South Vietnam came under the 
authoritarian government of Ngo Dinh Diem, causing Viet-
namese communists in the South, the Viet Cong, to fight a clan-
destine war for unity with the North. In 1960 North Vietnam 
set up the National Liberation Front, mostly made up of Viet 
Cong combatants. The United States, which had been assisting 
the Diem government, became increasingly drawn into the war 
on communism in the North, and increasingly frustrated with 
the Diem government. The USA was party to the assassination 
of Diem in 1963, and when Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked 
the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, the 
subsequent Gulf of Tonkin Resolution escalated the American 
 military campaign in Vietnam.350 Further civilian catastrophes 
lay ahead.
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The Bombing of Vietnamese Military and Civilian 
Targets
Air power was crucial to the escalation of the US war in Vietnam. 
Given its superior economic and military might the USA appeared 
to have a significant advantage over the Vietcong. American sol-
diers were better equipped, trained and fed than their enemies, 
but more importantly, the USA waged a hi-tech war: its B-52 
bombers were superior to the B-29, and supplemented by fleets of 
combat helicopters. During its major air campaigns in Vietnam 
the USA deployed an aerial arsenal comprising dumb bombs, 
guided bombs and missiles, air explosive devices, napalm and the 
defoliant ‘Agent Orange’. The first significant American bombing 
campaign in Vietnam began in March 1965 and terminated in 
October 1968, Code-named ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’, it was 
dubbed ‘The Vietnam Blitz’ by Movietone.351
Operation Rolling Thunder
President Lyndon B. Johnson had been sworn into office follow-
ing the assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963. His 
Secretary of Defence was Robert J. McNamara, an advocate of air 
power. During his time at the White House he presided, some-
times reluctantly, over Operation Rolling Thunder, the longest 
bombing campaign in the history of the United States Air Force 
(USAF). Its key intention was to disrupt and degrade supplies to 
the enemy by targeting fuel storage facilities, power plants, ware-
houses, steel works, military installations and army barracks, and 
infrastructure.352 From 1965, Operation Rolling Thunder was 
accompanied by the first boots-on-the-ground deployment of 
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American troops, who fought simultaneously against communist 
forces in South Vietnam.
With assistance from the USSR, the North Vietnamese man-
aged to construct an air-defence system and a civil defence 
apparatus. Using surface-to-air missiles, and with the support of 
Russian MIG fighters, the North Vietnamese brought down hun-
dreds of American B-52s. Civilians and active combatants created 
an improvised network of tunnels and shelters, a continuation 
of the defensive strategy witnessed in earlier total wars. Civilian 
workers also assisted emergency workers to repair infrastructure 
damaged by bombs, a further manifestation of the ‘people’s army’ 
trope used in 1939–45. This demonstrated a degree of resilience 
in the face of heavy odds.353
American peace activists were keen to report the tragic conse-
quences of air raids on the very people the bombs were intended 
to liberate. In October 1966 David Dellinger visited Phy Ly, a city 
with a population of over 10,000 people, described as a ‘Vietnam-
ese Guernica’. That Guernica was bombed by the airplanes of a 
fascist dictatorship at the behest of a fascist leader, while the USA 
was a democracy raises many moral questions, but the main point 
Dellinger wished to transmit was that when women and children 
were killed and horribly maimed, when straw huts, temples and 
churches were destroyed by the USAF, the Viet Cong gained in 
support, as did anti-American sentiment.354
Dellinger was not the only peace activist in Vietnam during 
Operation Rolling Thunder. The American folk singer and peace 
activist Joan Baez was in Hanoi during a major air raid. Her 
attempt to sing the Lord’s Prayer at a Christmas Service in 1966 
was interrupted by the wail of an air raid siren. It was the first of 
twelve days of air raids that the Vietnamese were subjected to, 
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with Baez as their sympathetic witness. In her interview with Roll-
ing Stone, magazine Baez recalled her recent experiences of debris, 
bomb craters, of dead and dismembered people. She painted a 
picture of Vietnamese citizens carrying bicycles to negotiate the 
rubble; an old man hobbling with difficulty through the wreck-
age; of women crying but defiant: ‘Nearby there was a bomb shel-
ter that had taken a direct hit. Everyone was dead.’355
Rolling Thunder has been mostly adjudged a failure by mili-
tary historians when measured against its intentions to destroy 
the military, industrial and communications capacities of com-
munist forces in Vietnam.356 The USAF suffered significant losses 
of air crew and aircraft, and many Americans were captured to 
endure the hell of becoming prisoners of war. In 1968 President 
Johnson called for a termination of the campaign, as its lack of 
success became cruelly apparent in harrowing spectre of Ameri-
can servicemen returning in body bags from the conflict. Despite 
this very recent and humbling lesson, however, his successor in 
the White House viewed bombing, and lots of it, as an essential 
strategy to winning the war.357
Operation Menu
President Richard M. Nixon took office in November 1968. Rob-
ert McNamara was replaced by Henry Kissinger as Defence Sec-
retary. Nixon had promised to end the war within months, but 
as 1969 progressed he became deeply frustrated at the failure of 
the American military to end the ongoing North Vietnamese 
offensive. Taking advice from Kissinger, Nixon considered that 
the neighbouring countries of Cambodia and Laos were aiding 
the People’s Army of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, Nixon 
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authorised Operation Menu, a prolonged and supposedly secret 
air campaign that lasted from March 1969 to May 1970. Target-
ing Laos and mostly eastern Cambodia, the campaign extended 
the sphere of conflict beyond Vietnam. The operation partly ran 
alongside an unsuccessful US-South Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia to capture or destroy North Vietnamese positions.358
Operation Menu was subdivided into smaller raids aimed at 
specific bases code-named as ‘Lunch’ ‘Snack’, ‘Dinner’, ‘Supper’ 
and ‘Dessert’. Historians disagree on the military achievements 
or otherwise of Operation Menu, but some firm conclusions have 
been drawn by social historians: the Cambodian bombing led to 
terrible consequences for the people of Cambodia in the subse-
quent regime of Pol Pot; reinvigorated the anti-war protests in 
the USA, and gravely damaged the American image across the 
world.359
Operation Linebacker
By 1971 Nixon was increasingly frustrated with the lack of success 
and the growing unpopularity of the war in the United States. A 
policy of ‘Vietnamization’, of increasingly allowing the Vietnam-
ese to take control of the conflict as the USA pulled back, was also 
undermined by the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese army. As 
Nixon shouted during a taped Oval Office conversation between 
himself and Kissinger on 2 June 1971, ‘we’re not gonna go out 
whimpering … we’re gonna take out the power plants, we’re gonna 
take out Haiphong, we’re gonna level that goddam country.’360
The almost impotent rage of the world’s most powerful man 
became tragi-comically apparent as the North Vietnamese 
launched the Spring Offensive of 1972 against American ground 
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forces. Nixon opted for an intensification of the bombing cam-
paigns on the capital Hanoi, its chief port city of Haiphong and 
other key cities and battlefields where the North Vietnamese were 
holding sway. B-52 bombers fighter bombers attacked Haiphong 
Harbour and petroleum storage facilities near Hanoi.361 In a 
recorded Oval Office conversation between the president and 
Kissinger on 25 April 1972, the potential consequences of bomb-
ing the docks and key oil and petroleum plants had been laid bare:
Kissinger: That will drown about 200,000 people [un-
clear]… [The volume of Kissinger’s voice perceptibly 
drops at this point].
Nixon: Well, no, no, no, no, no. I’d rather use a nuclear 
bomb. Have you got that ready?
Kissinger: Now that, I think, would just be, uh, too 
much, uh…
Nixon: A nuclear bomb, does that bother you? [I] just 
want you to think big Henry, for Christ’s sake [said in an 
animated, angry-sounding tone of voice].362
The Linebacker campaign was in two phases, culminating in the 
Christmas bombings from 18 December to 22 December 1972. 
Nixon was angry that the ongoing pattern of hostilities and nego-
tiations had achieved little, arguing that ‘only the strongest action 
would have any effect in convincing Hanoi that negotiating a fair 
settlement with us was a better option for them than continuing 
the war.’363 The Christmas bombings, a term with distant echoes 
of the Luftwaffe strikes on London some thirty-two years earlier, 
was made up of over 700 sorties by the B-52s, targeting railways 
stations, storage depots, rail lines, and the electricity supply. 
According to both Mark Clodfelter and Tucker, over 15,000 tons 
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of bombs were dropped in a fairly accurate campaign that hit mil-
itary targets while leaving adjacent residential areas mostly intact. 
Nonetheless, civilian mortalities still numbered 1,138 in Hanoi 
and 305 in Haiphong. Witnesses said that many buses evacuated 
the citizens of Hanoi into the nearby countryside, an echo of the 
trekking seen in so many air raids.364
Linebacker II ‘did unsettle the North’s urban populace.’ Many 
North Vietnamese people were disorientated and suffering from 
sleep problems, ‘their nerves strained by the continual attacks.’365 
Clodfelter was writing during the 1980s. Some years later a revi-
sionist teaching text argued that the Christmas bombings saw 
36,000 tons of explosives, more bombs than were dropped dur-
ing the fourteen months of Operation Menu. According to this 
revisionist estimate, about 1,600 civilians were killed in Hanoi 
and Haiphong, and many were injured. Whatever the exact fig-
ures, the Christmas attacks contributed to a resuscitation of peace 
talks, but also led to a sharp fall in the popularity of Nixon, who 
was increasingly seen by many critics of the war as a madman.366
Such was the view of the actress Jane Fonda who visited Hanoi 
in August 1972 during the Linebacker bombings. In common 
with Joan Baez some years before her, Fonda sheltered with the 
Vietnamese. Her testimony also reveals patterns of civilian behav-
iour under the bomb witnessed by many previous visitors to war 
zones. Yet Fonda possibly had more in common with Monica Fel-
ton during the Korean War than Baez, speaking out against Amer-
ican imperialism at a time when many captured US soldiers were 
enduring suffering and torture, and drawing upon a more explic-
itly politicised language than the folk singer. She wrote of the defi-
ant militia girls who kept singing as US imperialists bombed their 
country; of an evacuee from Hanoi who offered her the safety 
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of a bomb shelter while all around she witnessed ‘the systematic 
destruction of civilian targets- schools, hospitals, pagodas, the 
factories, houses, and the dike system’. And in words partly echo-
ing those of another American expounding his impressions of a 
civilian population under the bomb, namely Quentin Reynolds 
during the London Blitz, Fonda stated:
[One] thing that I have learned beyond a shadow of a 
doubt since I’ve been in this country is that Nixon will 
never be able to break the spirit of these people; he’ll 
never be able to turn Vietnam, north and south, into a 
neo-colony of the United States by bombing, by invad-
ing, by attacking in any way.367 
Fonda has since regretted some of her antics in Vietnam.368 Yet 
while her use of the language of imperialism to describe Ameri-
can bombings reflected the other side in the Cold War, her prog-
nosis of the consequences of mass bombardment was broadly 
correct, certainly more so than that of the American president. As 
noted in previous chapters and above in this one, heavy and con-
tinuous bombing wrecked buildings, infrastructure, and killed 
and maimed many fragile human bodies. But it did not crush the 
collective morale of the Vietnamese people, whether they lived in 
cities or villages.
Despite their impressive arsenal, the United States lost the air 
war in Vietnam. Clodfelter argues that American air command-
ers mistakenly believed that strategic bombing campaigns during 
the Second World War had been essential to ultimate victory.369 
Unlike the defeated German and Japanese, whose urban centres 
had been soundly reduced to ruins, the rural Vietcong had ulti-
mately triumphed over the USA, while the urban populations of 
Vietnam remained mostly unbowed by American air raids.
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American Movies and Vietnam
The American bombing war in Vietnam has featured in a number 
of compelling scenes in Hollywood representations of the con-
flict since 1975. As the B-52s flew on and away, they left behind 
a legacy that was both immediate and longer term. Images of 
mothers carrying the twisted bodies of their infants or of little 
children running from their destroyed villages, their skin burning 
with napalm, their faces contorted with fear and pain, were com-
mon in transatlantic and European news reports of the Vietnam 
War during the 1960s. Such images influenced not only public 
opinion and media criticism against the USA; they shaped a post-
1975 discourse that saw America not as a defender of Western 
values against communist belligerence, but as an imperialist, even 
demotic country whose guiding principle of manifest destiny 
had tragically become globalised. The same contempt for Native 
American cultures during the westwards spread of the Frontier 
in the nineteenth century, was now writ into American foreign 
policy. Older films about General Custer had depicted him as a 
hero defeated by treachery and inhuman Native Americans. In 
the film Little Big Man (1970), however, directed by Arthur Penn, 
the Vietnam metaphors come thick and fast: vulnerable tepees 
and animals are torched, an allegory for napalm, while Indian 
children and young woman are brutally raped or slaughtered by 
the men in uniform. A simple rural lifestyle is put to death by 
flames and the barbarism of the so-called ‘civilised world’.
Popular perceptions of the American war on communism 
in Vietnam and Cambodia have been shaped to a considerable 
degree by the American film industry. In e Deer Hunter  (1979) 
disproportionate aerial firebombing of simple agricultural com-
munities provided another vivid picture of the disproportionate 
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might of American air power. The aerial shots in Frances Ford 
Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979) depict deadly fleets of USAF 
planes dropping napalm onto a vulnerable jungle landscape. 
The ‘Ride of the Valkyries’ sequence in the same movie depicts 
a swarm of attack helicopters machine gunning many helpless 
innocent civilians in the coastal villages. In Oliver Stone’s Platoon 
(1986) both American and Vietnamese soldiers are victims of an 
American air strike. The Vietnam war films of the late twentieth 
century are very different from the early post-war representations 
of the Second World War from 1939–45, where death and injury 
was not graphically depicted. Interestingly, the bombing of Viet-
namese cities is rarely represented in the genre of Vietnam War 
films. The more vulnerable, innocent rural landscape is perhaps a 
more emotive landscape than the city to critique the alleged bru-
tality of American air power.
One of the most compelling films about the Vietnam War, how-
ever, was e Fog of War (2011), a series of interviews with the 
former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara. His emphasis 
upon the need for air superiority prefaces a sequence of heavy 
bombing raids from 1965, in which falling bombs and explosions 
below almost seem detached from their consequences. In his ear-
lier memoir, McNamara accepted some responsibility for errors 
made in the fog of war, but ultimately placed blame for the ter-
rible death toll on the Cold War and the threat of communism.370
From Destruction to Reconstruction
Much of Hanoi, Haiphong and other Vietnamese urban centres 
lay in varying degrees of desolation as the Americans retreated. 
But while the USA had been instrumental in the reconstruction 
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of post-1945 Germany and Japan, they were absent from the 
post-1975 Vietnamese reconstruction. In fact, as William Stewart 
Logan has argued, the growing Soviet influence in North Vietnam 
from 1972 was accompanied by urban renewal schemes in Hanoi 
and other Vietnamese cities hammered by American bombing. 
Following American withdrawal in 1973 reconstruction began 
in earnest, but as had so often happened in other countries, the 
rebuilding of Vietnam was beset with practical problems. The 
USAF had destroyed about 70 per cent of Vietnamese industrial 
capacity, and large swathes of infrastructure lay in ruins. Hun-
dreds of thousands of urban homes needed to be built to address 
the post-war housing shortage. A shortage of materials hampered 
reconstruction, however, and the country lacked a skilled corpus 
of architects, planners and civil engineers. The Americans also 
refused to honour their commitment to financial and practical 
aid for reconstruction as laid down by the Paris Peace Treaty, and 
even imposed an economic embargo on Vietnam in 1978.371
In common with North Korea some twenty years earlier, the 
new urban landscape of communist Vietnam was to reflect the 
ideology of the ruling elite with practical support and ideological 
input from the USSR. According to a leading Vietnamese social 
scientist and government advisor in 1980, existing towns and cit-
ies were to be transformed and modernised to reflect the com-
munist future, not the past, while bomb-damaged cities, notably 
Hanoi, were to be constructed to promote worker productiv-
ity, while eliminating any Western-influenced ‘consumer town 
aspect.’372 In addition to Soviet Russian influences, utopian urban 
designs from the GDR also influenced the rebuilding of post-
war Vietnamese cities, bringing into being suburbs of apartment 
blocks arranged around putatively communitarian spaces and 
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facilities.373 Ironically, the USAF had once more, as with North 
Korea, unwittingly assisted in the post-conflict creation of mod-
ern socialist cityscapes.
The NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia
The Balkan Wars of the 1990s demonstrated once again that 
large regions of Europe were politically unstable. As the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia disintegrated into nationalist and sectarian 
conflict between Orthodox Serbs and Muslim minorities, and as 
news of Serbian atrocities against Muslim men began to be widely 
reported in 1998–9, international pressure grew for a ‘humanitar-
ian’ bombing campaign to protect Kosovar Albanians from Ser-
bian aggression. NATO launched an offensive against Serbia on 
24 March 1999 which lasted for 78 days. Kosovo was effectively 
liberated 12 June when NATO and Russian troops moved in from 
Macedonia, and Kosovo soon regained its autonomy.
In February 2000 the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) pub-
lished its report Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign. Con-
cerned with the targeting of civilians and non-military facilities 
during the air campaign of 1999, and by the deployment of cluster 
bombs, HRW felt that a case should be answered by NATO, and 
of course the USA. It was particularly keen to investigate inci-
dents including the bombing of refugees, of displaced civilians, 
and raids on a prison and a Serb radio station.374
In common with earlier major conflicts, destruction caused 
reconstruction, and key themes re-emerged. Some fascinating 
recent historiography on architecture and heritage in the Balkans 
has uncovered the fact that most people wanted to see a rebuilt 
urban landscape that reminded them of their home, community 
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and city prior to the destruction. They prefer facsimile rebuilding, 
an emphasis upon history, an imagined past and familiar tradi-
tional structures, to modernity. Hence in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
many thousands of listed and public buildings that were destroyed 
in the wars of the 1990s, for example municipal buildings and 
mosques, were rebuilt ‘with these sentiments of continuity and 
identity in mind.’375 This rebuilding of historical landscapes was 
shaped by historical memory, cultural identities, social values, 
and political conflicts in the Balkan region, but similar influences 
are germane to all reconstructions in different contexts.376
The Middle-East and South Asia Since 1991
Criticism of American bombing in the Middle East began with the 
Persian Gulf War of 1991, and the American-led coalition cam-
paign to free Kuwait from the murderous Iraqi occupying forces. 
This was Operation Desert Shield, described by the US Defence 
Secretary Dick Cheney as ‘the most successful air campaign in 
the history of the world’. Following the liberation of Kuwait from 
the murderous intentions of Saddam Hussein, the United States 
attacked Iraqi forces as they retreated. Tragically, many civilians 
were killed in Iraq as ‘collateral damage’. One of the most disturb-
ing events was the loss of over 400 civilian lives in the Amiriyah 
shelter bombing in February 1991. Human Rights Watch was 
again on the case, highlighting the ‘needless deaths’ to non-com-
batants, not only as a consequence of coalition air attacks, but also 
the Iraqi Scud missiles launched in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.377
During the present century, American interventions in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria have all pursued 
military objectives, claiming to minimise civilian casualties but 
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often wilfully accepting this as an inevitable consequence of aerial 
warfare.378 Non-combatant deaths from drone strikes in Afghani-
stan and Pakistan have caused anti-war activists to question the 
legitimacy of the bombing, and invite opprobrium against the 
United States. In Iraq and Syria, Islamic State (ISIS) and other 
fundamentalist groups also coexisted with (and terrorised) the 
local population, meaning civilian casualties of bombing were 
inevitable.379
American Criticisms of US Bombing Campaigns
The American bombings during the Vietnam War led to a grow-
ing internal criticism of the aggressive so-called ‘imperialism’ of 
the United States. The peace protesters during the Vietnam War 
continued to condemn American military conduct, but increas-
ingly, critical academic interpretations of American air raids dur-
ing the Vietnam War began to interpret these the latest tragic 
historical phase in a continuity of American atrocities since the 
Second World War.
The most famous opponent of American air warfare has been the 
linguist and Marxist academic Noam Chomsky. His American Power 
and the New Mandarins was first published in 1968 when the air 
war was raging. Blaming the conflict in no small part on  American 
imperialism, Chomsky bitterly attacked the loss of life caused by the 
American bombing of Cambodia and Laos, and in the same year the 
Americans pulled out of Hanoi, he denounced American attacks on 
Vietnamese society as criminal, an unnecessary aggression in which 
‘the conduct of war was an indescribable atrocity’:
The US goal was to eradicate the revolutionary  nationalist 
forces which, US officials estimated, enjoyed the  support 
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of half the population. The method, inevitably, was to 
destroy the rural society. While the war of annihilation 
partially succeeded in this aim, the US was never able to 
create a workable system out of the wreckage.380
In many articles held on his website, Chomsky views US foreign 
policy during and since the Second World War as an extension 
of American geopolitical expansionism for the purposes of eco-
nomic and cultural hegemony.381 In his view, the terrorism of 9/11 
can in large part be viewed as consequent upon the USA’s support 
for Israel, for condoning the alleged ‘terrorism’ of the Israeli state, 
and the wider alienation and anger of Muslims in the Middle East 
caused by American interventions in the region.382
Another passionate and biased critic of American bombing 
policy is William Blum, an ex-federal government employee and 
Left-liberal writer who asserts a deadly continuity in US foreign 
policy and air wars since 1945. His widely-read polemic Rogue 
State bizarrely draws upon the mass society insights of Adolf 
Hitler to castigate Americans for their ‘primitive simplicity’ in 
accepting the legitimacy of the US bombing of Hiroshima.383 List-
ing almost all American bombing campaigns since 1945, includ-
ing Korea, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, South America, the Middle East 
and Afghanistan, Blum dismisses these as an imperialistic project 
to dominate the world and choke off communism (Korea and 
Vietnam) or rid the world of terrorism (the Middle East, Afghan-
istan) while perpetrating bombing campaigns which he argues 
were terrorist in and of themselves: ‘a terrorist is someone who 
has a bomb but doesn’t have an air force.’384 Few people would 
now argue that the Vietnamese bombing campaigns were always 
proportionate and successful, but for Blum Korea and Vietnam 
were simply at the worst end of a spectrum of unjustified Ameri-
can aggression. He sees the USA is the biggest terrorist on the 
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planet, and American culpability has been exacerbated by the use 
of high-tech weapons such as cluster bombs and drones which 
have killed and maimed many thousands of innocent civilians. 
However Blum is unable to attach relative weights to those who 
committed the atrocity in September 2001, Islamist attackers who 
bomb or gun down civilians, and the US government. The major 
culprit remains the American military complex.385
Continuities between American air raids have been empha-
sised by younger historians with similar views to Blum and 
Chomsky. Writing in the Asia-Pacic Journal they have attacked 
American indifference to civilian mortalities and casualties in air 
raids. Roosevelt’s condemnation of the air raids during the 1930s 
have been mobilised to question the subsequent morality of US 
bombing campaigns, initially thrown into relief by the role of the 
B-29 plane in conventional and atomic bombings.386 The lessons 
learned by the USAAF were adapted for the Korean War, where 
American military commanders sought to avoid civilian casual-
ties but tacitly accepted that there would be death and maiming of 
innocents during air raids on industrial centres. Similar precepts 
informed the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ and the bombings of civilians in 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.387
A problem with these arguments can be identified in the follow-
ing sentence about the Second World War: ‘Although Americans 
were quiet about the harm to civilians resulting from US bombing, 
they spoke out loudly against German and Japanese atrocities.’388 
This begs a number of questions. Surely, when loved ones and 
service personnel are fighting for their country, such emotions 
are easily explained? The Americans were fighting for democracy, 
moreover, whereas the Axis powers attempted to brutally impose 
fascism upon the world. The use of bombs was also a far cry from 
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the hand-to-hand atrocities committed by the Germans and 
Japanese. Yet none of these articles on American bombing policy 
since the 1940s detail the fact that the USA was fighting enemies 
whose conduite de la guerre was hardly modelled on the Geneva 
Conventions. American air raids on civilians did not take place in 
a neutral context, and civilians in fascist dictatorships were often 
ruthlessly sacrificed by their own side.
Conclusions
Undoubtedly and tragically wasteful of civilian lives, and devas-
tating to towns, cities and villages, the Cold War conflicts and 
post-1992 wars have been used by critics of the USA as evidence 
of American imperialism and of a callous indifference to cultures 
and peoples of which they knew little. Among the most vocal 
 British opponents of American air raids is the Stop the War Coali-
tion (STWC). On its website, the STWC blames the United States 
for every global conflict from Korea to the bombing of Syria: 
‘Since the Korean War (1950-53), the United States has controlled 
vast regions of the world through first establishing and then con-
tinuing a military presence.’389
This judgement implies there is no consent from ‘controlled’ 
countries, which was not the case for millions of people who 
opposed communism. It also begs counterfactual questions for 
both Korea and Vietnam: if the USA had not intervened, would 
the entire Korean peninsula now be a dynastic dictatorship mired 
in the oppression and poverty that blights the people of North 
Korea? And had the Americans and the South Vietnamese been 
victorious, would Vietnam now be a freer and more prosper-
ous country? And how long and in what directions would the 
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Balkan conflicts of the 1990s have taken without NATO inter-
vention from the air? Yet such questions are hidden behind the 
terrible images caused by the atrocities against civilians in both 
 conflicts, for which the USA bears the brunt of responsibility. 
This  chapter has, hopefully, provided a more nuanced and histor-
ically-informed approach than those offered up by anti-American 
interpretations aerial warfare since 1945. Yet no account of the 
American bombings during the Cold War should ignore the terri-
ble legacy of unexploded bombs and the deaths and injuries they 
have caused since. In 2016 President Barack Obama expressed 
regret, but offered no apology, for the bombing of Laos during the 
Vietnam War, and increased compensation for the victims. About 
20,000 people have been victims of unexploded ordnance since 
the war ended. Many were children, fascinated by the small size 
and shape of unexploded cluster bombs.390
Coda
Most readers of this book will be aware of the conflicts in Syria 
and the Ukraine. In common with the website of the Stop the War 
Coalition, the online articles by both Chomsky and Blum offer 
little criticism of the Russian bombing of the Ukraine in 2015 
which killed innocent bystanders, and led to an illegal annexa-
tion of Ukrainian territory. While in Syria since 2015, air strikes 
on Aleppo and other cities by the Russians have killed innocent 
civilians, in order to support a barbaric regime that uses chemical 
weapons on its own citizens. This raises a serious question mark 
over the integrity of their arguments.
CHAPTER 8
Commemoration and Controversy: 
Remembering Air Raids and Their 
Victims Since 1945
Introduction
Most wars in history have led the victors and the vanquished to cre-
ate memorials to those who were slain in the course of battle. The 
terrible casualty rates of the First World War gave rise to nationwide 
projects to remember those who would not grow old. In Britain, 
the most famous of the memorials is the Cenotaph in Whitehall, 
London. Those who died during the Second World War fighting 
for their country were added to the First World War memorials in 
the cities, towns and villages where they had once lived. As Amy 
Helen Bell argues, however, the First World War cast long shad-
ows over the interwar period. The promise of a land fit for heroes 
was tarnished by economic decline, unemployment and increasing 
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inequality. Mixed emotions over the Armistice Day commemora-
tions, the tragedy of so many lost lives during the ‘war to end all wars’ 
and fear of another war during the later 1930s, meant that memori-
alisation was never a singular and shared national experience.391
Yet the twentieth century marked a decisive shift in com-
memoration. The First World War produced other commemora-
tive emblems, not to those who died in service, but to civilians 
and cities hit by air raids. It is rare to see a building named after 
the device that destroyed the previous building on the site, but 
along the Farringdon Road in East London the Zeppelin Build-
ing proudly announces itself to passers-by (See Fig 1). A hundred 
years later, on the anniversary of the Zeppelin raids, the London 
Borough of Hackney placed a brown plaque on the wall of a house 
in Alkham Road, the site of one of the first bombs to be dropped 
on London during the First World War.392 All across London, and 
many other British cities, plaques mark the place where a bomb 
or an incendiary device caused death and destruction. They are 
modest, localised sites of memory, or lieux de memoire.
Historians of commemoration have drawn a significant distinction 
between official and ‘top down’ commemoration events and struc-
tures, and those from the ‘bottom up’, initiated by the social agency 
of people and groups who are not in government. Across the world 
many state-led or local-government sponsored memorial fixtures 
exists to the war dead, and many others reflect the actions of local peo-
ple, associations of bomb survivors, and non-governmental organisa-
tion such as charities, religious initiatives, pacifist groups and veterans 
organisations. In some important cases, however, both official and 
public initiatives fused together, hence the distinction between top-
down versus social agency approaches can sometimes be misleading.
Memories of war are not confined to those who lived through 
or endured conflict. As Geoff Eley and Penny Summerfield have 
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argued, ‘remembering’ the Second World War does not require 
direct lived experience of it.393 Those who were born soon after 
the war, and who grew up during the 1950s and 1960s were social-
ised into images of the war and a sense of victory by many tri-
umphalist war films. For those born later still, a significant range 
of sites, spatial, textual and visual, encourage vicarious experi-
ences of the air raids. As Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson have 
argued, British cultural memory has been strongly influenced by 
the victory of 1945.
German cultural memory, by contrast, has been troubled by the 
Allied bombings. In her study of the Dresden bombings of Febru-
ary 1945, Anne Fuchs focuses upon the ‘carriers of memory’ of the 
‘impact narrative’ of the bombing of Dresden, namely photogra-
phy, ruins, fine art, architecture, fiction and film.394 Each of these 
textual or visual genres may be viewed as presenting Dresden as 
the most important lieu de memoire of German suffering in the 
Second World War. These sources also remind us that the Second 
World War was a very visual war, more so than previous major 
conflicts due to the new popularity of film and photography.
Fuchs’ arguments are certainly applicable beyond Dresden. She 
argues that ‘the Holocaust, the bombing of Warsaw, Dresden, 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki:’
the Vietnam War, and recently perhaps the Iraq War, are 
signature events that underline the destructive poten-
tial of a modernity that divorced technological progress 
from ethical reflection.395
Some refinements are required to this argument. Comparing the 
botched and tragic attempt to liberate Iraq from a Ba’athist neo-
fascist dictatorship as a ‘signature event’ alongside the industri-
alised murder of 6 million Jewish people is fraught with difficult 
176 The Blitz Companion
issues. And as previous chapters have shown, the reactions of 
Churchill to the Dresden bombing, and of the American pilots 
who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
were not devoid of ethical reflection. Yet Fuchs is broadly cor-
rect in her view that bombings on other major cities have carried 
impact narratives. They acknowledge and recall the impact of air 
raids mostly as urban phenomena with global significance.
Urban Sites of Commemoration in Post-war Britain
Within the context of fixed war memorials in towns and cities, the 
remembrance of the air war on Britain has been a largely prag-
matic affair, mostly relying upon agencies such as interest groups, 
local activists and charities for their provenance and construction. 
In 2010 the journalist Peter Watts asked why London, the city 
that sustained the longest continuing bombing raids in Europe, 
had no powerful and meaningful memorial to its Blitz victims.396 
The absence of a significant site of active commemoration of the 
London Blitz was denied to those who have lived through it, and 
denied a context for subsequent generations to activate histori-
cal empathy an imagination. Some years later it is still the case. 
Within the precincts of St Paul’s Cathedral a diminutive circular 
monument fails to project the scale of the bombing of London, 
and does little to commemorate the victims of the Blitz and their 
suffering. The modestly-sized Cenotaph in Whitehall, the memo-
rial to the dead of the First World War, is proof that well-designed 
memorials do not have to be on a large scale, but a more signifi-
cant statement commemorating civilian endurance and suffering 
during the Blitz would make a powerful contribution to the sites 
of memory in the capital city.
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The piecemeal nature of commemoration of air raids in Britain 
is evident in the random plaques or interpretation boards which 
adorn the sides of homes and buildings where bombs, or V1 and 
V2 rockets struck. Yet East London, the first and most heavily 
battered area of the London Blitz, has been proactive in calling 
for memorials to those who suffered the air raids. Popular litera-
ture has recognised the devastation wrought on East London, and 
the experiences of women during the Blitz are at the heart of the 
stories. Sally Worboyes’ novel Over Bethnal Green (2000) deals 
with the experiences of a young mother in the East End during 
the Blitz, while Dee Williams in Love and War (2004) explores a 
young woman and her family’s endurance of the Blitz in Rother-
hithe in the London Docklands. Worboyes grew up in the East 
End, and Williams was herself a young girl during wartime Lon-
don, so the novels contains autobiographical elements. In July 
2008 the Hermitage Riverside Memorial Gardens were opened in 
the Docklands by the Culture Secretary of the Labour govern-
ment, Hazel Blears. Those in attendance included a local survivor 
of the bombings and an ex fire warden. Designed by the architect 
Wendy Taylor CBE, the memorial in the gardens depicts a dove 
of peace within a marble rectangle set on a stone plinth.397 Hence 
both the popular novel and sculpture present East London as a 
site of memory of wartime air raids.
A modest tribute on the ground in the precincts of St Paul’s 
Cathedral is the memorial to Londoners who lost their lives dur-
ing the Second World War, and to the many thousands of others 
in the capital city who endured the conflict. It was paid for by the 
public following an appeal by the Evening Standard. The words 
around the memorial state ‘Remember Before God the People of 
London, 1939-1945’ while the spiral inscription on the top states 
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‘In war resolution, in defeat defiance, in victory magnanimity, in 
peace goodwill.’ These words were used by Winston Churchill in 
his preface to his history of the Second World War.398 Dedicated 
on 1 January 1999, it is rather underwhelming. (See Fig 4)
The heroism of the fire fighters and other members of the emer-
gency services was the subject of some powerful documentary 
films made during the Second World War, as noted in chapter 
Figure 7: National Firefighter’s Memorial, St. Paul’s Cathedral Lon-
don (photograph by author, 2017).
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three. Just south of the St Paul’s Cathedral stands the National 
Firefighters Memorial, a superior statement to the one in the 
grounds of St Paul’s itself. Commissioned by the Firefighters 
Memorial Charitable Trust, and opened by the Queen Mother 
in May 1991, it depicts the kind of action poses seen in docu-
mentary war films such as Humphrey Jennings Fires Were Started 
(1943). The monument also lists the names of those killed in 
the service of their country, as they fought to protect others in 
 London from the conflagrations that engulfed so many buildings 
and streets. The memorial also hosts the praise from Churchill to 
the firefighters as ‘Heroes with grimy faces’, a term revealing the 
influence of American cinema on British popular culture during 
the 1930s. The arms pointing towards the cathedral also reference 
its miraculous survival.399
Situated close to St Paul’s Cathedral, it is respectful, heroic, yet 
unboastful, a significantly better memorial than the floor-bound 
disk to those killed and injured by the London Blitz. St. Paul’s 
Cathedral is therefore commemorated in both film and by the 
memorials within and just beyond its precincts. This is one of the 
most significant sites of memory to the dead of wartime London, 
and particularly to those killed during the Blitz on the capital city.400
Close to the Cenotaph in Whitehall is the Monument to the 
Women of World War II. Unveiled by Queen Elizabeth II in July 
2005, just two days after the London bombings, it was a long 
overdue statement to the contribution of women not only in mili-
tary uniform but as civil defenders. Its history again highlights 
the pragmatic culture of commemoration in Britain: it was the 
product of voluntary lobbying and fund raising by the Memo-
rial to the Women of World War II charitable trust, and it gained 
support from the National Memorial Heritage Fund. Dame Vera 
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Lynn, a popular wartime singer, was among many famous women 
who supported the memorial, including notably Baroness Betty 
Boothroyd, the patron of the trust. At the unveiling, Boothroyd 
dedicated the memorial to ‘all the women who served our  country 
and to the cause of freedom, in uniform and on the home front.’401 
This was an important moment and monument recognising 
the role of women in wartime, a mostly male-dominated arena 
of commemoration. Many other memorials to the bravery and 
 sacrifice of people in wartime came London can be found on the 
website londonremembers.com.
Beyond London, the National Memorial Arboretum in Stafford-
shire hosts the Civil Defence Memorial Grove, which recognises 
Figure 8: Monument to the Women of World War Two.  (Photograph 
Jane Rix / Shutterstock.com).
Commemoration and Controversy 181
the sacrifice and work of Civil Defence workers in the Second 
World War. It also holds a memorial to animals who helped defend 
Britain.402 Across provincial Britain, cities and towns host fixed 
memorials to the dead of air raids. There are too many to detail 
here but in Clydebank for example, the memorial contains the 
names of the 528 people who were killed by the Luftwaffe on 13–14 
March 1941. Commissioned by West Dumbartonshire Council, 
and designed by a local artist, the memorial was unveiled in 2009, 
and powerfully creates a sense of lost lives among a living city.403
Art: Representations and Remembering
Leading artists were commissioned by governments during the 
Second World War to paint images of the Home Front. Others 
painted spontaneously in the wake of air attacks. Art is both a rep-
resentation of the air raids and their impact, as well as reinforcing 
cities and places as lieux de memoire. Guernica (1937) by Pablo 
Picasso is one of his finest and possibly his most famous paint-
ing. In London, for example, there are many fine paintings on air 
raids and their aftermath in the Imperial War Museum, while the 
City of Westminster Archives in Victoria also contains artwork 
on the London Blitz, including an amateur depiction of St Paul’s 
Cathedral, one of many paintings of the cathedral completed 
during the war. Many online websites host representations of 
air raids, for example, Premonitions of the Blitz, 1940 by Julian 
 Trevelyan and John Piper’s Interior of Coventry Cathedral  fo lowing 
air raid damage are partcularly haunting images.404 Many local 
history museums hold amateur paintings of cities during and 
after air raids. They may not have the impact of Picasso but they 
are carriers of imagery of the air raids and depict landscapes 
forever altered by air raids.
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Ruins and lieux de memoire
Places of worship destroyed by air raids, and left in preserved 
ruins, are also spaces of contemplation and of memories. Many 
churches in London and the City of London were laid waste dur-
ing the Second World War. Not far from the Fire Service Memorial 
are the ruins of Christchurch Greyfriars Church, for example. The 
ruins of this place of worship, designed by Sir Christopher Wren, 
were left by the City of London Corporation and the Church of 
England as a visual reminder of the Blitz on the City of London. 
They are beautifully preserved, as the once covered interior is now 
open to the elements, and hosts an attractive garden.405 Although 
many people eat their lunch there, it is also a place of quiet con-
templation about the nature of war.
The shell of the medieval Coventry Cathedral is also an impor-
tant religious site of commemoration, and this took on global sig-
nificance when Coventry was twinned with Dresden in 1959. This 
is discussed further below. These memorials and sites of memory 
also form some of the places of interest in the guided Blitz walks 
that are now popular tourist events in London, introducing thou-
sands of people to the palimpsests of bombsites, and to the types 
of buildings that were built on them during the reconstruction 
era, or since. Field walks are another carrier of memories, provid-
ing informed retrospective impressions of air raids; a number of 
books and websites are dedicated to them.406
Film, Television and Memories of the Blitz
Contemporary documentary films made during the Second 
World War provide powerful and often moving images of  ordinary 
people and of emergency service workers battling against the air 
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raids. Among the most famous are the films directed by Hum-
phrey Jennings, one of the leading pioneers of the British docu-
mentary film movement between the wars. It was Jennings who 
directed London (Britain) Can Take It at the height of the Blitz 
in 1940, discussed in chapter three. Listen to Britain (1942) is a 
depiction of life on the Home Front, set to music, while Fires were 
Started (1943) sensitively presented the quiet heroism and the 
stoicism of the AFS during the worst nights of the air raids. These 
were not filmed in situ, but used ‘real people’ as opposed to actors 
to stage realistic enactments of the work of the AFS. Jennings also 
made the end-of-war film A Diary for Timothy  (1944–5) which 
looked forward to the democratic future that would emerge from 
the horrors of war. To the present-day viewer, wartime documen-
taries, alongside wartime newsreels, provide vivid, if censored, 
scenes from everyday life. The British Film Institute (BFI) and the 
Imperial War Museum (IWM) host many films about the Blitz 
and other air raids.
Not to be confused with contemporary documentaries are his-
torical documentaries. Providing a rich vein of information and 
interpretations of air raids and their consequences historical 
documentaries are a synthesis, a combination, of both secondary 
interpretations and primary sources. Some are specifically about 
air raids, others view air raids within the wider context of war. 
Among the best historical documentaries is the award-winning 
television series e World at War , first broadcast in 1974, and 
available as a box set. Made for Thames Television, a British com-
mercial channel which broadcast on the ITV network, e World 
at War drew upon interviews and oral testimonies, wartime 
newsreels, propaganda, documentary films, military films and 
recordings, photographs, and images of newspaper front pages 
to accompany the narration by the classical actor Sir Laurence 
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Olivier. A total of twenty-six episodes were overseen by histori-
cal adviser Noble Frankland and written by leading historians 
such as Neal Ascherson, Courtney Browne, David Elstein and 
David Wheeler. The Blitz on British cities, the Nazi Blitzkrieg 
across Europe, the Allied bombing campaign against Germany 
and the War in the Pacific, culminating in the bombing of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, are given balanced treatments, tending not 
towards pure objectivity or neutrality but a multi-angled narra-
tive from the perspectives of the combatants as well as innocent 
victims. For example, in the episodes on air raids over Britain and 
 Germany, interviews are held with combatants and civilians from 
both sides.407 The series is therefore also very useful in putting the 
British Blitz into comparative international context.
On the fiftieth anniversary of the ending of the Second World 
War, the BBC ran a series of mock news reports on the events of 
the war, reminding viewers of the differences in tone then and 
now. While encouraging a powerful sense of nostalgia for those 
who were alive at the time, for younger viewers it ‘placed us inside 
the grand narrative’ of the People’s War, of a country that had once 
been fought alone, endured the air raids and other wartime hard-
ships and battles, and ultimately triumphed over the Nazis.408
A further television series, broadly within a historical documen-
tary tradition, was the BBC series Blitz Cities (2005). Remembering 
the air raids and the victims of Birmingham, Cardiff, Liverpool, 
London and Cardiff, each episode was hosted by a celebrity from 
the city, and included images and films of the bombings, along-
side interviews with people who lived through them. The inclu-
sion of famous people was a clever device to encourage people 
to watch and share in the experiences of seventy-five years ago. 
That the Blitz remained a popular subject with both audiences 
and programme makers was further evidenced in the fine BBC 
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series Blitz: e Bombs that Changed Britain (2017). Drawing 
upon oral testimonies, contemporary footage and photographs, 
the series showed the impact that one bomb or raid could have on 
individuals, families and communities.409
Cinema and television fiction features have also dealt with the 
impact and legacy of air raids. Earlier post-war films that include 
images of air raids or their aftermath include the 1955 film e 
End of the Aair, in which an illicit love affair is conducted against 
the austere background of wartime London. Almost fifteen years 
after its deadly arrival in London the V2 rocket made a post-war 
appearance in the BBC science fiction series Quatermass and the 
Pit, written by the acclaimed screenwriter and science fiction 
author Nigel Kneale, and broadcast live to an awestruck televi-
sion audience in 1958–9. The story was also made into a movie 
by Hammer Film Productions during the Sixties. As foundations 
for an extension to a London Underground station were being 
dug, construction workers unearthed an alien rocket which the 
government and military officials claimed was an unexploded 
German V2, but which was really an ancient Martian spaceship. 
There is a kind of inverted echo in Quatermass of the mislead-
ing denials about the existence of the V2 issued by the wartime 
government. During the war, the V2 was seen by some politicians 
as too menacing for public awareness; now it was a useful foil to 
cover up the terrible truth about latent Martian menace lurking 
beneath the streets of London. The concluding scene in which the 
devil appears over London might have reminded many London-
ers of the first appearance of the Luftwaffe.410
In the BBC television series, Goodnight Sweetheart, broad-
cast from 1993–9, which of course coincided with the fiftieth 
anniversary of 1945, the Home Front in wartime London was 
imaginatively recreated within the context of a time-travelling 
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TV repairman who repeatedly enters wartime London through 
a time portal. His life is one of infidelity to his late-twentieth- 
century wife and his wartime spouse, the main humorous theme 
of the series. But Goodnight Sweetheart also gently mocks figures 
of authority in the police service and the ARP, while depicting the 
humour but also tensions, irritations and privations of the Home 
Front. Nonetheless, the sense of nostalgia in Goodnight Sweetheart 
is palpable. Rather than invalidating it, the series can be a useful 
source for social historians in any comprehensive interpretation 
of the Blitz. Nostalgia is a powerful emotion. As people age, they 
often feel they have lost something, while many possess a more 
nuanced and realistic understanding of the past than Calder gives 
them credit for. It also cleverly creates and depicts the atmosphere 
of the Home Front with its plot juxtapositions of ‘then’ and ‘now’.
Chapter three drew attention to Hope and Glory (1987), a film 
about childhood during the Blitz. So too was e Evacuees, (1975) 
a television film for the BBC’s Play for Today series. Written by 
Jack Rosenthal, it sensitively deals with the experiences of two 
Jewish boys evacuated from Manchester during the Blitz. Both 
Goodnight Sweetheart nd e Evacuees also shows how television 
drama is a carrier of imagined memory.
Among the least obvious yet most evocative representations of 
the Blitz are drawn and animated images of the air raids and their 
effects. The air raids on wartime London make a tantalising appear-
ance in Walt Disney’s Peter Pan 2: Return to Never Land, a chil-
dren’s animation based on the boy hero of J.M. Barry, when Peter 
and Wendy are hiding in an air raid shelter. Some of the most emo-
tionally moving depictions, however, are literally drawn from the 
experiences of the artists themselves. The English artist Raymond 
Briggs has produced a beautiful autobiographical graphic novel of 
the lives of his parents, and his childhood, which includes a poign-
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ant segment on the Home Front. First published in 1998, Ethel and 
Ernest depicts the evacuation of young Raymond from London to 
the county of Dorset. It evokes the atmosphere in  Britain as war 
is declared, the voluntarism and good humour of ARP wardens 
such as his father, the impact of bombs on the terraced houses, the 
searchlights and the bombers, Anderson shelters, the irritations 
of rationing, the spectre of the doodlebugs, VE Day celebrations, 
and the election of the Labour Party to government in 1945.411 In 
2016, the BBC and the BFI released Ethel and Ernest as an ani-
mated film, demonstrating many similarities with the original, but 
also a couple of subtle but revealing differences that can creep into 
stories as they transition from one textual format to another. For 
example, unlike the graphic novel, the opening frames of the film 
depict a bi-plane flying over London in 1928, an echo of the air-
mindedness of the interwar years discussed in chapter two, and a 
harbinger of the prominence of air raids in the story to come.
Ethel and Ernest also references the momentous events in Japan 
in August 1945: ‘ATOMIC BOMB…HIROSHIMA…100,000 
DEAD…’ blares the radio. ‘Hundred thousand dead from one 
bomb’, repeats Ernest in awe, while Ethel exclaims that ‘at least 
it will put paid to wars’.412 Briggs also drew and wrote When the 
Wind Blows, a powerful graphic novel about atomic destruction. 
Made into a film released in 1986, it depicts a nuclear attack on a 
typical English town.413
Air Raid Photography: Creating Images for 
Memorialisation
Contemporary photographs of air raids, of survivors, victims and 
of the landscape during and after bombings, were a conscious act of 
enabling memorialisation during or immediately after the attacks 
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themselves. During the Blitz on London, the Picture Post photog-
rapher Bert Hardy captured many black and white images of East 
Enders. Hardy recorded the images for ‘East End at War’. In com-
mon with the work of documentary film makers, he took photo-
graphs of everyday life: of the AFS battling against walls of flames; 
of working-class people living in their bombed-out streets or sleep-
ing in the tube stations platforms at night; of shop-workers carry-
ing on despite the bomb damage, and of ARP wardens and local 
clergymen comforting children. This was documentary photogra-
phy of the highest order.414 Any memories or imaginary recreations 
of the London Blitz would be lacking without sight of such images.
Hardy was aware that he and his newspaper were creating a 
visual record of the air raids, and of the bravery of civilians, ARP 
volunteers and fire fighters. His photographs are well-known, but 
less so are the personal experiences which he endured to take 
them. He accompanied a fireman into the cellar of a burning 
warehouse, when the roof collapsed, leading to a frantic struggle 
to escape. ‘I must have gone onto the roof of one of the build-
ings to get pictures of firemen fighting the fire from the tops of 
ladders’, he recalled, ‘but I can’t remember anything about it.’ In 
common with the British documentary film movement, Hardy’s 
photographic realism was motivated by the bravery and dignity 
of ‘ordinary’ people, and of their resilience in adverse circum-
stances.415 An impressive collection of photographic images of the 
Blitz are held at the Imperial War Museum.
Memoirs, Autobiographies and Oral Testimonies as 
Carriers of Memory
Remembering exists beyond the built environment, and beyond 
ceremony and symbolism. Memoirs, autobiographies and oral 
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testimonies enable us to gain insights into the sensory and emo-
tional experiences of air raids. Drawing upon a wide range of 
wartime and post-war memoirs for London, Amy Helen Bell 
draws attention to the predominant subjective characteristics of 
memory among those who survived the air Blitz. Emphasising 
the predominance of a British sense of sangfroid, a subjectivity 
of ‘taking it’ always with a good dose of humour or stoicism, Bell 
argues that ‘the memory of the Blitz:’
helped to create a retrospective vision of civilian collec-
tivity. In this vision, the fortitude of Londoners during 
the bombing raids assured them of victory, and a new 
post-war social contract. The British war victory, and 
subsequent Labour election victory in 1945, consolidat-
ed this hindsight vision.416
Bell does not seek to deflate the achievement of Londoners and 
of the British more widely in withstanding aerial bombardment. 
She is more concerned with the nuances of memory, arguing that 
the traces of fear and loathing, anger at politicians, and grief at the 
loss of home and family, were also important parts of the story.
Oral testimonies also record eyewitness accounts of air raids, 
not only from the point of view of those attacked, but also of mili-
tary personnel. These are some of the carriers of memory of the 
Blitz and other air raids. There are however both particular prob-
lems as well as distinctive advantages when using autobiographies 
and oral testimonies in historical accounts of air raids. Because 
memory can be flawed, or selective, oral histories can never be 
relied upon solely as an accurate or verifiable version of events. 
Statements need to be checked, contextualised and integrated 
within a wider apparatus of sources.
Students and anyone wishing to interview people with a  living 
memory of the past can create their own oral histories. Some 
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useful guides to undertaking oral history and memory work can 
be found in Rob Perks and Alastair Thomson’s (eds) e Oral  
History Reader (2016). Testimonies of such traumatic events 
as air raids possesses immense value to the student of modern 
 warfare in general, and of the experiences of civilians in violently 
disrupted circumstances in particular. Such testimonies are not 
only gained through interviews conducted by historians and 
respondents. Invitations to write letters to newspaper or magazines, 
or the use of autobiography, all count as oral history.
The oral historian Joshua Levine, for example, has collected 
many testimonies, and drew upon autobiographies and memoirs, 
of those who lived through the Blitz, and most of the best social 
histories of wartime Britain include oral testimony for the vivid 
and often emotional manner in which people relate their experi-
ences, experiences which since 1945 have only really been visited 
again on London by terrorist bombings. Many of the gobbets of 
testimony in Forgotten Voices of the Blitz and the Battle for Britain 
(2007) or e Secret History of the Blitz (2015) are about bereave-
ment, the killing of friends and family, the loss of home and neigh-
bourhood, illicit sexual relations, sweeping away rubble, disposing 
of the dead, and tending to the wounded. The pain of disrupted 
lives, the sense of loss, spontaneous pleasures, and the senseless-
ness of many wartime horrors, are still felt many years after the 
bombings were over. Two important and accessible collections of 
Second World War testimonies in Britain are held online by the 
BBC on the People’s War website, the subject of some interest-
ing insights by Noakes, while the British Library Sound Archive is 
available online in addition to further materials in the collection 
at the British Library site on the Euston Road in London.417
So the picture was by no means one of uncritical triumphalism 
when looking back on the air raids. Nonetheless, victory for the 
Commemoration and Controversy 191
British powerfully influenced the national culture of memory as a 
shared celebration resonant with varying degrees of celebration. 
British post-war attitudes to Germany have in turn been power-
fully influenced by that.418 International football matches, notably 
the World Cup Final of 1966, held in London, became occasions to 
remember and re-fight the Second World War. Moreover, images 
of the Germans as militaristic and humourless have pervaded 
post-war British popular culture.419 As Summerfield argues, how-
ever, different generations, while encouraged to ‘remember’ the 
Second World War, often respond in complex ways to predomi-
nant wartime narratives.420
But things were different for the citizens of occupied Euro-
pean countries. Their wartime experience was involved with col-
laboration, genocide, heroic or tragic resistance, and everyday 
interactions with the enemy. British celebration may be sharply 
contrasted with the defeated people of Germany, who endured 
post-war expulsions, mass rape and looting, and the ‘occupation’ 
by American, British and Soviet forces. The significance of violent 
anti-Semitism and of the Holocaust, furthermore, infused Ger-
man memory with the crimes of participation, and the turpitudes 
of casual racism or wilful indifference to the plight of Jews. Bell 
points to the highly-charged Historikerstreit in Germany dur-
ing the 1980s, when leading German historians interrogated the 
role of the Holocaust in national history and memory.421 At one 
end of the argument, historians argued that the Holocaust was 
not the fault of most Germans then, and certainly not of younger 
 Germans since. Strangely, in a book about the Blitz, Bell avoids 
mention of the air raids on German and other European cities 
within her analysis of their cultures of memory. Since the 1980s, 
however, German historians and many other  commentators have 
increasingly focused upon the aerial bombardment of German 
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cities in order to disrupt notions of German guilt. The most blatant 
interpretations even implicate the Allies in a ‘holocaust’ against 
the German people, wherein memories can be recast within the 
context of German victimhood and suffering.
Commemoration and Remembering Air Raids in 
Germany
Acts of commemoration and remembrance in Germany have a 
controversial and contested history. In West Germany, for much 
of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the defeat in 1945 was reinterpreted 
as liberation, while the German post-1945 ‘economic miracle’ 
brought about an increasingly affluent and comfortable society. 
As we saw in chapter six, reconstruction led to a significant mod-
ernisation of the blasted and burned-out areas of German cities. 
While the memories of the terrible air raids lived on, much of the 
mnemonic landscape of destruction and despair was concreted 
over. The legacy of National Socialism and its ignominious defeat 
also haunted many who had participated in Nazi Germany and its 
war. In combination these points explain why the memorialisa-
tion of the Allied air raids remained problematic.
Following the end of the Second World War, the Cold War 
divided commemoration as it divided so many other aspects of 
German life. The Federal Republic of Germany (FDR) adopted 
an official version that the Nazi regime had caused the war, and a 
certain level of penitence was required for German actions during 
the conflict. Communist East Germany, by contrast, the home of 
Dresden and other heavily bombed cities, framed the devastat-
ing air raids of February 1945 as acts of American imperialism, 
supported by the lickspittle British, who now existed in a state 
of confrontation with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
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Commemorative insistence on the Anglo-American bombings as 
a war crime also served the communist regime’s presentation of 
the Soviets as liberators in 1945.422
A study of ‘the Allied war and urban memory’ compared 
the politics of memory in Kassel in West Germany with 
Magdeburg in the communist zone of occupation.  Kassel had 
been heavily bombed in October 1943 while Magdeburg was 
attacked in January 1945, a month before the Dresden bomb-
ings. Both cites experienced what Jörg Arnold has termed 
‘catastrophic rupture’ of both the landscape but also in the 
subjective memories of the citizens whose life stories were 
harshly interrupted by aerial bombardment. As Arnold makes 
clear, however, these air raids were not experienced in a moral 
vacuum beloved of revisionist interpretations but ‘by members 
of a brutalised society, whose hegemonic voice was Nazism, 
the very force that had been responsible for the unleashing of 
a world conflagration in the first place.’423 The spectre of ‘World 
Jewry’ was blamed for the bombing as opposed to the  honest, 
chivalrous Aryan victims of global treachery, and almost 
 immediately tropes of a much-beloved ‘home town’ wrecked by 
the British and Americans arose amongst the corpses and ruins 
that pervaded the town.424
In Kassel, following the war, the Gedentag or ‘day of memory’ 
of 22 October was mostly decontextualized and depoliticised 
by local political and religious leaders. During the 1950s and 
much of the 1960s they preferred to present the bombings in 
terms of  Christian forgiveness and reciprocity across borders. 
In  Magdeburg, by contrast, as in Dresden, the communist elites 
used the anniversaries of the air raids to mobilise sentiment not 
only against Nazism, but increasingly against the Anglo-American 
imperialist enemies of the Cold War.425
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Comparing the commemorations in Hamburg in  pre-unification 
West Germany and Dresden in East Germany, Claudia Jerzak 
draws out the different groups and actors that sought to com-
memorate the suffering and destruction wrought by the allies. 
These included the governments of West and East Germany, civic 
associations, and the church.426 In Dresden, the allied bombing 
was utilised by the communist regime to demonise the Americans 
as ‘imperialist war-mongers’ during the Cold War.427 The ‘Flor-
ence of the Elbe’ was viewed by its citizens and many other Ger-
mans as an ‘innocent city’ undeserving of attack, while Hamburg 
was presented as an open port city long associated with interna-
tional trade and a liberal political culture. A strong reluctance 
after the war to acknowledge the approval of National Socialism 
there during the 1930s permeated early post-war Hamburg.428 Yet 
in Hamburg the culture of commemoration from the late twenti-
eth century increasingly recognised German complicity in aerial 
warfare, and also sought to be more inclusive towards minority 
citizens, particularly Jewish groups who had suffered terribly 
from the mid-1930s to 1945.429 This may also partly reflect the 
wider tendency of the West German state to avoid nationalistic 
memorials to the Second World War after 1945.430
The reunification of Germany in 1990, however, began to erode 
the East-West distinction in the national memory of air raids. More 
tellingly, literary works encouraged German anger about hostile 
air raids in the Second World War, notably Air Raids and Culture 
(1999) by the German-born academic and writer W.G. Sebald, 
later translated into English as e Natural History of Destruction. 
He was heavily critical of what he saw as the collective amnesia 
of both the German post-war liberal establishment for their fail-
ure to acknowledge the Allied bombings.431 During the late 1990s 
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Sebald also gave a series of public lectures on the same theme, 
while the left-leaning novelist Günter Grass also deplored the 
scale and tragedy of the Allied bombings.432 The German cultural 
historian Annette Seidel Arpaci has made some withering criti-
cisms of Sebald, arguing that he contributed to the dubious con-
cept of the Bombenholocaust which gained currency in neo-Nazi 
and far-right circles in Germany, and with many members of the 
German public.433 Sebald wilfully drew upon Holocaust tropes, 
claiming the Allies were responsible for ‘German suffering’ which 
was on a scale compatible with the atrocities committed by the 
Nazis. Yet his key arguments about a complicit silence within 
the German elites were erroneous, while the extent of consent 
from millions of Germans to the Nazi war was under-explored. 
And in choosing to deploy such terms as ‘war of annihilation’ 
and ‘cultural invasion’ by Americanisation, Sebald was drawing 
upon familiar rhetorical phrases used by the Nazis against their 
enemies. His ‘universalised notion of trauma’, moreover, failed to 
properly weigh the anti-Semitism in wartime Germany and its 
terrible consequences.434 The South African social scientist Leo 
Kuper also argued that the deliberate bombing of the population 
of Dresden and in other large cities by incendiaries held equiva-
lence with genocide and was an undeniable war crime.435
Equating German suffering caused by air raids with the Holo-
caust was not a new idea, however. During the 1980s the Ameri-
can historian Earl R. Beck clumsily argued that the Allies ‘achieved 
holocaust’ in heavily bombed German cities.436 Beck was writing 
on the eve of the Historikerstreit, the dispute between German 
historians over the nature and legacy of the Nazi regime in Ger-
man history, and the place of the Holocaust in the remembrance 
of the past, and in contemporary German identity. Liberation 
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from a sense of shame and guilt was a key theme of the debates, 
leading to a striking media and public debate in West German 
society over the extent to which late twentieth-century Germany 
should accept or challenge an apologetic view of history. The 
Historikerstreit was less concerned with the Allied and German 
bombing campaigns, but it was sharply indicative of the shifting 
cultural attitudes towards the years 1933–45 in German history, 
and a growing aspiration towards a less black-and-white interpre-
tation of the recent past.
The controversy over commemoration resonated beyond aca-
demic and literary spheres. In 2002 the publication of e Fire  
(Der Brand) by the anti-establishment writer Jörg Friedrich 
fanned the flames of public anger about the mass  bombings of 
1943–5. Friedrich blamed the Allies for hundreds of thousands 
of unnecessary deaths and injuries. Serialised by a leading Ger-
man tabloid, e Fire  was calculated to stir the emotions, for 
example lambasting Winston Churchill as ‘the greatest child-
slaughterer of all time. He slaughtered 76,000 children’.437 
Friedrich’s follow-up offering Fire Sites contained gruesome 
photographs of charred and skeletal bodies in the charnel houses 
left by area bombing.438 Such visuals were deployed explicitly to 
evoke anger at the Allied bombing and pity for German victims. 
As Bill Niven has argued, e Fire  also ‘represented a radicalisa-
tion of GDR anti-Western rhetoric’, contributing to the grow-
ing notion in post-1990 Germany that the bombings were a war 
crime.439
Such sympathetic attempts to revaluate the historical commem-
oration of air raids over Germany in the Second World War led to 
some predictable responses in Britain and the USA. The left-lean-
ing Guardian newspaper carried a couple of articles in the wake 
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of the controversy engendered by the publication of e Fire  and 
Fire Sites that gave a qualified admission of British and American 
war crimes. An article in e Guardian  by the writer Ian Buruma 
sided with Friedrich claiming ‘London in the Blitz was dreadful; 
Hamburg was worse.’440
Similar perspectives were adopted by many German social-
ists and communists. As Schmitz has further argued, the Left 
student movement in late twentieth-century and early twenty-
first century Germany accepted the view that their grandpar-
ents were victims both of Nazism and of Allied atrocities. This 
‘belated empathy’ enabled the German student generations since 
the 1970s to emphasise victimisation, a seductive and indulgent 
position that fails to acknowledge wider issues such as complic-
ity.441 Endurance of mass bombing and the devastation to people 
and places has furthermore become woven into a narratives that 
interpret  Germany and Germans during the 1940s as a historically 
mistreated people, bombed blasted and burnt not into democracy 
but into the genocidal atrocities of mass expulsions and home-
lessness, and the widespread rape and looting witnessed at the 
end of the war and in its aftermath.442 Both Arnold and Tony Joel 
agree that the post-1968 student movement in West Germany and 
Western Europe more widely increasingly influenced the politics 
of memory culture away from culpability and condemnation of 
Nazism towards Allied conduct during the war.443
Yet this revisionist tendency struck a powerful chord with the 
German public. Many increasingly articulated long-held  feelings 
of anger towards the Allied bombing campaigns. Viewing the 
cumulative consequences of the air raids as a holocaust enabled 
Germans, even those with a dubious war record themselves, 
to adopt the pose of victimhood. This leads to the danger that 
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 privileging German suffering may obscure the verifiable causes 
of the war, and soften the lens when looking back on German 
genocidal and military atrocities during the Second World War. 
It also enabled Germans to challenge the notion of collective 
guilt for the war. As the Israeli historian Gilad Margalit shows, 
different stages of psychological coping with guilt and bereave-
ment can be identified in both East and West Germany, and in 
the unified Reich, following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Today, he 
argues, Germany has difficulty coming to terms with its guilt as a 
consequence of the growing popularity of cultural sentiments of 
suffering and victimisation.444 Margalit deplores the way in which 
German victims of air raids are depicted ‘in ways borrowed from 
the Jewish narrative of the Holocaust’ and the allocation of similar 
moral responsibility for war crimes to all political elites, despite 
their politics and global intentions.445 He argues the discourse 
of German suffering and victimhood was transmitted from one 
generation to the next, becoming part of German national 
identity during the early twenty-first century. This may have 
influenced the recent growth of anti-Americanism and of anti-
Semitism in Germany.446 Linde Apel is also suspicious of German 
victimhood, arguing that a key driver of its subjectivity is a desire 
to exonerate ‘ordinary’ Germans from the Holocaust and other 
atrocities.447
Friedrich, Sebald and others shared views disseminated by the 
far-right National People’s Party (NPD) in Germany, and neo-
Nazi fringe groups. They tried to turn the allied air raids into 
a ‘bombing holocaust’, a cynical manoeuvre to ‘depict the Ger-
mans as hapless victims.’448 Leaving wreathes on the graves and 
 memorials of the dead, and making their mostly unwelcome pres-
ence felt at commemoration ceremonies, NPD interventions have 
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inadvertently served to undermine German claims to  victimhood 
and unnecessary persecution. Such interpretations have been 
 fodder for more extreme positions on commemoration. There is 
also a rather shadowy web presence by a right-wing German outfit 
calling themselves justice4germans.com. One of their offerings on 
YouTube depicts the bombing of Dresden explicitly as an unnec-
essary and disproportionate attack, while failing to highlight the 
German air campaigns against Britain and other European coun-
tries. The Nazi Party, who brought the war upon Germany, is not 
mentioned.
German television also took up the theme of Allied bombing 
and its legacy for the Fatherland, reaffirming the media as visual 
and diverse channels for stirring up emotions. In 2006 the Ger-
man television channel ZDF broadcast an ‘authentic, emotional 
and moving’ two-part television-movie drama entitled Dres-
den.449 Influenced by Friedrich’s e Fire , it was hugely popular in 
Germany. The plot pursued an unlikely romantic affair between 
a downed British pilot and a German nurse. As Dietmar Süss 
argues, ‘the British-German history of the air war carries the bag-
gage of cultural memory in both countries’, and he views Dresden 
partly as an attempt at reconciliation between former enemies 
still conscious of wartime air aids.450 While an attempt to show 
that love could cross the most terrible of divides, the television 
drama reiterated themes in e Fire :
While the movie painstakingly tries to avoid any sim-
plistic reversal of moral positions and attempts to repre-
sent all perspectives from a point of empathy – German, 
British and Jewish – it ultimately relies on a distinction 
between ‘ordinary’ Germans and ‘evil’ Nazis that is redo-
lent of the 1950s. [This] is facilitated by the narrow fo-
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cus of the first two hours of the film on the love story 
between Anna, a nurse working in her father’s hospital, 
and Robert, a British bomber pilot who hides in the 
hospital cellar after his plane is shot down. The final 40 
minutes of high-production-value destruction, horror, 
suffering and mayhem caused by the bombing is thus 
visited upon a series of individuals, witnessed mainly 
through the eyes of the two main characters. This cre-
ates a sense of visual immediacy that decontextualizes 
the suffering, reducing it to a pure spectacle of horror.451
The horror of air raids, of course, was experienced no matter 
which country was suffering them, which may be why Dresden 
decontextualized the Allied bombings. The shared experience 
of bombing became the basis of reconciliation amongst former 
enemies.
Reconciliation and Commemoration Since the 
Second World War
In 1992 Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother, unveiled a fairly 
modest statue of Sir Arthur Harris outside the RAF Church of 
St Clement Danes in Central London. It was commissioned by 
the Bomber Command Association (BCA) in recognition of his 
achievements and the bravery and sacrifice of those who served 
under him. As Joel wryly observes, St Clement Danes still bears 
the scars of damage from wartime air skirmishes.452 The intention 
of the BCA had been to commemorate the RAF, rather than 
 glorify the death and destruction wrought upon Germany. But 
protestors who saw the bombing of Dresden as a war crime 
 gathered to disrupt the proceedings, to the extent the Queen 
Mother was struggling to be heard (See Fig 6).453
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In October of the same year, 1992, Queen Elizabeth II and her 
husband Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh, paid the first state 
visit to newly unified Germany, attending a reconciliation service 
in the Kreuzkirche in Dresden. The Mayor of Dresden Herbert 
Wagner campaigned against the statue in 1992, arguing it had no 
place in the Europe of the 1990s, and that the bombing of Dres-
den had been militarily unjustifiable.454 Three years later, during 
an event commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Allied 
bombing of Kassel, a heckler called out to the British ambassa-
dor, ‘Ambassador, when are you going to pull down the statue 
to Bomber Harris’? He then went on to shout about the absence 
of any permanent fixture to the memory of Herman Goering.455 
Unlike the fascist leader Goering, however, Harris was fight-
ing for democracy. Nonetheless, the event at Kassel was one of 
many episodes in the ‘media tumult’ that surrounded the statue 
to Bomber Harris.456 The protests, and also the notion of Germans 
as victims, attracted international attention. e New York Times, 
for example, viewed Dresden as symbolic of unjustifiable mass 
destruction.457 Surviving members of Bomber Command who 
had bravely flown over Germany, including Dresden, were upset 
at what they perceived as a lack of appreciation for the risks they 
and their dead comrades had taken.458
Yet attitudes began to soften. In June 2012 the memorial to 
Bomber Command was unveiled by Queen Elizabeth. This was 
another long overdue recognition of the bravery and sacrifice 
demonstrated by the aircrew who flew night raids over Germany 
during the Second World War. Surviving members of Bomber 
Command and relatives of those who were killed celebrated the 
memorial, and although there was some concern in Germany at 
the memorial, an acceptance that Britain deserved to honour its 
war dead prevailed, indicating further reconciliation between 
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Figure 9: The Bomber Command Memorial, Green Park Lon-
don. In addition to the 55573 air crew killed, the memorial also 
commemorates ‘those of all nations who lost their lives in the 
bombing of 1939–1945’. Hence it reflects the globalisation of 
memorialisation (photograph by author, 2018).
former enemies. It received less condemnation than the statue to 
Arthur Harris.459
During the war, even as beautiful old churches were reduced to 
ruins by air raids, many British Christian leaders had expressed 
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concerns about the Allied bombing of German cities. Once the war 
was over, Christian principles of forgiveness and reconciliation 
would surface sooner or later, to greater or lesser degrees, in 
 Britain and across Europe. Religion was thus a driver of reconcili-
ation. The ruins of the Frauenkirche in Dresden served a strongly 
similar purpose to the shell of the old cathedral in Coventry. And 
in 1959 Coventry was twinned with Dresden. During the 1960s, 
 Christians in both Coventry and Dresden worked for reconcili-
ation between Britain and Germany. Young Germans helped to 
build an International Centre for Reconciliation in the ruins 
of the old cathedral in Coventry, while young British believers 
assisted with repairs to the Frauenkirche.460 Local and national 
governments in the GDR however increasingly positioned the 
bombing of Dresden as one of many acts of American imperialist 
aggression that led to the Cold War. Every 13 February, ‘the day of 
remembrance or commemoration’ was an occasion not simply to 
remember and mourn the 25,000 victims of the Dresden bomb-
ing, but to stage demonstrations against the West. Every tenth 
anniversary was particularly charged with passion and anger 
towards the Allied bombings as an expression of hatred toward 
capitalism, but as Joel shows, the first post-Cold War day of mem-
ory in 1995, when Germany was no longer divided, posed hugely 
significant questions for national identity. The process of accom-
modating different political positions within Germany towards 
the Allied bombings while inviting once adversarial opponents to 
the commemorations was fraught with potential problems.
In 1995, on the fiftieth anniversary of the ending of the  Second 
World War, a service of Thanksgiving, Reconciliation and Hope 
was held at St Paul’s Cathedral, a symbolic act that came with 
commemorative memorabilia such as postal stamps depicting 
the cathedral surrounded by anti-aircraft searchlights.461 Both 
204 The Blitz Companion
St Paul’s and Coventry cathedrals are Anglican places of  worship, 
one razed to the ground by bombing, the other miraculously 
surviving. Despite the impossibility of knowing God’s will in the 
outcome of the war, the increasingly liberal establishment within 
the Church of England would come to suggest moral equiva-
lence between British and Nazi complicity in air warfare. In 2009 
the Bishop of Coventry, the Right Reverend David Cocksworth, 
apologised for the bombing of Dresden in February 1945. Speak-
ing at the newly rebuilt Frauenkirche, he deplored the violence 
visited upon both Coventry and Dresden, praised the two cities 
for their forgiveness, and looked forward to a future of hope and 
cooperation, and of course, peace.462 A further act of reconcilia-
tion and commemoration, modest yet moving, is the dedication 
by Frederick Taylor of his book on the bombing of Coventry to 
his dear departed friend, a teenage survivor of the 1945 raids on 
Dresden.463
In a passage that neatly links German memories of air raids to 
those in Japan, Joel argues that Dresden became ‘a highly visible 
memory politics asset’ for international peace campaigners. Its 
destruction served ‘as a warning and an obligation to pursue and 
promote world peace’ and to prevent an atomic ‘Euroshima’.464
Memorialisation and Commemoration in Japan
A complex welter of emotions, dominated by anger, grief and the 
physical and mental wounds from the atomic bombings emerged 
to dominate memorialisation of the air raids in post-war Japan. 
Yet tendencies for cultural self-condemnation and guilt were 
moderated by cultural and political pressures.465
The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki created consecutive 
phases of the grieving process for the many thousands who were 
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directly bereaved and deprived of their homes. The initial post-
war response to the attacks was rage, enabling the Japanese to 
view themselves as the victims of a terrible war deed. The humili-
ation of resounding defeat led to widespread revulsion towards 
the bombings but that anger had to be tortuously negotiated 
with the prevalence of denial about atrocities committed by 
 Japanese forces against unarmed civilians and uniformed com-
batants.466 Hence places of commemoration, beautifully designed, 
and accompanied by thoughtful interpretation and information, 
where reflection can be situated within a human response rather 
than one conditioned by nationalistic attributions of blame, can 
be such places to come to terms with the horror of aerial warfare. 
The Hiroshima Memorial Peace Park (HMPP) is the most famous 
site of memory in Japan. And together, Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
are the most powerful lieux de memoire in the world.
The visitor to the city of Hiroshima today cannot really avoid the 
reminders of those terrible events in August 1945. The Industrial 
Promotional Hall, which was situated beneath the hypocentre of 
the Atom Bomb, is now a poignantly preserved ruin labelled the 
‘Peace Dome’. A number of plaques mark the places where civil-
ians were incinerated. The Peace Dome is an essential but by no 
means the only symbolic and experiential space, connected as it 
is to the Hiroshima Memorial Peace Park in 1955. The opening of 
the HMPP on the tenth anniversary of the atomic bombings was 
an official or ‘top-down’ project. Designed by the leading Japanese 
architect Kenzo Tange, ‘it was a simple concept’:
The centrepiece was a long pavilion raised on Corbusian 
pilotis and set across the axis which connected the Me-
morial Monument, a saddle-like structure based on the 
Haniwa funerary house of the 3rd to 6th century AD, with 
the torn and melted Gembaku, or Atomic Dome.467
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The Pavilion was a fusion of both modern architecture with influ-
ences from Le Corbusier, and traditional motifs drawn from Japa-
nese culture.468 In a sense it encapsulates the modern-traditionalist 
tension in many other reconstruction projects, yet resolves them, 
unlike many other major undertakings. The HMPP has been the 
major national and international focus of remembrance of the 
victims of atomic bombing in Japan, drawing hundreds of thou-
sands of visitors every year.
Yet the emotional experience intended by interpretation boards, 
and the information and images offered at the Peace Park, has 
increasingly been questioned. It may sound strange to argue that 
a beautiful and moving memorial to those killed and affected by 
nuclear bombing and its aftereffects could be criticised, but the 
sensory and emotional experiences at the heart of the HMPP 
have been attacked by critics as manipulation, exercises in stimu-
lating American and Western guilt, de-contextualised from the 
bitter context of war in which the bombs were dropped.469
Ending all wars, as well as remembering victims of the atomic 
bombings, and in preventing another atomic cataclysm, merged 
to become combined intentions of the hibakusha. As Pierre Nora 
Figure 10: Peace Dome, Hiroshima (Photograph, Shutterstock.com).
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has argued, for sites of memory to even exist ‘there must be a 
will to remember’.470 The hibakusha themselves became increas-
ingly proactive in creating an apparatus of commemoration and 
memorialisation to those who had perished. Susan Southard 
argues in a chapter entitled ‘Against Forgetting’ that the hibaku-
sha of Nagasaki were motivated by an overwhelming desire to tell 
their stories in order that the world might learn from their terri-
ble ordeal and decommission the global arsenal of nuclear weap-
ons. Rage at the violence and pain done to them was certainly a 
powerful driving force, but so too was a strong sentiment of ‘rec-
onciliation not revenge.’ The bomb-affected survivors of Nagasaki 
formed organisations to deliver their message across Japan and to 
the world. As a way of reclaiming their history, they also fought 
for the repatriation from the United States of captured Japanese 
footage of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the immediate wake of the 
bombings. This was broadcast on Japanese television in 1968 but 
censored by the government to remove images of suffering.471
For one elderly and ill man in Nagasaki, bereavement was not 
simply about the loss of family and friends, although his emo-
tional pain was palpable. He was also grieving for the loss of his 
familiar landscape, for the homes and the community with which 
he was intimately associated until Fat Man wiped them away. He 
attempted to reclaim their lives from ‘the darkness of history; by 
remapping the community in which he had lived. Initiating a ‘res-
toration project’ that drew upon survivor memories to recreate 
the pre-August 1945 layout of the settlements in his valley, cem-
eteries were searched for names of those killed by the bomb; peo-
ple put names to homes, and homes to streets; they recalled where 
shops and public buildings were, and drew maps of remembered 
landscapes: ‘one house, shop, and ration station at a time’:
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they filled in a comprehensive map of Matsuyama-
machi, rendering back into historical existence the 
 immediate hypocentre area and nearly all of the people 
who had lived and worked there.472
Such commemorative work is an imaginative example of hibaku-
sha agency. There are also fascinating unconscious similarities to 
the mind-mapping urban research undertaken by Kevin Lynch. 
In his seminal work e Image of the City (1960), Lynch defined 
five elements that influenced individual perceptions of their sur-
roundings in the city they lived in. These were paths, for example, 
streets, roads, canals; edges, such as walls, streets, shorelines or 
spaces where people felt their community ended; districts which 
people entered into and out of during their everyday life; nodes, 
such as the town and city centres, where local people migrated to 
for regular or commonplace interactions; and external landmarks 
that served as common points of reference for all, such as moun-
tains and hills, or even the sun.473
Southard is disappointed that hibakusha testimonies have 
been mostly marginalised from the American war story, and 
points to the commemoration of the atom bomb raids at the 
Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum (NASM) in 
Washington DC as proof. During the late 1980s curators at the 
NASM began planning for an exhibition on the Enola Gay as 
a historically important military artefact. This led to lobbying 
from the Japanese who wished to include the consequences of 
the bombs on the hibakusha, and thence to a conundrum for 
the NASM curators who felt compelled to recognise the  bravery 
of the pilots. It proved impossible to achieve the acquired 
 balance to satisfy both American and Japanese audiences, so 
a pared down exhibit of the Enola Gay was presented to the 
public in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the atomic bombings. 
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Disappointment felt by the hibakusha was supported by some 
Americans who wanted the full story of the atomic bombs to be 
told in the exhibition. Other Americans, however, pointed to 
Pearl Harbor and the cruelty of Japanese hand-to-hand combat 
against civilians, to justify the exhibition, and through that, the 
bombings.474
Ultimately, sadly, the hibakusha have not accomplished their 
mission to rid the world of nuclear weapons. And while they 
have succeeded in helping to keep alive the flickering flames of 
anti-nuclear and anti-war movements, a significant irony perme-
ates their actions: the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction, 
and images and memories of the hell on earth that the hibakusha 
suffered, have served together in an unlikely alliance to prevent 
nuclear catastrophe.
Nonetheless, the simple fact that the message of the hibakusha 
was being heard around the world evidences what Zwigenberg 
terms ‘a global memory culture’, a truly international effort to pro-
mote memories of suffering to ensure that humanity never again 
imposes such suffering upon itself.475 As the Japanese-American 
cultural historian Yuki Miyamoto argues, reconciliation drove the 
attempts to internationalise the hibakusha experience, to ensure 
that nuclear catastrophe would never happen again.476 This is one 
theme amongst many in the NHK channel programmes about the 
hibakusha. NHK is the leading national public broadcasting chan-
nel of Japan, with a worldwide distribution via satellite television 
and the internet. One of its many programmes focused upon US 
journalist Henry Hersey’s early post-war book Hiroshima (1946), 
which told the stories of survivors of the bomb. Both regret and 
reconciliation coursed through the programmes. As a satellite tel-
evision channel, NHK has also helped to create a global memory 
culture.477
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Hence, the bomb survivors were not acting alone. Although 
they had formed collective self-help groups in both Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in the aftermath of the Second World War, their 
worldwide dissemination of commemoration and reconciliation 
messages was aided by some hugely influential organisations, 
including leading religious institutions, the Japanese govern-
ment, and the United Nations and the World Health Organiza-
tion, among the largest NGOs in the post-war world. The cause 
of the hibakusha was also taken up by pacifist movement such as 
the World Federalist Association (WFA) and the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND).478 Formed in Britain in 1957, the 
CND became a well-known pressure group in Western Europe, 
marching against nuclear research establishments and using the 
media to promote its cause.479 CND personnel have included 
many pacifists who have visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and 
propagated the cause of the hibakusha. Here is another reminder 
that sharp distinctions between state-led or top-down initiatives, 
and social-agency or bottom-upwards movements, are not always 
helpful. Equally importantly, it demonstrates how different agen-
cies and organisations can adapt a message of reconciliation for 
their own agendas.
The moral relativism of commemoration, that views all bomb-
ing raids and their victims as essentially state crimes, regardless of 
the nature of the state, and without due recognition of historical 
context, has increasingly attached itself to the commemoration of 
the Hiroshima-Nagasaki survivors. One unwitting expression of 
such relativism was the explicit connection between the atomic 
bombings and the memorialisation of Auschwitz, evidenced in 
the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace March during the early 1960s, 
as Cold War tensions rose sharply. This emanated from a genuine 
if sometimes naïve desire by four Japanese peace campaigners to 
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unite the different sites of commemoration that stemmed from 
the tragedies of the Second World War.480 Yet the equation of the 
atomic bombings with the deliberate industrialised incineration, 
gassing and torture of 6 million Jewish people by the Nazi regime 
was by no means convincing. And of course, both Germany and 
Japan were former Axis partners.
The politics of the hibakusha were by no means monopolised by 
the Left, and indeed the atomic bombings have also contributed 
Figure 11: Hibakusha Memorial Tree, 1967, Tavistock Square, 
London, another symbol of the global presence of hibakusha 
memorialisation in a world city (photograph by author, 2017).
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to a strong sense of victimhood coursing through Japanese mem-
ory culture. This is evident, for example, in the commemoration 
of the war dead, be they civilians or soldiers, cobblers or kamikaze 
pilots, at the Yasakuni Shrine in Tokyo. A place of worship for fol-
lowers of the Shinto religion, the shrine is also a space for a ‘dia-
logue with the dead’ rather than the apportionment of blame.481 
The Buddhist and Christian religions have tended to frame the 
atomic bombings in terms of forgiveness and reconciliation, 
but some in the Japanese Roman Catholic Church appropriated 
the atomic bombings as a message of punishment from God for 
sins committed on Earth. Equally troubling to the secular mind 
was the notion that bombings played a part in some Divine Plan 
for the ending of the war.482 In the Japanese fiction feature film 
Matouquin Nocturne (2007), the Fountain of Miracles at Lourdes, 
a sacred Catholic space, is abstractly juxtaposed with the sear-
ing apparition of light of the Nagasaki bombing. If spiritual tran-
scendence towards the afterlife is the message, no atheist will be 
convinced.
An international symposium held in Tokyo in the summer of 
1978 self-consciously drew upon the language of the Communist 
Manifesto, linking it with apocalyptic images of urban destruc-
tion in the call for an international decommissioning of nuclear 
weapons:
Women and men, young people and children of the 
world, unite! You have nothing to lose but the chains 
that bind you to the increasing armaments and war. Un-
less you break these chains, we may lose our jobs, our 
homes, our schools, our playgrounds, our culture, our 
civilisations, our world.483
Supported by UNESCO and the WHO, the symposium com-
prised pacifists and academics from many different countries, as 
Commemoration and Controversy 213
well as the victims of the bombings. It issued a powerful declara-
tion that ‘hibakusha should be made an international word and 
find its way into every language of the world.’484
For Miyamoto, as for Southard, the efforts of the hibakusha are 
still being ignored in the USA, where the discourse of the atomic 
bombings as ‘necessary’ has predominated.485 She argues that a 
wider failure to really listen to the voices of the hibakusha partly 
explains the disconnection between a nuclear arms-free world 
and the culture of memory. While this is mostly true, it is not 
the complete picture. The website miningawareness.com contains 
testimonies and actions by Japanese-American hibakusha who 
have tried to tell their story to the USA in recent years.486
Film and ‘Remembering’ the Atomic Bombings in 
Japan
In the episodes on Japan in the television series e World at War , 
fascinating newsreel and propaganda footage depicts everyday 
life on the Home Front, provides glimpses into the Air Raid Pre-
cautions. The episodes on Japan contain interviews with leading 
members of the Japanese wartime government, and with hibaku-
sha; talking heads of General Curtis LeMay and the pilots who 
dropped the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and documen-
tary, military and newsreel film of the conventional as well as 
atomic bombings of Japan.487
Beyond historical documentaries, some of the most powerful 
representations and carriers of memory of the atomic bombings 
have been Japanese movies. They tell stories of the hibakusha 
within a fictional frame, or use metaphor to remind their view-
ers and the world of the horrific nature and consequences of the 
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Looking at cinema,  moreover, 
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enables historians to explore ‘popular culture responses’ to the 
atomic bombings and their victims within the prevailing ‘politi-
cal, social, psychological and cultural milieu’ during the post-war 
decades.’488
During the American occupation and until 1952, Japanese films 
made about the events in August 1945 tended to treat them as a’ 
tragedy’, while in the West there was gathering criticism of them 
as an ‘atrocity’.489 Films such as e Bells of Nagasaki (1950), I’ll 
Never Forget the Song of Nagasaki (1952) and Children of Hiro-
shima (1952) reflected a sense of wistful realism: this is not how 
we would wish it to be, but how it is.490 e Bells of Nagasaki tells 
of the fate of the 10,000 Catholic hibakusha partly through the 
allegorical suffering of Christ, and the resurrection after the catas-
trophe.491
Once the Americans left, Japanese film directors became a 
little more critical of their nuclear legacy. In the science fic-
tion film Godzilla (1954), a sleeping prehistoric monster is 
awoken from millions of years of slumber under the seabed by 
 American atomic testing in the Pacific. Just like the bombs that 
fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the monster wreaks havoc on 
the environment, killing people indiscriminately, and devastating 
the Japanese metropolis. Godzilla was initially distributed by an 
American company, and edited to remove its anti-American and 
anti-nuclear messages. The version released by the BFI in 2005, 
however, is the original film, with the often crude anti- American 
sentiments re-introduced.492 The aforementioned Children of 
Hiroshima was directed by Shindo Kineto, whose concern for the 
atomic bomb survivors was also evident in the ironically-titled 
Lucky Dragon Number 5 (1958). This also dealt with the effects 
of radioactive contamination from American atomic testing, but 
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this time on a Japanese fishing boat, its fishermen and their haul. 
He also dealt with the theme of radiation-induced impotence in 
male hibakusha in Lost Sex (1966).
The theme of ‘remembering’, at the heart of commemora-
tion, forms the meta-narrative of the French film Hiroshima 
Mon Amour (1959). Written by Marguerite Duras and directed 
by Alain Resnais, who also made a film about the Holocaust, a 
multi-layered story focuses upon an affair during the late 1950s 
between a French actress in Hiroshima and a married Japanese 
architect whose family were killed in August 1945. She is acting 
in an anti-war film, but their relationship is troubled by memories 
of their haunted pasts – she had been in love with a German sol-
dier during the war – and images and flashbacks of the bombings. 
Hiroshima Mon Amour plays with the intensity and fragility of 
romantic attachment, the imminence of forgetting, and tragedy 
as possessing both a personal and global dimension. At one point 
the French actress declares ‘I’m forgetting you already’ as their 
relationship comes to its end. In another scene, the Museum in 
the Hiroshima Memorial Peace Park becomes a site of contested 
memory between the two lovers.
A key moment in the filmic representation and commemoration 
of the bomb-affected people was Black Rain (Kuroi Ame, 1967) 
originally a novel by Ibuse Masuji within the canon of gembaku 
bungako, or ‘atomic bomb literature’.493 Subsequently adapted into 
film by the renowned director Shohei Imamura, Black Rain (1989) 
depicts horrifying images of the death and injuries caused by the 
bomb. The title refers both to the filthy torrent of radioactive rain 
that falls upon the desolated landscape of Hiroshima and its vic-
tims during the fallout, and to the erosion of the lives affected 
by radiation sickness in the following decades. Set in the 1950s, 
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a beautiful young woman who had moved to Nagasaki prior to 
the bombing finds she has leukaemia. Her beauty declines as her 
health deteriorates.494 A key theme in both novel and film include 
the often difficult relationship between non-sufferers and the 
female hibakusha: some detested their own victimhood, while 
many unaffected people viewed the bomb victims as pathetic or 
shameful, and turned their eyes away from their appearance.
Possibly better known to Western audiences is the film Rhap-
sody in August (1994) an American-Japanese production starring 
Richard Gere. Directed by Akira Kurosawa, starring a mainly Jap-
anese cast, and released on the eve of the eve of the fiftieth anni-
versary of the bombings, the film was attacked by some movie 
critics, for example such as Leslie Halliwell, whose blunt unen-
thusiastic summary hardly does justice to the profundity of the 
issues:
A grandmother, prompted by her grandchildren and 
a visit from her Japanese-American nephew, recalls 
the death of her husband when the atomic bomb was 
dropped on Nagasaki.
A small-scale but ponderous plea for an understanding 
of the past.495
Its subject matter is directly within the canon of memorialisa-
tion, however. The film can also be interpreted as a genuine even 
cathartic attempt at reconciliation between Japan and the USA 
around the central figure of a female bomb survivor. The lead 
actor Richard Gere apologises to the grandmother for the trag-
edy inflicted upon her by the bomb. The grandmother also unwit-
tingly represents the gendered nature of interpretations of the 
suffering caused by the bombings. In Black Rain, Rhapsody in 
August, Women in the Mirror (2002) and in the television series 
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Yumechiyo’s Diary (1985) a popular Japanese television melo-
drama from the 1980s, women are at the centre of narratives of 
sorrow. In Yumechiyo’s Diary, for example, the central character 
is both a geisha and an atom bomb survivor, a beautiful woman 
whose life, in common with the young woman in Black Rain, 
ends prematurely as a consequence of irradiation. On one read-
ing, such films remind both Japanese and international film audi-
ences of the human stories, the seemingly-endless suffering of 
the heroic women survivors. But in another interpretation, the 
feminist cultural critic Mayo Todeschini argues that the declining 
beauty of Yumechiyo is insensitively handled, almost a mocking 
essay on the ephemerality of youth and female good looks. Hence 
within the context of atomic bomb memory culture, Black Rain 
and Yumechiyo’s Diary expose the often difficult relationship of 
vulnerable female hibakusha to the more conservative patriarchal 
cultural forces in Japanese society.496
Filmmakers rarely consulted the survivors when making their 
movies.497 This was not the case with the work of Kenji Nakazawa. 
Like Raymond Briggs he lived through the Second World War 
as a little boy, but in Hiroshima. Nakazawa authored the graphic 
novel series Barefoot Gen (Hadashi no Gen) first serialised during 
the 1970s republished thereafter, and later made into an anime 
film and a television series. Nakazawa was about a kilometre from 
the epicentre of the explosion. Protected from the searing blast 
by a concrete wall, he was not incinerated to death or torched 
into agonies as were so many of his school friends.498 His illustra-
tions are in the Japanese manga tradition, narrating stories over 
many frames, and relying heavily upon symbolism. The burning 
morning sun is a recurring motif, a comment on the flag of Japan, 
the Land of the Rising Sun, ruled over by a divinely ordained 
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Emperor. The sun is also a metaphor for the atomic conflagration, 
while the strong wheat underfoot, growing back after the devasta-
tion, symbolise survival and renewal.499 That the bomb that deto-
nated over Hiroshima was called Little Boy and that Nakazawa 
was a little boy is no coincidence.
Nakazawa’s father objected to the war and was attacked locally 
as a traitor before his death in August 1945. Nakazawa agreed 
with his father that ‘Japan had been stupid and reckless to start 
the war’.500 Such autobiographical details partly explain the hos-
tile responses to Barefoot Gen. As in Germany, Japan possesses 
no victorious myth of the Blitz which allows for a heroic and 
patriotic narrative of civilian behaviour during either the con-
ventional or the atomic bombings. The martial code of Japan, 
however, and powerful sentiments of militaristic nationalism, 
led to criticisms that Nakazawa was a traitor, dishonouring the 
dead and shaming the history of the Japanese military. Barefoot 
Gen was removed from the shelves of school libraries in 2013.501
Barefoot Gen is not the only manga about the effects of the 
A-bomb on children. A more recent and intensely powerful 
anime representation of life before the atomic bombings, In is 
Corner of the World (2016), is a beautiful anime film ‘remember-
ing’ how life was before the cataclysm, and how people coped 
with destruction and loss. Again, the centre figure was a young 
woman, Suzu, who moves to be with her husband’s family in the 
port city of Kure, Hiroshima. In common with Barefoot Gen, the 
ominous sight of bombers in the beautiful blue skies prefigures 
the tragedy to come. The film depicts the Japanese Home Front, 
including rationing, making-do-and-mending with fabric, air 
raid alerts and actual raids. The thriving city and the devasta-
tion that follows are symbolically contrasted in the central image, 
drawn by Suzu, of the Industrial Promotional Hall, now the Peace 
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Dome, before and after the attack. The emotional narratives cre-
ate a colourful, romantic and tragic imaginal representation of 
loss and survival, and a return to the themes of transient youthful 
beauty.
Remembering the Victims of Conventional 
Bombing in Japan
The focus on the nuclear attacks has tended to obscure the his-
tory and remembrance of the conventional bombings suffered by 
Japanese cities and their civilians in 1944 and 1945. Yet conven-
tional bombing killed many more people due to its sustained and 
intensive nature, and the firestorms it created.502 For those who 
were not there, wartime photography enables imaginal memories 
of the conventional bombings of Japan and its consequences. At 
the instruction of the Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police 
Department, and at great risk to himself, the police photographer 
Ishikawa Koyo ranged around the city during the Great Tokyo 
Air Raid in March 1945. His testimony bears strong similarities 
with survivors in many different countries, including vivid details 
of speeding fire trucks, wailing sirens, streams of people trying to 
run from the fires, charred corpses of women and children, and 
the gallant efforts of fire fighters. Koyo was caught up in a collaps-
ing building:
As the blizzard of sparks and embers blew down over 
me, I wondered how long I could last. I was prepared for 
death. But to die there like that without a struggle was just 
intolerable. [I] told myself I must not die. In that deadly 
whirlwind of flames, my police colleagues were still mak-
ing desperate efforts to save as many people as they could, 
under this fierce attack by the barbaric enemy.
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In the sky above, as if they were mocking us, the B-29s 
were still flying serenely through the black smoke at 
such low altitude that it seemed you could hold out your 
hand and touch them. [In] my fury at being unable to 
grab them and throw them to the ground, I yelled ‘You 
bastards! But no sound came from my mouth.503
In common with Bert Hardy in London, he was not going to let 
his fear get the better of him. The social historian Arthur Marwick 
Figure 12: Anti-war sculpture in the plaza of the Tokyo Metro-
politan Government Building, designed by Kenzo Tange. The 
inscription reads ‘An appeal for peace by the citizens of Tokyo’ 
(photograph by author, 2017).
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The Blitz Companion offers a unique overview of a century of aerial 
warfare, its impact on cities and the people who lived in them. It 
tells the story of aerial warfare from the earliest bombing raids and 
in World War 1 through to the London Blitz and Allied bombings of 
Europe and Japan. These are compared with more recent American 
air campaigns over Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
NATO bombings during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and subsequent 
bombings in the aftermath of 9/11. Beginning with the premonitions 
and predictions of air warfare and its terrible consequences, the book 
focuses on air raids precautions, evacuation and preparations for total 
war, and resilience, both of citizens and of cities. The legacies of air 
raids, from reconstruction to commemoration, are also discussed. 
While a key theme of the book is the futility of many air campaigns, 
care is taken to situate them in their historical context. The Blitz 
Companion also includes a guide to documentary and visual resources 
for students and general readers. 
Uniquely accessible, comparative and broad in scope this book 
draws key conclusions about civilian experience in the twentieth 
century and what these might mean for military engagement and civil 
reconstruction processes once conflicts have been resolved.
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